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Summary
Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the Convention on Nuclear Safety which was adopt-
ed on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic Conference. The Convention was ratiﬁed on 
5 January 1996, and it came into force in Finland on 24 October 1996. This report is the 
Finnish National Report for the Fourth Review Meeting in April 2008.
There are two nuclear power plants in Finland: the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The 
Loviisa plant comprises of two VVER units, operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy, 
and the Olkiluoto plant two BWR units, operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oy. The Loviisa 
units were connected to the electrical network in 1977 (unit 1) and 1980 (unit 2) and the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in 1978 and 1980, respectively. The nominal reactor thermal power 
of the Loviisa units is 1500 MW and of the Olkiluoto units 2500 MW. In addition, a new 
nuclear power plant unit is being constructed at the Olkiluoto site. At both sites there 
are interim storages for spent fuel as well as ﬁnal repositories for medium and low level 
radioactive wastes. Furthermore, Triga Mark II research reactor is operated in Espoo by 
Technical Research Centre of Finland.
In the report, latest large safety reviews and plant modernization programmes are ex-
plained in detail including safety assessment methods and key results. Safety performance 
of the Finnish nuclear power plants is also presented by using representative indicators. 
Finnish regulatory practices in licensing, provision of regulatory guidance, safety assess-
ment, inspection and enforcement are also covered in detail including some performance 
indicators. 
Major developments in Finland since the Third Review Meeting are as follows: relicensing 
of the Loviisa nuclear power plant in 2005–2007, development of regulatory practices such 
as development and updating of safety guides, and construction of the new nuclear power 
plant unit, Olkiluoto 3. The report also reﬂects operational safety issues and the recent 
developments in design, such as defence in depth and severe accident management issues. 
Latest development in the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is described.
In the report, the implementation of each of the Articles 4 and 6 to 19 of the Convention 
is separately evaluated. Based on the evaluation, the following features stressing Finnish 
safety management practices in the ﬁeld of nuclear safety can be concluded:
• The Finnish regulatory infrastructure including nuclear and radiation regulations is in 
compliance with the Convention obligations. During the recent years Finnish legislation 
and regulatory guidance have been further developed and the work is still going on tak-
ing into account international guidance such as IAEA standards. This work is important 
since the new nuclear power plant unit is under construction and also new units are 
considered in Finland.
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• The licensee practices in provision of good safety performance and in modernization 
of operating nuclear power plant units comply with the Convention obligations. The 
licensees have shown good safety performance and rigorous safety management prac-
tices in carrying out their safety related responsibilities in the operation and moderni-
zation of existing NPP’s. Periodic Safety Reviews of the Loviisa plant was carried out 
in 2005–2007 in connection of relicensing, and the periodic review will be completed at 
the Olkiluoto plant by the end 2008. During recent years, only minor operational events 
have been reported and analyzed and no major safety problems have appeared. The 
Operating License of the Loviisa NPP was extended in 2007 to correspond the current 
goal for the plant’s lifetime, which is 50 years.
• Safety assessment practices are continuous and living probabilistic safety assessment 
(PSA) practices are effectively used for the further development of safety. New risks 
such as oil transports in the Gulf of Finland have been identiﬁed and responded via the 
analysis and the corresponding safety related improvements are under planning in the 
Loviisa plant. The methods for qualiﬁcation of non-destructive testing and management 
of ageing have been developed further for responding to the needs of continuous safety 
development. The operating practices were reviewed at the Loviisa plant in 2007 by 
IAEA OSART mission.
• The regulatory practices comply with the Convention obligations. The resources of 
regulatory body have been increased to correspond the construction of the new plant in 
Finland.  The Construction License for the new plant unit in Olkiluoto was granted in 
2005. The regulatory guidance and practices have been further developed. The Finnish 
Technical Support organization, VTT, supports effectively regulatory body in the safety 
assessment work providing safety analysis capabilities and tools e.g. via the regulatory 
research programmes, and performing safety analyses.
• There are some issues requiring further development to enhance safety as discussed 
in the report. The issues are covered in Chapter 3 of the report, including provision for 
plant ageing, qualiﬁcation of non-destructive testing (NDT), reliability of digital auto-
mation and risk informed regulation as well as management of competence taking into 
account of retirement of large age groups. Other important issues cover new technolo-
gies, security arrangements and the growing need for new research and development 
programmes. However, these issues require international attention in all countries us-
ing nuclear energy.
The Third Review Meeting in 2005 identiﬁed some challenges and recorded some planned 
measures to improve safety in Finland. On request of the Review Meeting these issues 
are included and responded in this fourth national report of Finland. These items were (in 
brackets the articles, in which the issues are addressed):
• ageing of regulatory staff (see Article 8)
• maintaining competence  during extended retirement (see Articles 8 and 11)
• developing risk informed regulation (see Articles 7 and 8 and chapter 3)
• regulatory control of construction of the new Olkiluoto plant unit  (see Article 7)
• replacement of I&C at Loviisa NPP (see Annex 2)
• maintaining and enhancing safety culture (see Article 10)
• completing the NDT qualiﬁcation programme (see Article 14 and chapter 3)
• ageing management at Finnish NPPs (see Article 14 and chapter 3)
• renewal of operating licenses for Loviisa plant units 1 and 2 (see Article 6)
• Periodic Safety Review (PSR) for Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2 (see Article 6).
In conclusion, Finland has implemented the obligations of the Convention and also the 
objectives of the Convention are complied with.
STUK-B 80
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Finland signed on 20 September 1994 the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety which was adopt-
ed on 17 June 1994 in the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference. The Convention was ratiﬁed on 5 
January 1996, and it came into force in Finland 
on 24 October 1996. This report is the Finnish 
National Report for the Fourth Review Meeting in 
April 2008.
The fulﬁlment of the obligations of the 
Convention is evaluated in this report. The evalu-
ation is based on the Finnish legislation and regu-
lations as well as on the situation at the Finnish 
nuclear power plants. The reference is made to the 
IAEA Safety Requirements and other safety stand-
ards as appropriate. Finland is a Member State of 
the European Union. The regulations of the Union 
are in force in Finland. The EU regulations relate 
e.g. to radiation protection, but there are no regula-
tions pertaining directly to nuclear safety. When 
necessary, the Finnish legislation is modiﬁed to 
take into account the EU Directives.
In Finland, there are two nuclear power plants: 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The Loviisa plant 
comprises of two VVER units, operated by Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy (Fortum), and the Olkiluoto 
plant two BWR units, operated by Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy (TVO). The Loviisa units were connected 
to the electrical network in 1977 (unit 1) and 1980 
(unit 2) and the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 in 1978 
and 1980, respectively. The nominal reactor ther-
mal power of the Loviisa units is 1500 MW and 
of the Olkiluoto units 2500 MW. A Construction 
License of the new plant unit was granted by the 
Government in 2005 to Teollisuuden Voima Oy for 
constructing a Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) 
unit of nominal reactor thermal power 4300 MW at 
the Olkiluoto site (Olkiluoto 3).
There are intermediate spent fuel storage fa-
cilities and ﬁnal disposal facilities for low and 
1 Introduction
medium level radioactive waste at the Olkiluoto 
and Loviisa plant sites. The disposal facility at 
Olkiluoto was taken into operation in 1992 and at 
Loviisa in 1998. For taking care of the spent fuel 
ﬁnal disposal, a joint company Posiva Oy has been 
established by Fortum and Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy. Research, development and planning work for 
spent fuel disposal is in progress and the disposal 
facility is envisaged to be operational in 2020. The 
repository will be constructed in the vicinity of the 
Olkiluoto NPP site. To conﬁrm the suitability of the 
site, construction of an underground rock charac-
terisation facility was commenced in 2004. Finnish 
Parliament endorsed in 2001 a Decision–in–princi-
ple made by the Government for the implementa-
tion of Finnish Disposal Facility to the Olkiluoto 
site.
Finland observes the principles of the 
Convention, when applicable, also in other uses 
of nuclear energy than nuclear power plants, e.g. 
in the use of a research reactor. In Finland, there 
is one TRIGA Mark II research reactor (250 kW) 
situated in Espoo. The reactor was taken into op-
eration in 1962.
In the report, latest safety reviews and plant 
modernization programmes are explained in detail 
including safety assessment methods and key re-
sults. Safety performance of Finnish nuclear power 
plants is also presented by using representative 
indicators. Finnish regulatory practices in licens-
ing, provision of regulatory guidance, safety assess-
ment, inspection and enforcement are also covered 
in detail. 
Major developments in Finland since the Third 
Review Meeting are as follows: relicensing of 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant in 2005–2007, 
development of regulatory practices such as de-
velopment and updating of safety guides, and 
construction of the new nuclear power plant unit, 
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Olkiluoto 3. The report also reﬂects operational 
safety issues and the recent developments in 
design, such as defence in depth and severe ac-
cident management issues. Latest development in 
the various topics of the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety is explained.
The Third Review Meeting in 2005 identiﬁed 
some challenges and recorded some planned meas-
ures to improve safety in Finland. On request of 
the Review Meeting these issues are included and 
responded in this fourth national report of Finland. 
These items were (in brackets the articles, in which 
the issues are addressed):
• ageing of regulatory staff (see Article 8)
• maintaining competence during extended re-
tirement (see Articles 8 and 11)
• developing risk informed regulation (see Arti-
cles 7 and 8 and chapter 3)
• regulatory control of construction of the new 
Olkiluoto plant unit  (see Article 7)
• replacement of I&C at Loviisa NPP (see An-
nex 2)
• maintaining and enhancing safety culture (see 
Article 10)
• completing the NDT qualiﬁcation programme 
(see Article 14 and chapter 3)
• ageing management at Finnish NPPs (see Arti-
cle 14 and chapter 3)
• renewal of operating licenses for Loviisa plant 
units 1 and 2 (see Article 6)
• Periodic Safety Review (PSR) for Olkiluoto NPP 
units 1 and 2 (see Article 6).
In Chapter 2 of this report, the implementation of 
each of the Articles 4 and 6 to 19 of the Convention 
is separately evaluated. At the end of Chapter 2, a 
concluding summary on the fulﬁlment of the ob-
ligations of the Convention is presented. Main is-
sues requiring further measures to enhance safety 
are discussed in Chapter 3.
The fourth National Report is selfstanding and 
does not require familiarization with the earlier re-
ports. The text is based directly on the third report. 
The latest development is indicated in the report 
with clear time references where some report-
able development has taken place since the Third 
Review Meeting. The time period for the detailed 
description of the nuclear power plant and regula-
tory issues covers the latest ten year period that 
gives a clear picture on the nuclear safety related 
activities in Finland during one Periodic Safety 
Review timeframe.
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2 Compliance with Articles 4 and 6 to 
19 – Article–by–article review
2.1 Article 4. Implementing measures
Each Contracting Party shall take, within the 
framework of its national law, the legislative, 
regulatory and administrative measures and 
other steps necessary for implementing its ob-
ligations under this Convention.
Main regulations in the ﬁeld of nuclear ener-
gy are the Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, the 
Radiation Act and Decree, and the Decisions of 
the Government as well as the Regulatory Guides 
(YVL Guides) issued by the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK). The most essential safety 
regulations and guides are listed in Annex 1.
The legislative and regulatory measures to 
fulﬁl the obligations of the Convention were dis-
cussed in detail in the ﬁrst three reports. It was 
concluded that the Finnish regulatory framework 
fulﬁls the obligations of the Convention, and also 
the objectives of the Convention are complied with. 
The approach in Finland is a continuous fulﬁl-
ment of the criteria presented in the Articles of 
the Convention. Also, the approach of a continuous 
improvement of safety is manifested in the Finnish 
nuclear legislation (Decision 395/1991). This fourth 
report concentrates on the activities of licensees to 
fulﬁl the obligations of the Convention.
The time period for the description of the nu-
clear power plant and regulatory issues covers the 
last ten year period that gives a clear picture on 
the nuclear safety development in Finland during 
one Periodic Safety Review timeframe.
2.2 Article 6. Existing nuclear 
installations
Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that the safety of 
nuclear installations existing at the time 
the Convention enters into force for that 
Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as pos-
sible. When necessary in the context of this 
Convention, the Contracting Party shall en-
sure that all reasonably practicable improve-
ments are made as a matter of urgency to 
upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. 
If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans 
should be implemented to shut down the nu-
clear installation as soon as practically possi-
ble. The timing of the shut-down may take into 
account the whole energy context and possible 
alternatives as well as the social, environmen-
tal and economic impact.
2.2.1 Nuclear installations in Finland
In Finland, there are two nuclear power plants: 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. The Loviisa plant 
comprises of two VVER units that are operated 
by Fortum Power and Heat Oy, and the Olkiluoto 
plant comprises of two BWR units that are oper-
ated by Teollisuuden Voima Oy.
The Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
units were connected to the electrical network 
as follows: Loviisa 1, February 8, 1977; Loviisa 2, 
November 4, 1980; Olkiluoto 1, September 2, 1978; 
and Olkiluoto 2, February 18, 1980. The nominal 
thermal power of both of the Loviisa units is 1500 
MW (109% as compared to the original 1375 MW). 
The increase of the power level was licensed in 
1998. The Operating Licenses of the units are 
valid until the end of 2027 (unit 1) and 2030 (unit 
2). According to the conditions of the licenses, two 
intermediate safety assessments are required to be 
carried out by the licensee (by the end of the year 
2015 and 2023).
The nominal thermal power of both Olkiluoto 
units is 2500 MW, which was licensed in 1998. The 
new power level is 115,7% as compared to the ear-
10
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lier nominal power 2160 MW licensed in 1983. The 
original power level of both units was 2000 MW. 
The Operating Licenses of the units are valid until 
the end of 2018. According to the conditions of the 
licenses, the licensee shall carry out an intermedi-
ate safety assessment by the end of 2008.
At both sites there are fresh and spent fuel 
storage facilities, and facilities for storage and 
treatment of low and medium level radioactive 
wastes. Other existing nuclear installations in 
Finland are the ﬁnal disposal facilities for low and 
medium level radioactive waste at the Olkiluoto 
and Loviisa plant sites. The disposal facility at 
Olkiluoto was taken into operation in 1992 and at 
Loviisa in 1998.
In 2005, the gross production of Loviisa 1 was 
4260 GWh (gross) and the load factor was 95.4%. 
The annual refuelling and maintenance outage 
lasted 17 days. The gross production of Loviisa 
2 was 4275 GWh, the load factor 95.7% and the 
length of the refuelling and maintenance outage 
was 16 days. The annual collective radiation doses 
were 0.47 manSv and 0.34 manSv for Loviisa 1 and 
Loviisa 2, respectively.
In 2006, Loviisa 1 produced 4166 GWh (gross), 
the load factor was 93.3% and the refuelling and 
maintenance outage lasted 26 days. In 2006 the 
gross production of Loviisa 2 was 3958 GWh, the 
load factor was 88.6%, and the refuelling and 
maintenance outage lasted 36.5 days. The collec-
tive radiation doses in 2006 were 0.68 manSv for 
Loviisa 1 and 0.98 manSv for Loviisa 2.
In 2005, net production at Olkiluoto 1 was 7221 
GWh and the load factor 98,3%. The annual refuel-
ling and maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 1 lasted 
7 days. The net production of Olkiluoto 2 was 6997 
GWh and the load factor was 94,0%. The annual 
refuelling and maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 2 
lasted 21 days. The collective radiation doses in 
2005 were 0,36 manSv for Olkiluoto 1 and 1,74 
manSv for Olkiluoto 2.
In 2006, net production at Olkiluoto 1 was 6973 
GWh and the load factor was 93,8%. The annual 
refuelling and maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 1 
and lasted 22 days. The net production of Olkiluoto 
2 was 7294 GWh and the load factor was 96,9%. 
The annual refuelling and maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 2 lasted 8 days. The collective radiation 
doses in 2006 were 1,74 manSv for Olkiluoto 1 and 
0,23 manSv for Olkiluoto 2.
Figure 1 shows the load factors of Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPP’s during the last twelve year pe-
riod. Load factor describes the energy produced 
in comparison to the energy that could have been 
Figure 1. Load factors of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units.
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produced if the unit had operated at the nominal 
power during the whole period.
Construction License application was submit-
ted by TVO in January 2004 for constructing the 
ﬁfth nuclear power plant unit in Finland on the 
Olkiluoto site. The new unit, Olkiluoto 3 is a 1600 
MWe European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR), 
the design of which is based on the French N4 and 
German Konvoi type PWR’s. A turn key delivery 
is provided by the Consortium Areva NP and 
Siemens. The technical requirements for Olkiluoto 
3 unit were speciﬁed by using the European Utility 
Requirements (EUR) document as a reference. 
TVO’s speciﬁcations complemented the EUR main-
ly in those points where Finnish requirements are 
more stringent. STUK gave its statement on nu-
clear safety in January 2005 and the Government 
issued the Construction License on February 2005. 
Construction work is going on and the commercial 
operation is expected to be started in 2011.
During the years 1996–1998 the overall safety 
reviews of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants were 
carried out by the licensees and independently by 
STUK in connection to the renewal of operating 
licenses of nuclear power plant units. The safety 
documentation, including safety assessments done 
by both licensees, was submitted to STUK at the 
end of 1996. In addition to the review of the li-
censing documents such as Final Safety Analysis 
Report, STUK also made an independent safety 
assessment. The statements of STUK were given to 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry in March 1998 
(Loviisa) and in June 1998 (Olkiluoto). As regards 
radiation and nuclear safety, the main conclusions 
in the statements were that the conditions of the 
Finnish nuclear energy legislation are complied 
with.
The latest overall safety review of the Loviisa 
plant took place in 2005–2007 in connection of 
the relicensing of the operation of the plant (see 
chapter 2.2.2). As regards the Olkiluoto plant, 
the comprehensive periodic safety review will be 
completed by the licensee by the end of 2008 (see 
chapter 2.2.3).
In Finland, the continuous safety assessment 
and enhancement approach is presented in the 
nuclear legislation. Decision (395/1991) states that 
operating experience from nuclear power plants as 
well as results of safety research shall be system-
atically followed and assessed. For further safety 
enhancement, actions shall be taken which can be 
regarded as justiﬁed considering operating experi-
ence and the results of safety research as well as 
the advancement of science and technology. The 
implementation of safety improvements has been a 
continuing process at both Finnish nuclear power 
plants since their commissioning and there ex-
ists no urgent need to upgrade the safety of these 
plants in the context of the Convention. Recently 
implemented and ongoing safety upgrading meas-
ures, mostly related to the mitigation of severe ac-
cidents at the nuclear power plants, are described 
in this report.
The large plant modernization and power up-
rating projects in the Finnish nuclear power plants 
at the end of 90’ies are described in Annex 2. Also 
plant modiﬁcations carried out during recent years 
are included in the Annex 2.
In addition to the regulatory safety assess-
ment, there have been independent safety reviews 
conducted by international organizations such 
as IAEA and WANO. IAEA OSART (Operational 
Safety Review Team) missions have been organ-
ized at both of the Finnish nuclear power plants, 
at Olkiluoto in March 1986 and at Loviisa in 
November 1990. The IAEA OSART visited Loviisa 
NPP again during 3–21 March 2007 (see chapter 
2.6.2). The WANO safety reviews at both Finnish 
nuclear power plants have been carried out at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant at the end of 1999 
and during the year 2006 as well as at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant at the beginning of 2001.
2.2.2 Extension of Operating License 
of Loviisa NPP in 2007
The Finnish Government granted in July 2007 to 
Fortum new licenses for the following:
• Operating licence until 31 December 2027 for 
reactor unit Loviisa 1
• Operating licence until 31 December 2030 for 
reactor unit Loviisa 2
• Operating licence for other buildings and fa-
cilities and their extensions in the plant area 
necessary for the operation of the plant until 31 
December 2030
• Licence for the possession of maximum 1100 
tonnes of uranium in spent nuclear fuel, 3000 
cubic meters of solid low and intermediate level 
nuclear waste and 2400 cubic meters of low and 
intermediate level liquid nuclear waste.
12
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The length of the operating licences corresponds 
to the current goal for the plant’s lifetime, which 
is 50 years. The contents of the operating license 
application were:
• Operating licence application including 12 ap-
pendices (13 documents, 200 pages)
• Documentation for STUK according to Nuclear 
Energy Decree (10 documents, 70 pages)
• Periodic Safety Review of the plant for STUK 
(43 documents, 700 pages).
The application was addressed to the 
Government and was handled by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry. Fortum ﬁled the application 
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry in November 
2006.
Legislative and regulative requirements for the 
application of the operating licence are described 
in the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) Sections 
33, 34, 36 and in the Guide YVL 1.1 Regulatory 
control of safety at nuclear facilities.
The Loviisa plant is reaching its original de-
sign age in 2007-2010, but the technical and eco-
nomical lifetime of the plant is estimated to be at 
least 50 years according to the current knowledge 
of the plant ageing. Due to consistent plant im-
provements, the safety level of the plant has been 
increased as shown by the probabilistic safety 
analysis (PSA).
For continued safe operation, plant improve-
ment projects are still necessary. The largest on-
going investment is the complete renewal of the 
plant automation system, which is scheduled to 
be completed by 2014. Plant lifetime management 
includes credible procedures for following the plant 
ageing. The conditions of components which are 
practically impossible to be replaced by new ones 
(pressure vessel, steam generators, etc.) are moni-
tored most actively.
Based on application, STUK carried out a com-
prehensive review of the safety of the Loviisa 
plant. The review was completed in July 2007 when 
STUK provided the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
with it’s statement on the safety of the plant.
2.2.3 Periodic safety review at 
Olkiluoto NPP in 2008
The operating licence for Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2, requires that a comprehensive safety 
review (PSR) shall be carried out by the end of 
2008. The operating licence also covers the interim 
storage facilities for spent fuel and medium and 
low activity operational waste, so these facilities 
are included in the PSR. The PSR will be submit-
ted to STUK for approval. TVO started prepara-
tions for the PSR in 2004.
Regulatory guide YVL 1.1 speciﬁes the contents 
of the PSR. For a separate periodic safety review, 
STUK shall be provided with similar safety-related 
reports as in applying for the operating licence. The 
PSR is mainly based on the documents referred to 
in Section 36 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. These 
documents shall be continuously updated, and the 
updated versions shall be submitted to STUK. The 
PSR will include a summary of the most signiﬁcant 
changes to the documents after the granting of the 
operating licence and a description of the docu-
ments’ updating status.
The PSR shall also contain an assessment of 
the safety status of the nuclear facilities, potential 
areas of development and maintenance of safety. 
This assessment shall include the following docu-
ments:
• with respect to nuclear power plants, a report 
on the fulﬁlment of the requirements laid down 
in the Decisions 395–397/1991 and in the rel-
evant regulatory guides, and, correspondingly, 
with regard to other nuclear facilities, a report 
on fulﬁlment of the requirements set in the reg-
ulatory guides concerning the nuclear facility in 
question. Work is going on to replace the Deci-
sions by corresponding Government Decrees. 
These will be taken into account in the PSR.
• a summary of the renewed safety analyses and 
conclusions drawn from their results. Several 
analyses in the FSAR will be updated.
• experience of the facility ageing and ageing 
management
• a description of the licensee’s safety culture and 
safety management
• with respect to nuclear power plants, a report 
on the actions required in Section 27 of Decision 
395/1991 and on the consequent plant improve-
ments. Here operating experiences in Finland 
and abroad and results of safety research are 
taken into account.
• a report on compliance with any terms of the 
operating licence
• a summary of fulﬁlment of the requirements 
laid down in Section 20 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act.
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The report on the safety culture will include the 
assessment methods, conclusions from the current 
status and effects within the operating licence pe-
riod, and the measures aimed to upgrade the safety 
culture. In assessing and upgrading the safety cul-
ture, the expertise acquired in both organizational 
studies and practical nuclear safety shall be put to 
good use.
When making the PSR, TVO will verify that the 
safety factors proposed in the IAEA’s PSR guide 
NS-G-2.10 have been taken into account to a suf-
ﬁcient degree.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 6.
2.3 Article 7. Legislative and 
regulatory framework
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish 
and maintain a legislative and regulatory 
framework to govern the safety of nuclear 
installations.
2. The legislative and regulatory framework 
shall provide for:
i. the establishment of applicable nation-
al safety requirements and regulations;
ii. a system of licensing with regard to nu-
clear installations and the prohibition 
of the operation of a nuclear installa-
tion without a licence;
iii. a system of regulatory inspection and 
assessment of nuclear installations to 
ascertain compliance with applicable 
regulations and the terms of licences;
iv. the enforcement of applicable regu-
lations and of the terms of licences, 
including suspension, modiﬁcation or 
revocation.
2.3.1 Legislative and regulatory framework
In Finland, current nuclear legislation is based on 
the Nuclear Energy Act from 1987, together with a 
supporting Nuclear Energy Decree from 1988. The 
scope of this legislation covers e.g.
• the construction and operation of nuclear fa-
cilities; nuclear facilities refer to facilities for 
producing nuclear energy, including research 
reactors, facilities for extensive disposal of nu-
clear wastes, and facilities used for extensive 
fabrication, production, use, handling or storage 
of nuclear materials or nuclear wastes
• the possession, fabrication, production, transfer, 
handling, use, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear materials and nuclear wastes 
as well as the export and import of ores and ore 
concentrates containing uranium or thorium.
The current radiation legislation is based on the 
Radiation Act and Decree, both of which are from 
1991 and take into account the ICRP Publication 
60 (1990 Recommendations of the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection). Section 2, 
General principles, and Chapter 9, Radiation work, 
of the Act are applied to the use of nuclear energy.
Based on the Nuclear Energy Act, the 
Government issued in 1991 the following regula-
tions:
• General regulations for the Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants (395/1991)
• General regulations for Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Power Plants (396/1991)
• General regulations for Emergency Response 
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(397/1991)
• General regulations for the Safety of a Disposal 
Facility for Reactor Waste (398/1991).
The Decisions 395/1991, 396/1991 and 397/1991 
are applied to a nuclear power plant which is de-
ﬁned to be a nuclear facility equipped with a nu-
clear reactor and intended for electricity genera-
tion, or if such or other nuclear facilities have been 
placed on the same site, the entity of facilities 
formed by them. The regulations are also applied 
to other nuclear facilities to the extent applicable. 
In 1999, a further Government Decision (478/1999) 
was issued to give the “Regulations for the Safety 
of Disposal of Spent Fuel”.
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2003 
to establish funding for nuclear safety research. 
The objective of this arrangement is to ensure the 
high level of national safety research and to main-
tain the national competence in the long run. The 
amendment established funding for nuclear waste 
safety research, respectively. In addition to the 
national research programmes funded mainly by 
the above arrangement, the nuclear utilities and 
the nuclear waste management company Posiva 
Oy carry out and ﬁnance R&D programmes to 
support their own activities. More than half of 
the industry’s R&D efforts are devoted to nuclear 
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waste management. Furthermore, STUK orders 
contracted research to support their independent 
reviews of licensing applications.
Some other minor amendments were also made 
in nuclear and radiation legislation to reﬂect 
changes of other legislation (labour safety, criminal 
code). Amendments in other national legislation 
have not caused essential changes to the regula-
tory control of NPPs nor to the safety requirements 
set for them.
It is assumed that the amendment will set 
in force in the beginning of 2008. Based on the 
amendment also the Nuclear Energy Decree and 
all above mentioned General regulations of the 
Government will be revised.
An amendment to the Nuclear Act is under 
preparation. The main purpose is to present the 
principal safety regulations at the level of Act.
As a result of the successful international 
negotiations to update the Paris and Brussels 
Conventions on Nuclear Liability also the Finnish 
Nuclear Liability Act has been under review by 
a special governmental committee. The ﬁnancial 
provisions to cover the possible harms of a nu-
clear accident have been arranged according to 
the Paris and Brussels Conventions. A remarkable 
increase in the sum available for compensation of 
nuclear damages is expected in the near future 
since international negotiations about the revision 
of the Paris/Brussels agreements on nuclear liabil-
ity were completed in 2004. In addition, Finland 
has decided to enact unlimited licensee liability by 
law. This means, that insurance coverage will be 
required for a minimum amount of EUR 700 mil-
lion and the liability of Finnish operators shall be 
unlimited in cases where nuclear damage has oc-
curred in Finland and the third tier of the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention (providing cover up to 
EUR 1.5 billion) has been exhausted. The revised 
law will also have some other improvements, like 
extending the claiming period up to 30 years for 
victims of nuclear accidents. The law amendment 
(2005) has not taken effect yet. It will enter into 
force at a later date as determined by government 
decree. The entering into force of the amending 
act will take place as the 2004 Protocols amending 
the Paris and Brussels Conventions will enter into 
force.
2.3.2 Provision of regulatory guidance
Detailed safety requirements are provided by 
STUK in the YVL Guides. YVL Guides also pro-
vide administrative procedures for regulation of 
the use of nuclear energy. YVL Guides are rules 
an individual licensee or any other organisations 
concerned shall comply with, unless some other ac-
ceptable procedure or solution has been presented 
to STUK by which the safety level laid down in 
an YVL Guide is achieved. The procedure to apply 
new guides to existing nuclear facilities is such 
that the publication of an YVL Guide does not, as 
such, alter any previous decisions made by STUK.
After having heard those concerned, STUK 
makes a separate decision on how a new or revised 
YVL Guide applies to operating nuclear power 
plants, or to those under construction, and to licen-
see’s operational activities. To new nuclear facili-
ties, however, the guides apply as such.
The regulatory guides are being continuously 
re-evaluated for updating. After the Decision-in-
principle was made in 2002 for the new unit, STUK 
established a special plan to update the most 
relevant guides related to the design and construc-
tion of a new reactor. Publication of new updates 
is described in Figure 2. Most of the planned YVL 
Guide updates were issued during 2002–2003 prior 
the Construction License application. The current 
list of regulations and regulatory guides is pro-
vided in Annex 1.
Relating to the next amendment of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (see chapter 2.3.1), the regulatory 
guide system will be reviewed. This project has 
been scheduled to be completed in 2011.
Figure 2. Recently published new updates of regula-
tory YVL Guides
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2.3.3 System of licensing
The licensing process is deﬁned in the legislation. 
The construction and operation of a nuclear facil-
ity is not allowed without a license. The licenses 
are granted by the Government. The conditions for 
granting a license are prescribed in the Nuclear 
Energy Act.
Before a Construction License for a nuclear 
power plant, nuclear waste disposal facility, or 
other signiﬁcant nuclear facility can be applied, a 
Decision-in-principle by the Government is needed. 
A condition for granting the Decision-in-principle 
is that the operation of the facility in question is 
in line with the overall good for society. Further 
conditions are as follows:
• the municipality of the intended site of the 
nuclear facility is in favour of constructing the 
facility
• no factors indicate a lack of sufﬁcient prereq-
uisites for constructing the facility according 
to the Nuclear Energy Act: the use of nuclear 
energy shall be safe; it shall not cause injury to 
people, or damage to the environment or prop-
erty.
The coming into force of the Decision-in-principle 
further requires that it will be conﬁrmed by the 
simple majority of the Parliament. The Parliament 
can not make any changes to the Decision, it can 
only approve it or to reject it as it is. The parties 
involved in the Decision-in-principle process and 
their tasks are described in Figure 3. This proce-
dure was applied during the period November 2000 
– May 2002 when Teollisuuden Voima Oy applied 
a Decision-in-principle for the ﬁfth NPP unit in 
Finland and the Government approved it and the 
Parliament conﬁrmed the approval (see chapter 
2.13.1).
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has ﬁled an applica-
tion for Construction License to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry in January 2004. Construction 
License documents to be submitted to STUK for ap-
proval in this phase are deﬁned in Nuclear Energy 
Decree § 35. After receiving all statements for the 
Construction License application, the Government 
made its decision in February 2005.
In accordance with Section 108 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, the different phases of construction 
of a nuclear facility may be begun only after STUK 
has, on the basis of the Construction License docu-
ments and other detailed plans and documents it 
requires, veriﬁed in respect of each phase that the 
safety-related factors and safety regulations have 
been given sufﬁcient consideration.
Review of the designs of structures and equip-
ment can be begun after STUK has found that the 
Figure 3. Licensing of nuclear facilities in Finland.
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system-level design data of the system concerned 
are sufﬁcient and acceptable. This assessment may 
take place as part of the review of the Preliminary 
Safety Analysis Report or separate system-speciﬁc 
descriptions, which are subsequently added to the 
Final Safety Analysis Report.
In accordance with Section 109 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, STUK oversees the construction of 
the facility in detail. The purpose is to ensure that 
the safety requirements, regulations for pressure 
equipment and approved plans are complied with 
and that the nuclear facility is constructed in other 
respects in accordance with the regulations. In par-
ticular, the oversigth is aimed to verify that work-
ing methods ensuring high quality are employed 
for the construction.
Before loading fuel into the reactor, an 
Operating License has to be granted. For the 
Operating License application, the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry asks STUK’s statement on 
safety. Operating License documents to be submit-
ted to STUK for approval in this phase are de-
ﬁned in Nuclear Energy Decree § 36. After receiv-
ing all statements for the Operating License, the 
Government will make its decision.
The Operating Licenses are granted for a lim-
ited period of time. This period has been at the 
beginning ﬁve years and then about ten years. The 
periodic re-licensing has allowed good opportuni-
ties for a comprehensive, periodic safety review. 
Current operating licenses of the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto units are valid for about 20 years, but 
intermediate safety assessments are required as a 
condition of the licenses.
2.3.4 System of regulatory inspection 
and assessment
The legislation also provides the regulatory control 
system for the use of nuclear energy. According to 
Nuclear Energy Act, STUK is responsible for the 
regulatory control of the safety of the use of nuclear 
energy. The rights and responsibilities of STUK are 
provided in the Nuclear Energy Act. Safety review 
and assessment as well as inspection activities are 
covered by the regulatory control.
Oversight during operation
The current periodic inspection programme of 
STUK for operating nuclear power plants was es-
tablished in 1998 and consists of altogether 30 
separate inspections. This programme replaced the 
former programme that had been in place for about 
10 years. The current programme is focused on 
licensee main working processes and is considered 
to cover the most relevant areas of nuclear pow-
er plant safety. The programme has three levels: 
safety management, main working processes and 
activities in different organisational and techni-
cal areas. The objective of the inspection process 
is to assess the safety level at the plants as well 
as safety management. Possible problems at the 
plants and in procedures of the operating organisa-
tions are to be recognised. Special emphasis has 
been put on the management of the entire inspec-
tion programme, including the timely conduct and 
accurate reporting of results.
The experience of the current programme has 
been good. Some development areas such as en-
hancement of the longterm planning and report-
ing of the inspection programme were identiﬁed 
during the International Regulatory Review Team 
(IRRT) mission to Finland in 2003. STUK is also 
developing Risk Informed Regulation practices. 
These include among others use of PSA for plan-
ning regulatory inspections to focus inspections on 
risk signiﬁcant areas. It also includes assessment 
of inspection ﬁndings by PSA.
In addition to the periodic inspection pro-
grammes, STUK conducts ad-hoc inspections if 
seen necessary. In the past, these have mainly 
related to operating event investigations (both 
domestic and international events), but they have 
been carried out also on the consequences of the 
development of science and technology.
Review of operational events by STUK is done 
basically at three different levels. First step is to 
perform a general review of all operational events, 
transients and reactor scram reports, which the 
licensees submit for information to STUK. The 
second level activities are related the clariﬁcation 
of events at site and ﬁling events’ speciﬁc data into 
the event register database of STUK. This is done 
for the events which meet the set criteria for the 
operator to submit a special report to STUK for 
approval. Numbers of operational events in differ-
ent categories are followed through STUK’s plant 
performance indicator system. Risk signiﬁcance 
of operational events is followed by PSA based 
indicators. The third step in operational event as-
sessment performed by STUK is to assign STUK’s 
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own investigation team for events deemed to have 
special importance, especially when the licensee’s 
organisation has not operated as planned. It is 
also possible to nominate an investigation team to 
investigate a number of events together in order 
to look for possible generic issues associated with 
the events. In addition, investigations may relate 
to domestic or international events. These inspec-
tions are usually conducted by a leadership of the 
event investigation manager, and an investigation 
team includes normally 2–3 experts from STUK 
nominated on case-by-case basis.
E.g. in 2002, STUK investigated two events. 
At the beginning of 2002 STUK launched its own 
investigation team to address the course of events 
and the utility actions in connection with degrada-
tion of turbine control and fast shutdown valves at 
Olkiluoto 2. During this event the utility made a 
temporary turbine protection system modiﬁcation 
at full power, which raised a concern by STUK. 
The investigation of the event was mainly targeted 
on the safety culture of the utility, including deci-
sion making and relations and communication 
between different parts of the organisation. The 
other investigation in 2002 addressed the course 
of events and the utility procedures and actions 
in connection with neglected license applications 
for non-destructive testing organisations and their 
personnel, and non-compliances in approval appli-
cations for in service inspection programs as well 
as qualiﬁcation of inspection systems. During the 
period 2003–2006 there has been no investigations 
concerning the operating power plant units. In 
2006, one investigation was carried out relating to 
Olkiluoto 3 (see below).
Oversight during construction
In accordance with Section 109 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, STUK oversees the construction of 
the facility in detail. Oversight consists of inspec-
tions within the frame of Construction Inspection 
Programme and inspections on manufacturing and 
construction of systems, structures and compo-
nents important to safety. In addition, STUK has 
two resident inspectors overseeing the construc-
tion, installations and commissioning work at the 
Olkiluoto site.
To oversee the licensee’s performance during 
construction, STUK has established a Construction 
Inspection Programme. The purpose of STUK’s 
Construction Inspection Programme is to verify 
that the operations of the licensee ensure high-
quality construction and implementation in ac-
cordance with the approved designs while comply-
ing with the regulations and ofﬁcial decisions. The 
Construction Inspection Programme is divided into 
two main levels: the upper level assesses the licen-
see’s general operations to construct the facility, 
such as project management and resources man-
agement, organisation, dealing with safety matters 
and consideration of safety in management proce-
dures, the licensee’s expertise and use of expertise 
and project quality management. The next level, 
known as the operation level, assesses e.g. project 
quality assurance, training of the operating per-
sonnel, inspection procedures, utilization of the 
PSA, document management, radiation safety, and 
system, structure and component-speciﬁc reviews 
and inspections in the various ﬁelds of technology. 
Furthermore, the emergency response arrange-
ments during construction, physical protection, ﬁre 
protection and nuclear waste treatment are sub-
jects of the Construction Inspection Programme 
as far as the scope STUK considers necessary. In 
addition to the above-mentioned inspections, of 
which the licensee is informed in advance, STUK 
carries out inspections without prior notice at its 
discretion.
STUK performs inspections on manufacturing 
and construction of buildings, concrete and steel 
structures, and components as speciﬁed in YVL 
Guides. In addition, STUK performs inspections on 
installation and commissioning of systems, struc-
tures and components. The safety class of systems, 
structures and components is taken into account 
when determining the scope of inspections. On the 
licensee’s application, STUK may approve a sepa-
rate testing and inspection organization to carry 
out speciﬁed control duties.
In March, 2006, STUK appointed an investiga-
tion team to assess compliance with safety require-
ments in the construction of Olkiluoto 3. STUK had 
noticed that the management of organisations par-
ticipating in the construction did not fully comply 
with STUK’s expectations concerning good safety 
culture. The objective of the investigation team was 
to make an evaluation of the practices of TVO and 
the Turn Key Supplier in the light of three case 
studies selected as examples. The example cases 
were the concreting of the base slab, the manufac-
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turing of the steel liner for the reactor inner con-
tainment, and the selection of the manufacturer as 
well as the start of the design process for the polar 
crane and the material hatch in the containment. 
Furthermore, the investigation team examined 
why the regulatory oversight of STUK had not pre-
vented the observed problems. In its report (July 
2006), the investigation team stated that the major 
problems involved project management, in particu-
lar with regard to construction work, but not nu-
clear safety. The power plant vendor had selected 
subcontractors with no prior experience in nuclear 
power plant construction. These subcontractors 
had not received sufﬁcient guidance and supervi-
sion to ensure smooth progress of their work. In its 
report, the investigation team emphasised work-
ing practises that would comply with good safety 
culture. It is important what kind of attitude to the 
safety is taken and how it is implemented in work-
ing practices. The investigation team provided rec-
ommendations both to TVO (10) and the Turn Key 
Supplier (11). Furthermore, there was also room 
for recommendations (7) for improvement in the 
practices of the regulatory body. TVO and the Turn 
Key Supplier prepared a detailed action plan in 
response to the recommendations. It was sent for 
STUK’s approval in fall 2006. Particular attention 
was paid to identify corrective measures to address 
the problems experienced in subcontractors’ guid-
ance and supervision. The action plan aimed for 
making the project-related responsibilities clearer, 
increasing the level of supervision, and improving 
the guidance and instructions provided. The action 
plan was approved by STUK. In its decision, STUK 
emphasised that the project management exper-
tise is a major issue, and that continued attention 
must be paid to it.
2.3.5 Enforcement
The Nuclear Energy Act deﬁnes the enforcement 
system and rules for suspension, modiﬁcation or 
revocation of a licence. The enforcement system in-
cludes provisions for executive assistance if needed 
and for sanctions in case the law is violated. The 
enforcement tools and procedures of regulators are 
considered to fully meet the needs. The repertoire 
of these tools together with some practical exam-
ples for implementing them has been presented 
in an internal policy document as part of STUK’s 
Quality System (2003).
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 7.
2.4 Article 8. Regulatory body
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or 
designate a regulatory body entrusted with 
the implementation of the legislative and 
regulatory framework referred to in Article 
7, and provided with adequate authority, 
competence and ﬁnancial and human re-
sources to fulﬁl its assigned responsibili-
ties.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure an effective sepa-
ration between the functions of the regula-
tory body and those of any other body or or-
ganization concerned with the promotion 
or utilization of nuclear energy.
STUK in the regulatory framework
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the over-
all authority in the ﬁeld of nuclear energy is the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. The Ministry pre-
pares matters concerning nuclear energy to the 
Government for decision-making and, to some ex-
tent, grants import and export licences for nuclear 
equipment and materials. Among other duties, the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry is responsible for 
the formulation of a national energy policy.
STUK is an independent governmental organi-
sation for the regulatory control of radiation and 
nuclear safety. No Ministry can take for its deci-
sion-making a matter that has been deﬁned by 
law to STUK. The current Act on STUK was given 
in 1983 and the Decree in 1997. According to the 
Decree on STUK, STUK has the following duties:
• regulatory control of safety of the use of nuclear 
energy, emergency preparedness, physical secu-
rity and nuclear materials
• regulatory control of the use of radiation and 
other radiation practices
• monitoring of the radiation situation in Finland, 
and maintaining of preparedness for abnormal 
radiation situations
• maintaining of national metrological standards 
in the ﬁeld
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• research and development work for enhancing 
radiation and nuclear safety
• informing on radiation and nuclear safety is-
sues, and participating in training activities in 
the ﬁeld
• producing expert services in the ﬁeld
• making proposals for developing the legislation 
in the ﬁeld, and issuing general guides concern-
ing radiation and nuclear safety
• participating in international co-operation in 
the ﬁeld, and taking care of international con-
trol, contact or reporting activities as enacted or 
deﬁned.
STUK is administratively under the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health. Connections to minis-
tries and governmental organisations are described 
in Figure 4. It is emphasised that the regulatory 
control of the safe use of radiation and nuclear en-
ergy is independently carried out by STUK. STUK 
has no responsibilities or duties which would be in 
conﬂict with regulatory control.
STUK has the legal authority to carry out 
regulatory control. The responsibilities and rights 
of STUK, as regards the regulation of the use of 
nuclear energy, are provided in the Nuclear Energy 
Act. They cover the safety review and assessment 
of licence applications, and the regulatory control 
of the construction and operation of a nuclear facil-
ity. The regulatory control of nuclear power plants 
is described in detail in Guide YVL 1.1. STUK has 
e.g. legal rights to require modiﬁcations to nuclear 
power plants, to limit the power of plants and to 
require shutdown of a plant when necessary for 
safety reasons.
STUK does not grant any construction or op-
erating licences for nuclear facilities. However, in 
practice no such licence would be issued without 
STUK’s statement where the fulﬁlment of the 
safety regulations is conﬁrmed.
An Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety has 
been established by a Decree. This Committee gives 
advice to STUK on important safety issues and 
regulations. In addition, an Advisory Committee 
on Radiation Safety has been established for advis-
ing the Ministry for Health and Social Affairs. The 
members of these Committees are nominated by 
the Government.
STUK’s public communication is proactive, 
open, timely and understandable. Communication 
is a privilege and duty of all employees. Good 
cooperation with the media is emphasized in all 
communication. The general public and media can 
reach STUK’s experts any time, including nights, 
weekends and holidays. A prerequisite for success-
ful communication is that STUK is known among 
media and general public and the information given 
by STUK is regarded as truthful. Communication 
is always based on best available information. 
Even sensitive matters are openly communicated. 
STUK’s web site is an important tool in commu-
nication. It is important that the web pages are 
Figure 4. Co-operation and interfaces between STUK and Ministries.
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professionally edited and updated regularly. The 
information on web pages must be easy to ﬁnd and 
understandable. Internal communication provides 
the personnel information about STUK’s activities 
and supports its capability in participating in the 
external communication.
Finance and resources of STUK
The organisational structure and the responsi-
bilities within STUK are provided in the Quality 
Manuals of STUK. Also processes for regulatory 
control and other activities of STUK are presented 
in the Manuals. The organisation of STUK is de-
scribed in the Figure 5.
STUK receives about 40 % of its ﬁnancial re-
sources through the government budget. The costs 
of regulatory control are charged in full to the 
licensees. The strategy of ﬁnancing the regulatory 
control work was changed in 2000 to so call net-
budgeting model. This means that the licensees 
pay the regulatory control fees directly to STUK. 
This approach to ﬁnance governmental regulatory 
activities became a common practice in Finland 
in the 1990’s. The change was carefully analysed 
and discussed among the parties involved. The 
conclusion was that considering the long traditions 
and stability of the amount of regulatory control 
no concern of loosing the required objectivity was 
foreseen. Also it was clearly recognised that the 
amounts charged would continuously be under the 
control of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. 
The tentative amount of budget for regulatory 
control is annually agreed with the Ministry. The 
change in the ﬁnancing procedure has not changed 
the actual costs of regulatory control activities.
In 2006, the costs of the regulatory control of 
nuclear safety were 10.1 million €. The total costs 
of nuclear safety regulation were 11.1 million €. 
Thus the share of activities subject to a charge was 
91 %.
STUK has adequate resources to fulﬁl its re-
sponsibilities. At the moment 95 professionals are 
working in the ﬁeld of nuclear safety. This is 15 
experts more than during the time of the third 
review meeting. The expertise of STUK covers all 
the essential areas needed in the safety control 
of the use of nuclear energy. As needed STUK 
orders independent analysis from technical sup-
port organizations to complement its own review 
and assessment work. The main technical support 
organisation of STUK is the Technical Research 
Centre of Finland (VTT). The Geological Survey 
(GTK) of Finland and University of Helsinki are 
important Technical Support Organizations in the 
ﬁeld of nuclear waste research and, respectively, 
Lappeenranta University (LUT) of Technology in 
Figure 5. Organisation of STUK. Numbers indicate the number of staff in the organizational unit.
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the ﬁeld of nuclear research. Also international 
technical support organizations and experts have 
been used.
New personnel have been recruited since 2003 
mainly for the safety review and assessment and 
inspection activities related to the new power 
plant unit Olkiluoto 3. First batch of the licens-
ing documentation was submitted to STUK at the 
beginning of the year 2004 and the Construction 
License was granted at the beginning of 2005. 
The overall manpower needed for the review and 
assessment of the Construction License applica-
tion documents was about 35 manyears; about 
70 % was STUK review work and 30 % Technical 
Support Organizations review work. Since that the 
annual volume of the oversight of the construction 
has been about 25 manyears.
The independence of STUK’s technical sup-
port has been evaluated in 2000. The evaluation 
included quality audits to the ﬁve research units 
of the Technical Research Centre of Finland, VTT, 
the main technical support organisation of STUK. 
The audits were performed by Qualitas Fennica 
Ltd. The audits concentrated on activities and 
work processes that are essential to nuclear safety 
and safety related research. Independence prob-
lems were not discovered in these audits. On the 
other hand, one essential element in this respect is 
STUK’s in-house expertise providing independence 
when drawing conclusions from research results. 
However, based on the audit results, the quality 
systems of these research units have been further 
enhanced taking into account STUK’s point of view 
concerning the required independence from util-
ity driven research projects. Two follow-up audits 
conducted in 2001. A similar quality audit carried 
out at the Geological Survey of Finland, GTK, at 
the end of 2001. This means that all main support 
organisations of STUK have been evaluated.
Ensuring competence
The nuclear safety competence has been in the fo-
cus of the management at STUK. The strategy work 
of STUK includes the deﬁnition of the core compe-
tences needed for the oversight. Implementation 
of the strategy is reﬂected into the annual train-
ing programmes, on the job training and new re-
cruitments. The national nuclear safety and waste 
management research programmes have an im-
portant role in the competence building of all es-
sential organizations involved in nuclear energy. 
These research programmes have two roles: for 
the ﬁrst ensuring the availability of experts and 
for the second ensuring the on-line transfer of the 
research results to the organizations participating 
to the steering of the programmes and fostering 
the expertise. STUK has an important role in the 
steering of these programmes.
Most of the professional staff of STUK con-
ducting safety assessments and inspections has a 
degree of university level. The average experience 
of the staff is about 15 years in the nuclear ﬁeld. 
For the ﬁrst time during the years 2002 and 2003 
a competence analysis was made at STUK. This 
analysis is periodically updated. The results of 
these analyses are used as the basis for the train-
ing programmes and the new recruitments. The 
training programme includes internal courses as 
well as courses organized by external organiza-
tions. On an average 5 % of the annual working 
hours has been used to enhance the competence. 
During 2005 and 2006 the focus of the internal 
training programme has been on the EPR safety 
systems.
STUK has participated in the preparation and 
execution of a basic professional training course on 
nuclear safety with other organisations in the ﬁeld. 
The ﬁrst 6-week course commenced in September 
2003 and continued in 2004. The ﬁfth basic profes-
sional training course is organized in autumn 2007. 
At the moment, about 200 junior experts and new-
comers, of whom about 40 have been from STUK, 
have participated in these courses. The content and 
structure of the course has been enhanced accord-
ing to the feedback received from the participants. 
The evaluation of the course was made by senior 
experts in 2007.
In Finland, VTT is the largest research organi-
zation in the ﬁeld of nuclear energy. At VTT, about 
200 experts are working in the ﬁeld of nuclear 
energy. The total volume of the nuclear energy 
research in the year 2006 was 28.5 million €. This 
ﬁgure includes also research made by GTK, LUT 
and Helsinki University of Technology (TKK).
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2003 to 
ensure funding for a long term nuclear safety and 
nuclear waste management research in Finland. 
Money is collected annually from the licence hold-
ers to a special fund. The amount of money is pro-
portional to the thermal power of the licensed plant 
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or the thermal power presented in the Decision-in-
principle. For the waste research, the payments 
are proportional to the payments for the future 
waste management activities to the Nuclear Waste 
Fund. The research projects are selected so that 
they support and develop the competences in nu-
clear safety. The key topics of the recent research 
programme (SAFIR2010) are the behaviour of the 
reactor, the properties of the containment and the 
ageing management of the nuclear power plant. 
There are also research projects in the ﬁeld of the 
assessment of the safety culture of an organiza-
tion. The amount of money collected in year 2007 
has been 2.7 million € for nuclear safety research. 
The research projects have also additional funding 
from other sources. The total volume of the pro-
gramme in 2007 is 6 million €. Similarly a national 
research programme in the area of nuclear waste 
management (KYT2010) to support the authori-
ties is underway. The annual volume of KYT2010 
programme is 1.0 million €. STUK participates 
in the steering of the programmes. In 2006, the 
share of the national publicly funded reactor safety 
research programme was 17 % of the total volume 
of the research and correspondingly the share of 
the national publicly funded nuclear waste man-
agement programme was 4% of the total volume. 
All the important technical support organizations 
participate in the research programmes.
International co-operation
In addition to the government review of regulatory 
activities, there have been independent regulatory 
reviews conducted by International Atomic Energy 
Agency, IAEA. The IAEA IRRT’s (International 
Regulatory Review Team) have visited STUK pro-
viding full-scope IRRT mission in 2000 and IRRT 
Follow-up Mission in 2003. The Review Team es-
tablished that the majority of recommendations it 
had given in 2000 had lead to improved operations. 
The Team gave STUK two more recommendations 
and some proposals to consider whether certain 
matters could be taken care of better, using the 
alternative method proposed. The team identiﬁed 
also some good practices worth pointing out to 
other authorities. STUK has found the IAEA IRRT 
mission as a fruitful tool in developing its own 
functions.
STUK participates actively in European and 
international co-operation in the ﬁeld of nuclear 
and radiation safety. STUK directors have mem-
berships and chairmanships in the OECD / NEA, 
IAEA and IRPA. STUK experts participate ac-
tively in the working groups of these organisations. 
The experience of the small regulators is shared 
in the Network of Regulators of Countries with 
Small Nuclear Programmes (NERS). STUK also 
participates in the work of European Commission 
through Atomic Questions Group, Working Party 
on Nuclear safety (WPNS), and RAMG-related 
PHARE-, TACIS- and INSC-programmes, and of 
EBRD as well as European regulators’ association 
WENRA.
STUK has close connections with foreign regu-
latory bodies for exchanging information on impor-
tant safety issues. There is regulatory co-opera-
tion through Nordic co-operation programmes and 
VVER Regulators Forum. STUK also co-operates 
actively with Russian Rostechnadzor, as well as 
with Kola and Leningrad NPP’s concerning nuclear 
safety of these plants close to the Finnish borders. 
Finnish government ﬁnances this co-operation. 
Bilateral co-operation with several regulatory or-
ganizations concerning the European Pressurized 
Water Reactor (EPR) safety issues has been very 
active since the beginning of the licensing of the 
new plant unit (Olkiluoto 3). STUK is an active 
member in a Multinational Design Evaluation 
programme (MDEP) in which a model is developed 
for a multinational safety assessment of a new 
reactor.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 8.
2.5 Article 9. Responsibility 
of the licence holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that 
prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear 
installation rests with the holder of the rel-
evant licence and shall take the appropriate 
steps to ensure that each such licence holder 
meets its responsibility.
The responsibility for the safety rests with the 
licensee as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
According to Section 9 of the Act each licensee is 
responsible for the safety of his use of nuclear en-
ergy. Furthermore, the licensee is responsible for 
such physical protection and emergency prepared-
ness arrangements and other necessary arrange-
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ments for limitation of nuclear damages, which do 
not belong to the authorities. To ensure that the 
ﬁnancial liability for the future management and 
disposal of nuclear wastes and for the decommis-
sioning of nuclear facilities is covered, the nuclear 
power companies are each year obliged to present 
estimates for future costs of these operations and 
take care that the required amount of money is 
set aside to the State Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund. In order to provide for the insolvency of the 
nuclear utilities, they shall provide securities to 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry for the part 
of ﬁnancial liability which is not yet covered by 
the Fund. At the end of the year 2006 the funded 
money (1 510 million euros) covered most part of 
whole liability and only about 75 million euros 
were covered by securities.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body to 
verify that the licensees fulﬁl the regulations. This 
veriﬁcation is carried out through safety review 
and assessment as well as inspection programmes 
established by STUK. In its activities, STUK em-
phasizes the commitment to the strong safety 
culture.
The ﬁnancial provisions to cover the possible 
damages to third parties caused by a nuclear ac-
cident have been arranged in Finland according to 
the Paris and Brussels Conventions. Related to the 
revision of Paris and Brussels agreements in 2004, 
Finland has decided to enact unlimited licensee li-
ability by law (see Article 7). The revised law will 
also have some other improvements, like extending 
the claiming period up to 30 years for victims of 
nuclear accidents. 
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 9.
2.6 Article 10. Priority to safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that all organizations 
engaged in activities directly related to nucle-
ar installations shall establish policies that 
give due priority to nuclear safety.
2.6.1 Regulatory approach to safety culture
Safety is emphasised in the general principles of 
the Nuclear Energy Act: the use of nuclear energy 
shall be safe; it shall not cause injury to people, or 
damage to the environment or property. Decision 
395/1991 provides that, an advanced safety culture 
shall be maintained when designing, construct-
ing and operating a nuclear power plant. It shall 
be based on the safety emphasising attitude of 
the management of the organisation in question, 
and on motivation of the personnel for responsi-
ble work. This presupposes well organised working 
conditions and an open working atmosphere as 
well as the encouragement of alertness and initia-
tive in order to detect and eliminate factors which 
endanger safety.
Safety is also emphasised in the Quality 
Manuals of STUK as well as in the framework 
contract between STUK and its technical support 
organisation VTT. STUK has updated its own 
Quality Policy in 2003. The Quality Policy includes 
also STUK’s values that are engaged to every day 
work giving the highest priority to keeping the 
radiation exposure of people as low as reasonable 
achievable and preventing radiation and nuclear 
accidents. STUK has taken an active role in this 
area and both developed its own culture and taken 
the initiative in the assessment and development 
of the culture of the utility organisations. STUK 
has indicators in its indicator system to detect the 
development in plant safety.
Safety culture has also been an essential topic 
in STUK’s continuous interaction with the licen-
sees. The top level inspection of the periodic in-
spection programme, called “Safety Management”, 
includes an assessment of safety culture issues and 
quality management. In addition, safety culture is-
sues are included in quality assurance audits and 
event analyses. Findings related to safety culture 
from different inspections are analysed in STUK 
and discussed in annual meetings between the 
senior managers of the nuclear power plant and 
the regulatory body. Attention has been paid to 
safety culture in the operation and maintenance 
of Finnish nuclear power plants. At the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants, actions have 
been taken to emphasise high level safety culture, 
and to further develop it. E.g. the rate of annual 
investment (Figure 6, see Article 11) shows a trend 
towards safety.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, a re-
sponsible director approved by STUK has to be 
appointed for the construction and operation of a 
nuclear power plant. The responsible director has a 
duty to see that the safe use of nuclear energy, the 
arrangements for physical protection and emergen-
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cies and the safeguards control are complied with. 
The responsible director shall have real possibili-
ties to take effectively care of this duty.
Organisational units for safety exist at the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants. These units are inde-
pendent of those units which are directly respon-
sible for the operation of the plants. In addition, 
independent advisory bodies for safety issues have 
been established by both licensees. The licensees 
have also established written quality and safety 
policies.
2.6.2 Priority to safety at the Loviisa NPP
The Loviisa plant is headed by a General Manager 
(responsible director). The operating organisa-
tion is comprised of four units: Operation, Safety, 
Technology and Maintenance Units. The operating 
organisation is supported by the Nuclear Safety 
Committee of the Loviisa plant. Its members are 
experts in different ﬁelds. The majority of the mem-
bers work at the headquarters of Fortum Power 
and Heat Oy. In addition, other organisation units 
of Fortum outside the plant also participate in the 
evaluation of safety and in the technical support 
to the plant. The duties, responsibilities and au-
thorities of the various units of the plant operat-
ing organisation and of Fortum’s internal support 
organisation are presented in the Administrative 
Rules and Organisational Manual of the Loviisa 
plant.
The Loviisa plant and Fortum Nuclear Services, 
its supporting organisation, have made a co-opera-
tion agreement that is annually updated. One aim 
of the agreement is to assure that all the know-how 
within Fortum Group is utilised in connection with 
the design of the plant modiﬁcations and develop-
ment activities.
The minimum stafﬁng of the main control room 
and the plant site is presented in the Technical 
Speciﬁcations of the Loviisa plant. According to 
the plant duty system a person outside the shifts is 
continuously reachable for the control room staff. 
The person has the highest level operator compe-
tence (the level of shift supervisor). The system is 
aimed to ensure safety, when operator actions are 
made during emergency situations.
In addition to the normal operating organi-
sation, an emergency preparedness organisation 
has been deﬁned to the plant for accident situa-
tions. The emergency preparedness organisation 
has been described in the Emergency Plan. The ac-
tivities of the emergency organisation are trained 
during annual emergency exercises. A security 
organisation has been deﬁned to the plant in the 
Security Plan. This organisation is responsible for 
the planning and maintaining of physical protec-
tion arrangements.
Developing safety culture
Fortum has a long tradition in power production. 
That has inﬂuenced on the development of the 
company’s organisational culture and reﬂected 
positively to the design, construction and operation 
of the Loviisa plant. A factor that has inﬂuenced 
on the development of safety culture at the Loviisa 
plant has been the inadequacy of operating proce-
dures received from the plant supplier. It caused 
a need to put effort in the design of the plant and 
to develop the functions of the operating organisa-
tion. This development process has given to the 
plant and the whole Fortum a strong expertise in 
several issues.
In the 1990’s Fortum internationalised in a 
strong way and with the acquisitions and incorpo-
ration Fortum has become a Group organisation. 
In the Group it has been considered appropriate 
that each independent company or unit develops 
its organisational culture from its own starting 
points, taking into account the principles of the 
Group management on common visions and values. 
It has been evaluated in Fortum that the attitude 
in the Group on the continuous development of 
activities gives a solid frame for maintaining an 
advanced safety culture in the operation of the 
Loviisa plant.
The concept of the advanced safety culture was 
added in the Administrative Rules of the Loviisa 
plant in 1991. The quality policy of the plant 
written in 1996 brings up the meaning of safety 
expressing good safety culture. Current safety 
and quality policies for Fortum’s nuclear power 
operations and for the plant address advanced 
safety culture. Several measures have been imple-
mented at the Loviisa plant for maintaining and 
developing safety culture. Related to this Fortum 
carried out a self-evaluation in 1994 using an in-
terview method based on the IAEA-guidance. The 
state of safety culture has been evaluated using 
mainly the IAEA-guidance as a point of compari-
son. Based on the evaluation, the procedures for 
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maintaining safety and availability have been 
noted to be comprehensive and relatively well 
operative.
In the evaluation many good characteristics of 
safety culture were noted. Respectively, the most 
important areas have been identiﬁed, to which the 
development measures should be focused in the 
future for the continuous development of safety 
culture. By nature these issues are related to the 
activities of organisations and people. Safety cul-
ture in the Loviisa Power Plant was observed dur-
ing the WANO Peer Review in 2001 and during the 
IAEA OSART mission in 2007.
At the request of the Government of Finland, an 
IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) 
of international experts visited Loviisa Nuclear 
Power Plant (NPP) during 3-21 March 2007. The 
purpose of the mission was to review operational 
safety practices and to exchange technical experi-
ence and knowledge between the experts and their 
plant counterparts on how the common goal of 
excellence in operational safety could be further 
pursued. Emphasis was placed on assessing the 
effectiveness of operational safety rather than 
simply the content of programmes. The conclusions 
of the OSART team were based on the plant’s per-
formance compared with IAEA Safety Standards 
and good international practices. The OSART team 
concluded that the managers of Loviisa NPP are 
committed to improving the operational safety and 
reliability of their plant. The team found good ar-
eas of performance, including the following: A long 
term commitment to ongoing investment in equip-
ment and system upgrades that have signiﬁcantly 
reduced overall plant risk for core damage and 
release of radioactivity; Developed a high quality 
and a comprehensive Probabilistic Safety Analysis 
with state-of-the-art methods and tools and its use 
by the plant in several areas; Use of an analysis 
programme for estimating accidental releases in 
advance to support the on and off-site emergency 
organizations with recommendations for protective 
actions; Direct information exchanges with other 
VVER plants has contributed for sharing operat-
ing experience through twinning and personnel 
exchange. The OSART team also made recommen-
dations and suggestions related to areas where 
operational safety of Loviisa NPP could be im-
proved. Recommendations and suggestions include: 
Operators’ performance could be improved by a 
more rigorous approach in their work practices, 
including shift turnover, control room conduct and 
ﬁeld operations; The operating experience feedback 
programme is not comprehensive regarding report-
ing and analyzing operating experience, identify-
ing and tracking corrective actions, using operat-
ing experience, and monitoring it by performance 
indicators; The methods currently employed by the 
plant for the containment and reduction of radioac-
tive materials are not fully effective. The OSART 
team recognised that the radioactive waste and the 
decontamination processing areas will be relocated 
under the impending plant upgrade, which will 
create better conditions for improving the handling 
and storage issues.
2.6.3 Priority to safety at the Olkiluoto NPP
TVO is headed by the President and CEO with 
the assistance of the Management Group. In ad-
dition to the President and CEO, the following 
members belong to the Management Group: Senior 
Vice President, Operation; Senior Vice President, 
Nuclear Engineering; Senior Vice President, 
Power Plant Engineering; Senior Vice President, 
Legal Affairs; Project; Executive Vice President, 
Corporate Resources; Senior Vice President, 
Finance and Senior Vice President, Corporate 
Social Responsibility. The activities of the compa-
ny are divided into areas of responsibility that 
belong to the aforementioned directors. TVO has 
a Safety Committee that is composed of experts 
from different technical areas. The tasks, responsi-
bilities and duties of units are clariﬁed in the TVO 
Administrative Rules and in the Organisational 
Manual. The Administrative Rules have been 
approved by STUK as a part of the Technical 
Speciﬁcations Document.
The minimum crew required for the main con-
trol room and the plant area has been presented 
in the Administrative Rules of the Olkiluoto plant. 
According to the duty system of the plant a person 
of the Shift Supervisor level has to be reachable for 
the control room personnel at all times, for a case 
of possible special situations at the plant.
In addition to the operating organisation, an 
emergency preparedness organisation has been 
deﬁned for the plant to prepare for accident situa-
tions. The emergency preparedness organisation is 
described in the Emergency Plan and its operation 
is exercised annually in emergency drills. To design 
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and maintain security arrangements, a security 
organisation of the plant is deﬁned in the Security 
Plan.
Developing safety culture
An in-depth safety approach is essential for ensur-
ing the safety of a nuclear power plant. It means 
that malfunctions must be anticipated and the 
preparation for them must be in the form of multi-
ple safety systems which are able, if necessary, to 
stop a power plant unit and prevent the malfunc-
tion from spreading. Safety measures are always 
planned on a conservative assumption that equip-
ment malfunctions can occur and people operating 
them can make errors. On the basis of analysing 
such situations, the plant is equipped with appro-
priate and adequate safety systems. The plant has 
several parallel systems that ensure its reliability.
In accordance with the safety culture, a nuclear 
power plant also contains a number of structural 
protective zones within each other. In order to 
achieve operational reliability, different systems 
are built so that they can operate normally with 
an ample margin of safety in every situation. 
Reporting of errors, nonconformities, deﬁciencies 
and “near misses” is the basis of TVO’s safety cul-
ture. The reports are analysed and the analyses 
form the basis for corrective measures. All observa-
tions are discussed in an open manner so that as 
much as possible can be learned from them and the 
reoccurrence of any similar nonconformities can be 
prevented. In the planning of preventive measures 
probability based safety and reliability models, op-
erational experience, “near-misses” and the result 
of “early warning” questionnaires are used.
TVO was originally founded as a nuclear power 
company. Its corporate culture was developed from 
approaches that have been available since the be-
ginning of 1970’s for producing nuclear energy in a 
manner that emphasises safety factors. The techni-
cal personnel who was employed to the company 
immediately after its foundation and who has since 
then had a crucial role in developing the company, 
received its education and prior work experience 
within the area of nuclear technology. This back-
ground has signiﬁcantly promoted the emphasis on 
safety issues in all of their actions.
Asea-Atom AB (later on ABB AB), the supplier 
of the plant, had also a favourable impact on the 
improvement of the TVO’s safety culture. The 
responsibility for practical safety solutions in the 
development of nuclear technology, was clearly left 
to the industry in Sweden, and safety authorities 
set forth only general requirements. Asea-Atom AB 
acknowledged its responsibility for the safety, and 
developed many solutions that were later adopted 
in other countries as well. TVO received all essen-
tial approaches needed for safe operation of the 
plant from its plant suppliers and developed them 
further.
In 1995, TVO drew up a safety and quality 
policy document signed by the Managing Director. 
The document contains the principles of safe and 
high quality performance as well as the principles 
of the good safety culture. In the policy document 
the company management commits to create the 
means for maintaining and developing a high qual-
ity safety culture.
TVO and its personnel have committed them-
selves to a high level of safety culture. Each matter 
is given the treatment and attention its importance 
deserves. Each matter is considered on the basis of 
its safety impact and safety is always given prior-
ity when decisions are made. If there is a conﬂict 
between safety and economic considerations, TVO 
always gives priority to safety.
TVO has conducted several measures to main-
tain and develop its safety culture. Related to this, 
the safety culture was self-assessed by the compa-
ny management in 1992. Review was based on the 
principles and questions presented in the INSAG 
4 Report. Review concluded that TVO’s measures 
are well in-line with the measures and character-
istic features, deﬁned in the INSAG 4 Report, of a 
company that has a high level safety culture. TVO 
also assessed the results of the two comprehensive 
Swedish safety culture reviews in 1995 from the 
standpoint of its own actions. Several ﬁndings 
requiring development actions were made on the 
basis of the reviews, but no new signiﬁcant issues 
surfaced.
TVO conducted an internal review of its actions 
during the year 1996 and the beginning of the 
year 1997 by using the objectives and criteria pre-
sented by the WANO (World Association of Nuclear 
Operators). In connection with the review, several 
issues requiring improvements were found. WANO 
conducted a Peer Review in Olkiluoto in 1999 and 
a Follow-up in 2001. WANO conducted a new Peer 
Review in Olkiluoto in 2006.
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In order to maintain a high safety culture and 
good operational results, TVO made a self-assess-
ment of the safety culture to enhance safety cul-
ture and safety management in 2004. The self-as-
sessment and the enhancement programme were 
conducted with the help of the IAEA.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 10.
2.7 Article 11. Financial and 
human resources
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that adequate 
ﬁnancial resources are available to sup-
port the safety of each nuclear installation 
throughout its life.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that sufﬁcient 
numbers of qualiﬁed staff with appropri-
ate education, training and retraining are 
available for all safety-related activities in 
or for each nuclear installation, through-
out its life.
2.7.1 Financial resources
Nuclear Energy Act deﬁnes as a condition for grant-
ing a Construction or Operating Licence that the 
applicant has sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources, neces-
sary expertise and, in particular, that the operating 
organisation and the competence of the operating 
staff are appropriate. Decision 395/1991 requires 
initial, complementary and refresher training pro-
grammes for the personnel. STUK controls the nec-
essary qualiﬁcations on the persons engaged in 
activities important to safety. STUK has issued 
requirements on staff qualiﬁcation and described 
the respective regulatory control procedures in the 
Guides YVL 1.1, YVL 1.6 and YVL 1.7.
For example according to the Nuclear Energy 
Act, the licensee shall have adequate ﬁnancial 
resources to take care of the safety of the plant. 
Nuclear Energy Act provides detailed regulations 
for the ﬁnancial arrangements for taking care 
of nuclear waste management. The Act on Third 
Party Liability provides regulations on ﬁnancial 
arrangements for nuclear accidents, taking into 
account that Finland is a party to the Paris and 
Brussels conventions.
The annual reports of Fortum Corporation and 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy provide ﬁnancial informa-
tion on the utilities. Both utilities have annually 
invested typically about 10–20 M€ for maintaining 
and improving safety. Figure 6 provides informa-
tion on plant annual rate of investments. The costs 
of large modernisation programmes at both nu-
clear power plants during 1996–2003 can be seen 
in these ﬁgures.
2.7.2 Human resources
The licensee has the prime responsibility for ensur-
ing that his employees are qualiﬁed and authorised 
to their jobs. Both Finnish power companies have 
training organizations and training facilities at 
NPP sites with the training staff round 20 persons 
and full-scope plant-speciﬁc training simulators.
Both utilities have a systematic approach to 
training. However, changes in energy markets and 
the fast development of technology will bring new 
challenges to the knowledge, and this requires 
special emphasis of all parties. During 2005–2006 
two ﬁve weeks training courses on nuclear safety 
technology were provided to train newcomers in 
the nuclear ﬁeld as a speciﬁc co-operation of all nu-
clear related organizations. About 60 young experts 
and newcomers were trained during one course. 
The intention is to continue with the training 
Figure 6. The annual relative rate of investments at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPP’s.
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course on annual basis as long as there are enough 
participants who need the training. Training ma-
terials have been developed and that can be used 
by the organizations in their internal training 
programmes as appropriate and for self-study via 
distance learning including text book, overhead 
materials, exercises and video lectures.
Certain persons, such as the responsible direc-
tor and his deputies, shift supervisors and control 
room operators of the plant, persons taking care of 
physical protection, emergency preparedness and 
nuclear material control need an authorization 
from STUK for their tasks. The authorization of 
plant operators is valid for maximum of 4 years at 
a time. The renewal of the authorization requires 
e.g. that the person in question has worked con-
tinuously in the control room, has taken part in the 
refresher-training program and in demonstration 
of shift work skill as well as an oral examination.
STUK also approves the persons, who control 
the operation of plant pressure vessels. Only com-
panies approved by STUK and persons working 
for them may conduct repairs of pressure bearing 
structures and inspections of mechanical compo-
nents and structures.
In spring 2000, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry set up a working group to analyse the 
contents and scope of the know-how required 
to continue the safe operation of nuclear power 
plants. The task of the group was to identify the 
measures needed to compensate the retirement of 
many experts and train new experts. The age dis-
tribution of personnel working in organisations in 
the nuclear energy sector indicates that the need 
for new experts will increase two- or even three-
fold round 2010 due to retirement. The current 
training capacity of universities is adequate to 
meet this need.
In addition to nuclear power plants, it is im-
portant to take care of the ﬁnancial and human 
resources of technical support organizations such 
as research institutions and universities. In this 
respect, the new funding arrangement for nuclear 
research (see section 2.3.2) is an important prereq-
uisite and this item needs further attention also in 
the future.
Loviisa NPP personnel training
The principles and organisation of the training 
activities of the Loviisa plant as well as detailed 
training instructions have been presented in the 
Training Manual. It has been established to ensure 
the systematic implementation of training activi-
ties. The training and simulator groups take care 
of training activities at the plant. The total man-
power is 11 persons. For assisting the training 
group, organisation unit-speciﬁc contact persons 
have been appointed. They ensure that unit- and 
individual-speciﬁc needs are taken into account 
and that information is transferred to both direc-
tions. The competence requirements of the person-
nel are presented in the Training Manual. The 
competence requirements are based on the duties 
of each vacancy, on responsibility areas and on reg-
ulatory requirements related to the duties in ques-
tion. The competence requirements deﬁne the basic 
education of a person and the initial and refresher 
training to be given at the Loviisa plant.
A full-scope training simulator identical with 
the plant is available for the training of the plant 
operators. Simulator training is given to new op-
erator candidates during about 50 days as a part 
of the initial training. In addition to the simulator 
training, the initial training programme of the op-
erators includes course-oriented classroom lectures 
and practical training at the plant and in the main 
control room. The initial training takes about two 
and a half years. Thereafter an operator can be 
licensed to work as a turbine or reactor operator. 
At the end of the training period a written and oral 
examinations as well as the demonstration of pro-
fessional skills at the simulator are arranged for 
the operators. These are preconditions for the work 
as an operator or a shift supervisor in the main 
control room of the plant.
For the operators of the plant a refresher 
training programme has been established. It is 
implemented in the periods of three years. The 
programme includes those subjects which shall be 
annually gone through. In addition, the refresher 
training of the operators includes annually simu-
lator training during two weeks, covering normal 
operational situations (e.g. start-up and shutdown 
situations) and plenty of training for disturbance 
situations. Refresher training is arranged for the 
plant operators during three weeks a year on aver-
age.
To ensure that all the expertise available within 
Fortum Group is utilised in dealing with extensive 
and/or many-sided principled safety issues, the 
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Loviisa plant and Fortum Nuclear Services have 
signed a co-operation agreement. In the agreement 
those expertise areas are identiﬁed within which 
it is the responsibility of Fortum Nuclear Services 
inside Fortum Group to educate and maintain suf-
ﬁcient number of experts to support the Loviisa 
plant operation.
In connection to bigger modiﬁcation or renewal 
of plant equipment, i.e. renewal of the automa-
tion systems (LARA-project) separate training pro-
gramme is made to ensure that the personnel is 
well trained in the use of the new equipment.
Olkiluoto NPP personnel training
The principles and organisation of TVO’s train-
ing activities as well as detailed training proce-
dures are presented in the Training Manual, by 
the means of which a systematic implementation 
of the training is ensured. The training in the com-
pany has been organised so that in addition to the 
existing seventeen persons in the training centre 
there are training contact persons at both units in 
operation and also in the project organization of 
Olkiluoto 3. In addition to this, there are several 
committees that survey and handle the training 
needs of e.g. operation and maintenance as well 
as of the entire company and monitor training 
results. External or internal experts give major 
part of the general training and the training centre 
staffs gives only minor part. The training centre 
staffs, instead, gives all simulator training. An or-
ganisation model like this makes it possible to take 
unit and individual related training needs into ac-
count in an efﬁcient manner. The Training Manual 
presents vacancy related competence requirements 
that have been deﬁned for the personnel. The com-
petence requirements are based on the tasks, areas 
of responsibility relating to the vacancies in ques-
tion, and the related regulations of the regulatory 
authority. Person’s basic education and the basic 
and refresher training given by the TVO are de-
ﬁned in the qualiﬁcation requirements.
A training simulator is available for the train-
ing of plant operators of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 at power 
plant site. The number of operating training days 
to new operator candidates is approximately 10 
weeks as a part of the basic training. In addition to 
the simulator training, the basic training program 
of operators includes classroom and on-the-job 
training at the plant and in the main control room. 
The basic training takes approximately 18 months, 
after which the operator is allowed to work as a 
turbine operator. After working as a turbine op-
erator and gaining more experience, the turbine 
operator is given more individual training by e.g. 
the simulator for the duties of a reactor operator. 
In the end of the training period, a written and oral 
examinations as well as a demonstration of operat-
ing skills at the training simulator are required 
before a person is allowed to start working as an 
operator or as a shift supervisor in the main con-
trol room of the nuclear power plant.
A refresher-training programme, which is con-
ducted in a three-year period, is available for the 
plant operators. The programme includes the sub-
jects that shall be repeated annually. Furthermore, 
the refresher training of operators includes annu-
ally two weeks of operating training at the simula-
tor containing a considerable amount of transient 
situation training in addition to the training of 
normal operating conditions (e.g. start-ups and 
shutdowns). The plant operators receive approxi-
mately three weeks of refresher training annually.
The initial training of personnel of Olkiluoto 3, 
which will be given during the construction and 
commissioning phases, will cover all staff members 
who are directly involved in plant operation, plant 
and systems maintenance, technical support and 
in power plant management. The training courses 
are comprised of theoretical courses such as funda-
mental plant technology, survey and plant courses. 
The training will also include practical training 
such as on-the-job training in factories and op-
erating power plants as well as active hands-on 
training during the commissioning phase of the 
unit. Olkiluoto 3 will also be equipped with a plant 
speciﬁc training simulator. Shift supervisors and 
control room operators will have a training period 
at the simulator, starting at least one year before 
the ﬁrst fuel loading and ending with the licensing 
examination just before the fuel loading, which has 
been planned to take place in 2010. The length of 
the simulator training course is 10 weeks. During 
the operational period of Olkiluoto 3, the training 
and the refresher training of the personnel will be 
incorporated into the existing complementary and 
refresher training programmes of TVO.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 11.
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2.8 Article 12. Human factors
Each Contracting party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that the capabilities 
and limitations of human performance are 
taken into account throughout the life of a 
nuclear installation.
2.8.1 Regulatory approach to human factors
Decision 395/1991 requires that a nuclear pow-
er plant’s control rooms shall contain equipment, 
which provide information about the plant’s op-
erational state and any deviations from normal 
operation, as well as systems which monitor the 
state of the plant’s safety systems during opera-
tion and their functioning during operational tran-
sients and accidents. A nuclear power plant shall 
contain automatic systems that maintain the plant 
in a safe state during transients and accidents long 
enough to provide the operators a sufﬁcient time to 
consider and implement the correct actions. There 
shall be an emergency control post at a nuclear 
power plant, which is independent of the control 
room, and the necessary local control systems by 
the means of which the nuclear reactor can be 
shut down and cooled and residual heat from the 
nuclear reactor and spent fuel stored at the plant 
can be removed.
Decision 395/1991 requires that special atten-
tion shall be paid to the avoidance, detection and 
repair of human errors. The possibility of human 
errors shall be taken into account both in the de-
sign of the nuclear power plant and in the planning 
of its operation so that the plant withstands well 
errors and deviations from planned operational 
actions. Human factors have also to be taken into 
account in the failure analyses of plant safety 
systems and in probabilistic safety analyses. Such 
analyses have been completed for all Finnish nu-
clear power plants.
As regards the operation of the facility, the 
inﬂuence of human factors and the respective 
need for corrective measures are assessed by the 
licensees and STUK, when evaluating abnormal 
events and their lessons learnt. Each operating or-
ganisation has established a systematic procedure 
for making event evaluations. Figure 7 shows the 
share of technical and human related causes for 
the latest incidents at the Finnish nuclear power 
plants. E.g. during 2006, Loviisa NPP reported 5 
events from which 1 contained human root causes 
and Olkiluoto NPP reported 9 events from which 6 
contained human root causes.
Human resources and quality assurance are 
discussed under Articles 11 and 13, respectively.
2.8.2 Monitoring and control of the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant
The Loviisa 1 and 2 units have their own inde-
pendent main control rooms. There are available 
the needed process information and all the needed 
control actions can be performed there. Alarm sig-
nals from the spent fuel storages are also available 
in the Loviisa 2 main control room. As regards 
their implementation, the main control rooms are 
of proven control room technology.
Process information is presented in the main 
control room with indicating meters, indicator 
lights and recorders as well as with the monitors 
of the process computer system. There are two re-
dundant alarm systems in the main control room. 
These systems have been realised by using two 
different techniques, conventional and computer-
based techniques. Indicator light ﬁelds are in the 
operator’s consoles, and two monitors have been 
Figure 7. Number of technical and / or human direct causes identiﬁed in the event analysis at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPP’s.
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reserved for computer alarms. In addition, data 
on events and conditions as well as the exceeding 
of warning and alarm limits are recorded by the 
alarm printers. The process computer gives process 
information in an illustrative format for the use of 
the operators.
In addition to the main control room, the shut-
down of the reactor as well as the control and 
monitoring actions necessary for safety can be per-
formed by means of a so-called emergency control 
room table, located in the main control room of the 
other unit.
In addition to the main control room, the ad-
ditional control rooms are located in the both aux-
iliary buildings for controlling the functioning of 
important auxiliary processes. Furthermore, there 
are the unit-speciﬁc ventilation control rooms and 
the diesel-speciﬁc local control posts at the plant. 
The alarm signals from all auxiliary control rooms 
are available in a combined format in the main 
control rooms. For severe accidents there is a dedi-
cated control room shared by the both units.
The Loviisa 1 and 2 protection systems have 
been designed so that quick operator actions are 
not required for the start-up of the safety systems 
during transient or accident situations. Possibilities 
of human errors are effectively reduced by a sufﬁ-
cient consideration time available to the operators 
before control or other actions, by appropriate in-
structions for transient and emergency situations 
as well as by operator training. The process com-
puter has been equipped with a so-called critical 
safety functions control system (SPDS), by means 
of which an operator can follow the performance 
of all the safety functions in a combined and clear 
format. An identiﬁcation system for transient situ-
ations is also related to the control of the critical 
safety functions. An operator may use it as a sup-
port when a situation is being identiﬁed.
The renewal of plant automation is in stage of 
design and implementation of the ﬁrst phase at the 
unit 1. The renewal project will be discussed under 
Article 18.
Human factors
Human errors can not be entirely avoided. However, 
the possibility of errors can be made smaller with 
proper procedures, training and efﬁcient quality 
assurance. For identifying human error possibili-
ties and for clarifying their consequences Fortum 
has prepared an extensive evaluation concerning 
these issues. This evaluation is a part of the proba-
bilistic safety analysis. For analysing hidden de-
fects inﬂuencing the course of a possible transient 
or accident, Fortum has evaluated regularly differ-
ent types of duties performed at the plant. In the 
analysis concerning human errors such operational 
and maintenance mistakes have been evaluated 
which may act as an initiating event of a transient 
or an accident. Different plant states and duties 
related to them have been evaluated in detail.
Control actions needed during an accident have 
been divided in the evaluation into two parts: a 
diagnosis and actions taken to prevent the acci-
dent. Possibilities for mistakes have been studied 
with the help of a simulator. Plant procedures for 
emergency situations have been developed and will 
be further developed, taking also into account the 
results of PSA. The progress is shortly referred in 
Article 19.
For preventing human errors it is important, 
that the operating events are carefully evaluated 
and, if necessary, procedures or the plant is de-
veloped to prevent similar mistakes. Fortum has 
developed the utilisation of operating experiences 
and does the root cause analyses out of every sig-
niﬁcant event.
When starting up the plant from an outage, a 
dedicated quality procedure is followed in order to 
check all required provisions for continued power 
operation.
The protection systems of the plant initiate the 
safety systems automatically when needed so that 
the operators will have enough time to consider ac-
tions according to operating procedures. Due to the 
inherent characteristics of the Loviisa plant, the 
operators will have usually more time for consid-
eration in a transient situation than at other types 
of nuclear power plants. The Loviisa plant is well 
equipped concerning the needed training for pre-
venting human errors. A simulator is at hand. It 
is used for training the operators to come through 
accident situations.
Studies on human errors until now and the 
development of improvement measures are also in-
ternationally focused on the activities of the plant 
operators and of the lowest levels of the operating 
organisation. In the future, also the functions of an 
organisation more extensively and the preventing 
of human errors in design activities may be signiﬁ-
cant targets for development.
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2.8.3 Monitoring and control of the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 have their own independent con-
trol rooms, where the necessary process informa-
tion is available, and from where all necessary con-
trol measures can be conducted. The alarms cover-
ing the interim spent fuel storage are conducted to 
the control room of the Olkiluoto 1. The technical 
solutions of the main control rooms are based on 
the proven control room technology.
Process information is presented by the in-
dicating measuring equipment installed in the 
steering desks and panels as well as with several 
computer display units. Conventional and compu-
ter aided alarm systems are used to facilitate the 
management of main processes and other sub and 
auxiliary processes. During the renewal of turbine 
automation system several new computerized op-
erator workstations and a large screen display 
system were installed into the main control room. 
The alarms are indicated primarily by the alarm 
lamp panels. The parallel alarms received through 
the computer are seen on the monitors. In addition, 
the event and state data as well as deviations from 
warning/alarm limits are printed on the alarm 
printers.
A safety parameter display system (SPDS), 
which improves the performance capability of the 
operating personnel in controlling transient and 
accident situations, is in use at the Olkiluoto plant 
units.
A so-called 30-minute rule has been the design 
basis for the protection system at Olkiluoto 1 and 
2. Important protection measures and safety sys-
tems start up automatically so, that no actions of 
operating personnel are needed during the ﬁrst 
thirty minutes after the beginning of the opera-
tional transient or postulated accident. Operators 
have time for consideration before entering into 
the control and other measures. Proper emergency 
and transient situation procedures as well as 
training of those situations reduce the possibility 
of human errors further.
Both Olkiluoto plant units have an emergency 
control post, from where the reactor can be tripped 
and where the main parameters of the reactor such 
as neutron ﬂux, pressure, temperature and water 
level can be monitored. Cooling the reactor down to 
a cold state and removal of decay heat can be car-
ried out after the shutdown by using local control 
posts. The interim spent fuel storage has its own 
local control room for the monitoring of decay heat 
removal.
The requirement of another, independent emer-
gency control post emerged after the TVO plants 
were designed. The units have been designed so 
that they can be shutdown in an ordinary way only 
from the control room or from the emergency control 
posts. TVO has studied the independence of the 
control room and the emergency control posts in 
connection with different accident scenarios such 
as ﬁres and in different initiating events of common 
cause failures such as earthquakes, high tempera-
ture of air and sea water, a magnetic ﬁeld caused by 
a mobile phone and losses of electrical power. The 
risk of a simultaneous loss of the control room and 
the relay room, which functions as an emergency 
control post, can be considered small. However TVO 
is evaluating possibilities to improve and centralize 
the emergency controls to better apply the present 
requirements. Any modiﬁcations are planned to be 
carried out in connections of modernization of reac-
tor protection automation system.
In a long-term accident situation the main 
process parameters as well as crucial radiation 
measurements and weather information can be 
monitored from the space preserved for the emer-
gency preparedness supporting group. The indicat-
ing instrumentation equipment, which is one of 
the severe accident management systems (SAM 
system) and monitors the state of the containment 
in case of a severe accident has been placed in an 
easily accessible room.
The modernization of systems, conducted in 
connection with the power uprating, facilitated 
the monitoring and operation of the plant. During 
the I&C modernization projects, some functions 
that were earlier manual have been automated, 
and displays of the control rooms as well as other 
means for collecting information have been im-
proved. The I&C modernisation projects started in 
90’s encompass several systems the latest of which 
are mentioned in Annex 2. TVO plans to continue 
the modernization of systems during the forthcom-
ing years.
A new programmable technology was taken into 
use, in connection with the conducted modernisa-
tions. The latest modernization of the turbine plant 
automation introduced the soft key controls to the 
power plant. The introduction of new technology 
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sets new challenges not only for the modiﬁcation 
design of the systems but also for personnel train-
ing and for the procedures applied at the plant 
during the operation. The aforementioned matters 
can be considered as improvements for the forth-
coming operating period.
Human factors
TVO has conducted a probabilistic safety analysis 
(PSA) where the consequences of human errors 
have been studied. Latent maintenance and test-
ing errors have been studied in connection with the 
system analyses related to the PSA. In addition to 
the human factor experts, experienced staff mem-
bers from the operating and maintenance person-
nel have participated in assessing the possibility of 
errors. The identiﬁed error possibilities have been 
classiﬁed into groups according to their importance 
and the most important ones have been modelled 
in the PSA study to clarify the risks related to er-
rors.
The reliability of operator actions conducted 
during accident conditions was assessed as a part 
of the PSA analysis. The diagnostic errors that may 
be made in connection with accidents have also 
been assessed. Based on the results of the analyses 
concerning the human errors, a few additions and 
modiﬁcations have been made on the emergency 
and operating procedures of the plant.
All the main control room related modiﬁcations 
are tested at the training simulator, and operators 
are trained for managing the modiﬁed systems 
prior to the modiﬁcations are installed. In the 
development of human aspects in the operating 
procedures TVO has utilized operating experience 
and results of root causes analyses. Errors related 
to the maintenance actions have also been exam-
ined and measures have been developed to avoid 
corresponding errors.
Human Factor issues are taken into account 
in all events. Lessons learned from the events are 
taken into account in the corrective actions plans 
and lessons learned are used in internal training 
and organizational develoment. TVO cooperates 
in human factors with national specialists from 
research organizations and also specialists from 
other industries. TVO also cooperates with foreign 
nuclear companies and organizations in the area of 
human factors. TVO has had human factor special-
ist since 2004.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 12.
2.9 Article 13. Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that quality assurance 
programmes are established and implemented 
with a view to providing conﬁdence that speci-
ﬁed requirements for all activities important 
to nuclear safety are satisﬁed throughout the 
life of a nuclear installation.
2.9.1 Regulatory approach to 
quality assurance
Nuclear Energy Decree requires that a quality 
management system for design and construction 
as well as for operation are required to be submit-
ted to STUK when applying for a construction and 
operating licence of a nuclear facility, respectively. 
The general quality management system require-
ments apply to the whole life of a nuclear facility. 
Decision 395/1991 requires that advanced quality 
management system shall be employed in all ac-
tivities which affect safety and relate to the design, 
construction and operation of a nuclear power plan. 
The quality management system requirements are 
provided in the Guides YVL 1.4 and YVL 1.9. The 
detailed quality management requirements for de-
sign of a nuclear facility are presented in the Guide 
YVL 2.0 and for the nuclear fuel in the Guide YVL 
6.7. The quality management requirements related 
to speciﬁc technical areas are presented in the cor-
responding technical guides.
Quality management systems of the licensees/
applicants and of the main suppliers are subject to 
approval by STUK. Furthermore, quality manage-
ment systems have to be established by all other 
organisations participating in activities important 
to safety of the use of nuclear energy. The imple-
mentation of these quality management systems is 
veriﬁed by STUK through inspections.
At the moment, STUK’s YVL Guides that set 
the general requirements for quality management 
system are being updated. The new guides will 
reﬂect the ongoing updating of the IAEA guide-
lines and the recent development in the qual-
ity management in industry. In addition, both 
licensees have recently implemented new quality 
management systems. The further assessment of 
the quality management system for the design and 
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construction of the new Olkiluoto unit is underway.
STUK has a Quality Manual that includes 
quality policy, description of the quality system, or-
ganisation and management, main and supporting 
working processes and personnel policy. The results 
of systematic internal audits, self-assessments and 
international evaluations are used as inputs for the 
enhancement projects of the Quality Management 
System at STUK. In addition to STUK’s Quality 
Manual, all main functions of STUK have their 
own more detailed Quality Manuals. During 2003 
STUK has updated its quality policy. In the qual-
ity management system, the process oriented ap-
proach has been implemented through out the 
whole organization in 2004. The Quality Manual 
prepared for the regulatory control of the use of 
nuclear energy has been benchmarked with other 
regulators under the auspices of OECD/NEA work-
ing groups and through bilateral contracts.
2.9.2 Development of the quality 
system in the Loviisa NPP
After Fortum Corporation was formed a need for 
an updated quality policy was obvious. In 1999, a 
quality statement “Fortum’s Policy Commitment 
to Quality in the Nuclear Power Operations” was 
issued by the president of Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy. The statement has been conﬁrmed in 2001 also 
by the new management of Fortum Power and 
Heat Oy.
The recent development of the plant quality 
management system is based on the principle of 
continuous improvement in accordance with the ob-
servations and remarks made in quality audits and 
quality assessments. Loviisa Power Plant adopted 
in 2001 a newly formulated management proce-
dure which deﬁnes an annual planning process 
from strategic planning to annual reports. A ﬁrst 
10-year strategic plan for the power plant was de-
veloped in 2000. Another important new procedure 
describes those review processes (e.g. management 
reviews, self assessments), which are needed in an 
effective quality management system.
In the internal quality audits, new efforts are 
directed to the evaluation of the recurrence of 
events. These have considerably increased the nec-
essary background work both in the preparation 
and in the reporting phase of an internal audit. An 
evaluation of the plant quality management sys-
tem against the ISO/DIS 9001, 9004:2000 stand-
ards were made in 2000 by Fortum Engineering. 
The work continued in 2001–2002 and a similar 
comparison with IAEA Safety Series No. 50-C/SG-
Q was carried out.
The environmental management system of 
the plant was certiﬁed in 2002 according to the 
ISO 14001:1996 standard. During the preparation 
phase an environmental policy and a new chapter 
on environmental system were introduced in the 
Quality Manual. Numerous quality procedures 
were also updated. A novel environmental aspect 
shall be considered in internal audits and new 
part-time auditors have been trained for environ-
mental evaluations.
A new tracking system for quality and safety 
decisions, obligations and actions has been taken 
into use in 2002.
Since the third National Report the Loviisa 
Power Plant Quality Management system has been 
developed continuously on the bases of internal 
and independent assessments and audits, manage-
ment system reviews and on non-conformance con-
trol and corrective action program. New procedures 
have been established in following areas:
• New emergency procedures
• Laboratory quality manual and procedures 
based on standard SFS-EN ISO/IEC 17025
• Inspection Body Loviisa YVL procedures based 
on standard SFS-EN ISO/IEC 17020:2004
• Management self assessment
• Industrial safety procedures and instructions.
All these new procedures are part of Loviisa 
Nuclear Power Plant Quality Management System. 
The management system processes have been 
deﬁned and process descriptions implemented in 
2006. The Industrial Safety System will be certi-
ﬁed in 2007.
2.9.3 Development of the quality 
system in the Olkiluoto NPP
TVO’s new quality management system, Activity 
Based Management System, is described in the 
Quality Management Manual. It takes into ac-
count the requirements from the documents YVL 
1.4 (1991), YVL 1.9 (1991), IAEA Safety Series 
No. 50-C/SG-Q, and ISO 9001:2000. Activity Based 
Management System guides all TVO’s operations 
and provides each staff member with procedures 
for the safe, economical, high-quality and envi-
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ronmentally friendly generation of electricity. The 
system comprises a general section and a func-
tions section. The general section presents TVO’s 
vision, business concept and values, company-level 
policies, organization and areas of responsibility, 
general principles governing the operations, the 
principles guiding quality assurance in operational 
processes, and a general description of the proc-
esses, their resources and the ways in which they 
are run. The functions section describes the opera-
tion as process models, and it also contains more 
detailed handbooks and instructions covering the 
functions.
TVO’s company-level policies are grouped under 
four headings. TVO bases its company-level poli-
cies on its values and business concept. TVO’s com-
pany-level policies are: nuclear safety and quality 
policy, social responsibility policy, production policy 
and corporate security policy.
The functions and responsibilities of TVO’s 
organizations and personnel are described in 
detail in the TVO Administrative Rules, in the 
Organisational Manual and in the manuals and 
instructions of individual organization units. The 
Administrative Rules have been approved by 
STUK as a part of the Technical Speciﬁcations 
Document.
The documentation and procedures are con-
trolled by a software based system as well as the 
management of deviations and corrective actions. 
TVO’s quality management system and quality 
management system for Olkiluoto 3 construction 
phase are certiﬁed to fulﬁll ISO 9001:2000 require-
ments. For the Olkiluoto 3 construction phase 
STUK has approved “The Quality Manual for 
Olkiluoto 3 Project”. The review of document as 
well as review of the QM systems of plant vendor 
and major suppliers is carried out by STUK. STUK 
has also asked external QM experts’ opinions on 
the QM systems.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 13.
2.10 Article 14. Assessment and 
veriﬁcation of safety
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. comprehensive and systematic safety as-
sessments are carried out before the con-
struction and commissioning of a nuclear 
installation and throughout its life. Such 
assessments shall be well documented, sub-
sequently updated in the light of operating 
experience and signiﬁcant new safety in-
formation, and reviewed under the author-
ity of the regulatory body;
ii. veriﬁcation by analysis, surveillance, test-
ing and inspection is carried out to ensure 
that the physical state and the operation 
of a nuclear installation continue to be 
in accordance with its design, applicable 
national safety requirements, and opera-
tional limits and conditions.
2.10.1 Regulatory approach to 
safety assessment
The license applications for a new licence or for 
the renewal of license include the documents re-
quired by the Nuclear Energy Decree: Preliminary 
or Final Safety Analysis Reports; Probabilistic 
Safety Analysis Reports, including Level 1 and 2 
PSA analyses; Quality Assurance Programmes for 
Construction and Operation; Safety Classiﬁcation 
Document, Operational Limits and Conditions 
Document (Technical Speciﬁcations); Programmes 
for Periodic Inspections; Plans for Physical 
Security and Emergency Preparedness; Manuals 
for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; 
Administrative Rules for the Facilities; Programmes 
for Radiation Monitoring in the Environment of 
the Facilities.
The design of the facility is described in the 
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and 
in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The 
reports are submitted, respectively, to STUK for 
approval in connection with the applications for 
Construction and Operating Licenses. According 
to the Nuclear Energy Decree, FSAR has to be con-
tinuously updated.
Decision 395/1991 requires that nuclear power 
plant safety and the design of its safety systems 
shall be justiﬁed by accident analyses and proba-
bilistic safety analyses. Analyses shall be main-
tained and revised if necessary, taking into account 
operating experience, the results of experimen-
tal research and the advancement of calculating 
methods. The calculating methods employed for 
demonstrating the meeting of the safety regula-
tions shall be reliable and well qualiﬁed for dealing 
with the events in question. They shall be applied 
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so that the calculated results are, with a good con-
ﬁdence, less favourable than the results which are 
considered best estimates. Furthermore, analyses 
which simulate the likely course of transients and 
accidents shall be conducted for the purpose of 
probabilistic safety analyses and for the develop-
ment of emergency operating procedures. Detailed 
requirements concerning transient and accident 
analyses, including sensitivity analyses, are pre-
sented in Guide YVL 2.2, “Transient and Accident 
Analyses for Justiﬁcation of Technical Solutions at 
Nuclear Power Plants” and requirements concern-
ing reliability and risk analyses in Guide YVL 2.8. 
According to Guide YVL 2.2, the accidents are clas-
siﬁed based on the frequency of initiating events in 
Category 1 and 2. Additional criteria are presented 
in the Guides YVL 6.2 and YVL 7.1 concerning 
nuclear fuel and releases from the nuclear power 
plant.
Special attention has been paid to plant modiﬁ-
cation processes and documentation. Requirements 
concerning modiﬁcations designed by the utility 
and their independent assessment have been reas-
sessed and included into appropriate YVL Guides. 
The new requirements mean in practice that all 
safety signiﬁcant plant modiﬁcations have to be as-
sessed by a unit which is independent of the design 
and implementation of the modiﬁcation. Detailed 
requirements for the system modiﬁcations are 
presented in the Guide YVL 2.0. STUK has also es-
tablished its own plant modiﬁcation database, in-
cluding the whole operating history of the Finnish 
plants. Based on this database, STUK produces 
reports on ongoing plant modiﬁcations biannually. 
These reports include all safety signiﬁcant plant 
modiﬁcations and other important modiﬁcations.
Comprehensive and systematic safety assess-
ment is an essential part of the licensing process. 
As a condition for a license, both deterministic and 
probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) need to be 
carried out and submitted to STUK for approval. 
Both assessments are kept up to date throughout 
the operation of the nuclear facility, reﬂecting the 
advancement of science and technology. Any chang-
es to these documents are submitted to STUK for 
approval. The review of these safety assessments 
by STUK includes independent safety analyses.
The relicensing of the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant took place in 2006–2007 and new operating 
license was granted in July 2007. The latest com-
prehensive safety assessment of Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant was carried out in connection with the 
relicensing in 1996–1997. The license applications 
included the documents required by the Nuclear 
Energy Decree (see above). E.g. Final Safety 
Analysis Reports were updated. The updates of 
the accident analyses and PSAs including Level 1 
and 2 PSA analyses were made in this connection. 
They involved calculations of most transients and 
accidents with advanced computer codes. The re-
sults of the analyses are discussed in detail below. 
The licensees also provided assessment how the 
regulations have been complied with, including the 
fulﬁlment of YVL Guides. The licensees explained 
how an adequate safety level has been maintained. 
Plans for Radioactive Waste Management were 
presented.
Recently, the PSAs have been updated, and 
their scope has been extended at both nuclear 
power plants. Plant-speciﬁc living PSAs, including 
internal initiators, ﬁres, ﬂooding, seismic events 
for operation mode, and internal events, ﬂoods, and 
severe weather conditions for normal annual refu-
elling outage, have been completed for the plants. 
These PSA studies are used in support of decision 
making by the management at the utilities as well 
as regulatory body. Special attention has been paid 
to seismic events in Finland, although Finland is 
not in a seismically active area. According to the 
PSA results, seismic events do not cause major 
risks in Finland. However, some modiﬁcations have 
been made at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, where 
for example the support structures of batteries and 
switchgear cubicles have been improved. There has 
been no need to implement any speciﬁc measures 
regarding seismic events at Loviisa nuclear power 
plant.
Safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3
The design and licensing process of Olkiluoto 3 
project is done according to the Finnish regulations 
and YVL Guides. The safety approach includes a 
strong deterministic basis complemented by proba-
bilistic analyses in order to improve the prevention 
of accidents, as well as their mitigation. A twofold 
strategy is pursued for the EPR safety require-
ments:
• To improve the preventive measures against ac-
cidents
• To mitigate Severe Accidents consequences, even 
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if their probability has been further reduced. 
This is achieved by implementing features, 
which ensure containment integrity. Thus, it 
can be demonstrated that the need of stringent 
countermeasures are restricted to the immedi-
ate vicinity of the plant. The most important 
special safety features of Olkiluoto 3 design are 
as follows:
• severe accident management (SAM) has 
been taken into account already in the be-
ginning of the design process
• plant structures are designed against a pos-
sible airplane crash so that the event does 
not lead to release of signiﬁcant amount of 
radioactive substances to the environment 
or threaten the safety functions required to 
achieve safe shutdown state. The military 
and the large commercial aircraft are con-
sidered in the design.
The compliance of the EPR with the Decision 
395/1991 and with all YVL Guides is assessed by 
the plant designer. The deterministic as well as 
probabilistic safety assessment will be done by 
plant designer and reviewed by TVO. The deter-
ministic approach is founded on the international 
defence in depth concept.
The comprehensive review of STUK during 
the design, construction and operating phases of 
Olkiluoto 3 is an on-going process divided into 
several stage-by-stage approvals. In addition to 
the review of the reports provided by TVO, STUK 
has asked VTT and foreign institutes to perform 
independent transient and accident analysis for 
the most limiting scenarios. VTT has developed 
own models and codes for the analysis. Results of 
these analyses will be compared to ones provided 
by TVO.
2.10.2  Deterministic safety assessment
Transient and accident analyses 
of the Loviisa NPP
The aim of transient and accident analyses is to 
demonstrate the capability of the plant to cope with 
various transient and accident situations so that 
regulatory requirements are fulﬁlled. According to 
regulatory requirements, the analyses shall be fo-
cused to events, which by nature and severity cover 
different kind of transient and accident situations.
In connection with the relicensing of the Loviisa 
1 and 2 units during 2005–2007, Fortum has 
revised the Final Safety Analysis Report, includ-
ing the transient and accident analyses, taking 
into account plant modiﬁcations implemented at 
both Loviisa 1 and 2 as well as new regulatory 
requirements. For the assessment of normal op-
erating conditions, transients and class 1 and 2 
accidents Fortum has used primarily calculation 
methods which have been developed and validated 
in Finland. The main tool in the analysis has been 
APROS code that has been developed in co-opera-
tion between Fortum and VTT.
The analyses presented in the Safety Analysis 
Report cover anticipated operational transients, 
Category 1 and 2 accidents used as a design basis 
of safety systems and severe reactor accidents. 
Different transient and accident types have been 
classiﬁed. Each category contains several different 
accident sequences. Speciﬁc analyses have been 
presented on each accident sequence. Each analy-
sis essential to safety includes sensitivity calcula-
tions which are often considerably extensive. The 
analyses have been carried out for full power, low 
power and zero power conditions.
Fortum has separately made accident analyses 
for the storages of spent fuel and reactor waste. 
The descriptions and results of the analyses have 
been presented in the appropriate chapters of the 
Safety Analysis Report.
Transient and accident analyses and used ana-
lytical methods have to be maintained and devel-
oped throughout the whole lifetime of a nuclear 
power plant. Based on the results of the analyses, 
measures are taken for enhancing safety, when 
necessary.
STUK has assessed the essential parts of the 
analyses and applied methods described in the 
Safety Analysis Report. STUK has also conducted 
or purchased comparison analyses, by the means of 
which the applicability of analysis methods to the 
description of different transients, the sensitivity 
of analysis results to the parameters describing 
the plant status, and course of an accident or func-
tioning of the models have been clariﬁed. STUK 
concluded that the plant behaviour in different 
transient and accident situations has been ana-
lysed comprehensively and that the methods used 
in the analyses are properly validated to describe 
the operation of the Loviisa plant.
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Transient and accident analyses 
of the Olkiluoto NPP
The performed analyses and the methods used in 
them have been described in the Safety Analysis 
Report (SAR), related Topical Reports and other 
reference reports of SAR.
Transient and accident analyses as well as anal-
ysis methods describing the operation of Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 have been maintained and developed dur-
ing the entire time of plant operation. The analyses 
concerning the operation of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 have 
been renewed during the modernisation project in 
1994–1998. The renewal of analyses for periodic 
safety review (PSR) in 2008 is in progress.
STUK has assessed the essential parts of the 
analyses and applied methods described in the 
Safety Analysis Report. STUK has also conducted 
or purchased comparison analyses, by the means 
of which both the applicability of analysis methods 
to the description of different transients, and the 
sensitivity of analysis results to the parameters 
describing the plant status, course of an accident 
or functioning of the models have been clariﬁed. 
STUK’s review is that the plant behaviour in dif-
ferent transient and accident situations has been 
analysed comprehensively and that the methods 
used in the analyses are properly validated to de-
scribe the operation of the Olkiluoto plant.
Transient and accident analyses 
of the Olkiluoto 3
Safety analysis rules provide a methodology to ver-
ify that safety systems are suitably designed. The 
degree of conservatism of these rules is sufﬁcient 
to provide appropriate margins in the design of the 
safety relevant systems.
The safety analysis rules are strictly applied 
when calculating the thermal-hydraulic and neu-
tronic transients associated to the DBC (Design 
Basis Conditions) incidents and accidents. They 
cover the initiating events of DBC 2 to 4. The “DBC 
accident analysis rules” are part of the conserva-
tive methodology, which supports the deterministic 
safety assessment of the Nuclear Power Plant. 
Events are grouped according to their potential 
risk with regard to the main safety functions:
• reactivity and power control
• heat removal from the fuel assemblies
• conﬁnement of radioactivity.
The events with potential risk are classiﬁed in 
Design Basis Conditions and in Design Extension 
Conditions. The classiﬁcation of Design Basis 
Conditions is based upon their rough expected fre-
quency of occurrence:
• DBC 1 events: Normal operation
• DBC 2 events: Incident Conditions
• DBC 3 events: Accident Conditions, Category 1 
and
• DBC 4 events: Accident Conditions, Category 2.
The Design Basis Conditions contain events caused 
by the failure of one component or the failure of 
one I&C function or one operator error (e.g. spuri-
ous starting of RCP) or loss of offsite power.
The deterministic design of the safety systems 
is supported by the safety analysis of the Design 
Basis Conditions. Beyond this analysis, the design 
basis is extended to provide a frame for the design 
of additional equipment needed to meet the proba-
bilistic objectives for core melt and large releases, 
and to limit radiological releases to an acceptable 
level in case of a postulated low pressure core 
melt. In this design extension, a limited number 
of representative events are analyzed in order to 
justify the design of this additional equipment. The 
representative events are considered as Design 
Extension Conditions.
The preliminary analyses of Olkiluoto 3 are pre-
sented in PSAR and the Topical Reports joined to 
PSAR. The validation process of the used calcula-
tion methods and codes is based on the operational 
data and experiences of the reference plants as 
well as model comparisons by test facilities. The 
validation process of codes used for design and 
licensing calculations is going on. STUK accepted 
the PSAR and its analyses for the construction 
license of Olkiluoto 3 in January 2005.
2.10.3 Probabilistic safety analysis
Probabilistic safety analysis 
in the Loviisa NPP
STUK required in 1984 that Fortum makes an 
extensive probabilistic safety analysis concerning 
the Loviisa units. It was required that the objec-
tive of the study is to determine the plant-speciﬁc 
risk topographies of the most essential accident se-
quences. Another important objective was to train 
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the plant personnel to understand more deeply 
than before the plant and its behaviour as a whole 
in different situations.
Fortum provided STUK with level 1 PSA in 
summer 1989. Since 1990 Fortum has extended 
PSA by analysing risks related to ﬁres, ﬂoods, 
earthquakes, severe weather conditions and out-
ages, as well as by making level 2 PSA (integrity 
of the containment and releases). Since 1990 many 
modiﬁcations of the Loviisa units have been im-
plemented. By means of these modiﬁcations risks 
have been decreased and the risk topography of 
the plant has been balanced. A part of the modi-
ﬁcations was implemented in connection with the 
modernisation of the plant. Technical solutions of 
the modiﬁcations have also been often justiﬁed 
with PSA.
A description of the results of PSA performed 
during the period 1990–2003 including the mod-
ernization programme is presented in Annex 2. 
Thereafter the plant modiﬁcations have further im-
proved the plant safety and at the end of year 2007 
the calculated estimate for the total probability of 
reactor core damage is about 8.2 × 10–5 a year. This 
estimate takes into account all the factors present-
ed above. Fortum has also provided STUK with the 
level 2 PSA in which the integrity of the contain-
ment and the release of radioactive materials from 
the plant to the environment are evaluated. It 
was estimated that the total probability of a large 
release to the environment is about 2.7 × 10–5 a 
year. The implemented modiﬁcations of the Loviisa 
plant to fulﬁl the strategy against severe accidents 
have been included in the estimate. These are: the 
external cooling of the reactor pressure vessel, the 
measures aimed for preventing such loading situa-
tions which break the reactor cavity, the improved 
control of hydrogen and the new procedures for 
severe accident management. The estimate for a 
large release includes a detailed level 2 PSA study 
for internal events, ﬂoods and severe weather con-
ditions in at-power states, whereas the remaining 
areas (ﬁre, seismic and outages) are based on a 
rough estimate on the consequences of the accident 
sequences from level 1 analyses.
STUK has reviewed the analyses provided by 
Fortum. In the reviews a PSA computer program 
developed by STUK has been used. The results 
of the review show that Fortum has applied in its 
analyses commonly accepted methods in modelling 
transient and accident situations of the plant and 
in collecting and handling reliability data.
Probabilistic safety analysis 
in the Olkiluoto NPP
STUK required in 1984 that TVO shall conduct a 
comprehensive probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) 
referring to Olkiluoto plant units 1 and 2, with 
the objective to clarify plant related “risk topog-
raphies” and to train the personnel to understand 
more profoundly the plant and its behaviour as a 
whole in different accident situations. In the ﬁrst 
part of the PSA, TVO was to analyse the frequen-
cies of accident sequences leading to a reactor core 
damage (level 1). In the second part of the PSA, 
TVO was to observe the damage mechanisms of the 
containment and the course of an accident as well 
as to group the accident sequences to release cat-
egories according to the amount of radioactive sub-
stances released to the environment, release mode 
and timing of release, and to assess the occurrence 
probabilities of these release categories (level 2).
Detailed description of the results of PSA per-
formed 2007 including the modernization pro-
gramme is presented in Annex 2. At the 2007 the 
overall core damage frequency of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
is according to the living PSA approximately 1.5 × 
10–5 per reactor year, when all analyses described 
in Annex 2 are taken into account.
In 1996, TVO also delivered to STUK the level 
2 PSA, in which the durability of the containment 
and the releases of radioactive materials to the 
plant vicinity are assessed. The analysis has been 
updated during 1997 and 2003. According to the 
living PSA model in 2004 the frequency of the 
large early release to the environment (>100 TBq 
Cs or undelayed release of noble gas) is 6 × 10–6 per 
reactor year, which is approximately one third of 
the core damage frequency.
STUK has inspected the analyses that TVO 
supplied by the means of a PSA-program it has de-
veloped. The inspection showed that, in its analy-
ses, TVO applied generally approved methods in 
modelling the transient and accident situations of 
the plant as well as in obtaining and handling of 
the reliability data. In the level 2 PSA, the speci-
ﬁcation of results requires further development of 
the models describing the course of an accident.
40
STUK-B 80
Probabilistic safety analyses of Olkiluoto 3
The supplier of the nuclear island of Olkiluoto 3 
has conducted a design phase PSA. The design 
phase PSA has been delivered to STUK as required 
by Nuclear Energy Decree 35 §. The design phase 
PSA includes analysis of internal initiating events, 
internal hazard and external hazards for power 
operation and refuelling outage. STUK accepted 
the Olkiluoto 3 PSA for the construction license of 
Olkiluoto 3 in January 2005.
2.10.5 Veriﬁcation
Veriﬁcation programmes
Decision 395/1991 includes several requirements 
which concern the veriﬁcation of the physical state 
of a nuclear power plant. For instance, in all ac-
tivities affecting the operation of a nuclear power 
plant and the availability of components, a system-
atic approach shall be applied for ensuring plant 
operators’ continuous awareness of the state of the 
plant and its components. The reliable operation of 
systems and components shall be ensured by ad-
equate maintenance as well as by regular in-serv-
ice inspections and periodic tests. General require-
ments on veriﬁcation programmes and procedures 
are provided in YVL Guides (e.g. Guide YVL 1.8, 
YVL 1.9, YVL 3.0, YVL 3.8).
Main programmes used for veriﬁcation of the 
state of a nuclear power plant are
• periodical testing according to the Technical 
Speciﬁcations
• preventive and predictive maintenance pro-
gramme
• in-service inspection programme
• periodical inspections of pressure equipment 
and piping
• surveillance programme of reactor pressure ves-
sel material
• programmes for evaluating the ageing of com-
ponents and materials.
Activities for verifying the physical state of a pow-
er plant are carried out in connection with nor-
mal daily routines and with scheduled inspections, 
testing, preventive maintenance etc. Activities are 
performed by the licensee personnel, and in the 
case of certain inspections by contractors approved 
separately. Detailed programmes and procedures 
are established and approved by the licensee, and 
reviewed and, to some extent, approved by STUK. 
The results of tests and inspections are documented 
in a systematic way and used through a feedback 
process to further develop the programmes. The 
Operational Limits and Conditions are approved 
by STUK. In general, the role of STUK is to verify 
that the licensees follow the obligations imposed 
on them and carry out all activities scheduled in 
veriﬁcation programmes.
Comprehensive evaluations related to the state 
and operation of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants 
were carried out by Fortum in 2005–2007 and 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy in 1996–1998. These ac-
tivities were controlled by STUK. The new periodic 
safety review of Olkiluoto plant will be completed 
by the end of 2008.
Inspection qualiﬁcation
According to international experience and Guide 
YVL 3.8 STUK has recognised the qualiﬁcation of 
non-destructive testing systems and procedures as 
an issue of high importance. This issue requires 
high priority at both nuclear power plants. The 
implementation of qualiﬁed NDT systems has been 
started in 1990’s in Finland. STUK has decided in 
those days that the consensus document “Common 
position of European Regulators on qualiﬁcation 
of NDT-systems for pre- and in-service inspection 
of light water reactor components, EUR 16802 
EN” is to be followed in Finland. ENIQ documents 
(European Network for Inspection Qualiﬁcation) 
shall also be followed. The application of the docu-
ments has been described now by Guide YVL 3.8. 
The licensees have drawn up a strategy for quali-
ﬁcation including general guidelines and guides 
to the practical qualiﬁcation work. Licensees have 
also nominated a steering committee, which has 
nominated a technical support group, and inde-
pendent qualiﬁcation body has been established. 
Several qualiﬁcation cases have been completed.
General requirements on inspection qualiﬁca-
tion are provided in Guide YVL 3.8. The docu-
ment “European methodology for qualiﬁcation” 
drawn up by the European Network for Inspection 
Qualiﬁcation shall be used as the minimum re-
quirement level for qualiﬁcation of inspection sys-
tems to be used in in-service inspection, and it 
shall be complemented by recommended prac-
tices. The report stating the common position 
of European regulators on the qualiﬁcation of 
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NDT systems relates the qualiﬁcation of inspec-
tion methods applied in the in-service inspection of 
nuclear power plant pressure equipment to nuclear 
safety. In the content of licensees guidelines the re-
quirements presented in YVL 3.8, in the European 
Methodology for Qualiﬁcation (EUR 17299) and 
in its recommendations have been taken into ac-
count.
Inspection qualiﬁcation means the systematic 
assessment, by all those methods that are needed 
to provide reliable conﬁrmation, of an inspection 
system to ensure it is capable of achieving the 
required performance under real inspection condi-
tions. Each inspection system shall be qualiﬁed for 
in-service inspections such that it reliably detects, 
characterises and/or sizes defects endangering 
structural integrity and nuclear safety.
The licensee is responsible for organising quali-
ﬁcation and using in its implementation the servic-
es of testing bodies and a qualiﬁcation body. On the 
basis of Sections 19 and 20 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, the licensee shall have available the necessary 
expertise and economic resources.
The licensee has a qualiﬁcation body for quali-
ﬁcation management, implementation, control and 
assessment as well as the issuing of qualiﬁcation 
certiﬁcates. The qualiﬁcation body is competent 
and independent of the construction and operation 
of nuclear power plants as well as ﬁnancial factors 
that could affect its work and decisions.
The personnel of the qualiﬁcation body have 
diverse expertise and experience in the technical 
ﬁelds required to assess the capability of inspec-
tion systems to reliably detect, characterise and 
size ﬂaws. At least one member of the personnel 
monitoring and assessing qualiﬁcations from the 
inspection technical point of view shall have Level 
3 basic qualiﬁcation for the inspection method in 
question according to a qualiﬁcation system that 
complies with Standard SFS-EN 473 or a corre-
sponding system; in addition, extensive practical 
experience is required on factors that could affect 
inspection reliability in the in-service inspection of 
nuclear power plant components and structures.
A qualiﬁcation body may also be qualiﬁca-
tion-speciﬁc. The licensee is responsible for as-
suring the continuity of qualiﬁcation by setting 
up a qualiﬁcation steering committee and as-
signing to it members who have sufﬁcient ex-
pertise in the ﬁeld. The nuclear licensees have 
established the Steering Committee and nomi-
nate its members. The Steering Committee is 
formed by the representatives of Fortum, TVO, 
VTT, vendors performing nuclear power plant in-
spections and STUK. The representative of the 
qualiﬁcation body, Inspecta Certiﬁcation, is the 
secretary of the Steering Committee. The members 
of the Steering Committee are nominated on an-
nual basis. Nominated qualiﬁcation body (Inspecta 
Certiﬁcation) is responsible for the practical ar-
rangement of qualiﬁcation. When needed Inspecta 
Certiﬁcation uses also experts outside of its own 
organisation for individual qualiﬁcations.
Qualiﬁcation of UT inspection personnel is now 
organised and realised. In addition to SFS-EN 473 
qualiﬁcations, an additional personnel qualiﬁcation 
is required and established for in-service inspec-
tions. Additional personnel qualiﬁcations are based 
on theoretical and practical trials using qualiﬁed 
inspection procedures and test pieces with cracks 
for detection and sizing, and covering the data ana-
lysts and manual inspectors. The qualiﬁcation for 
sizing of cracks manually is realised for the most 
experienced inspectors. Several qualiﬁcations of 
inspection systems are completed successfully and 
approved by STUK.
In-service inspections in Loviisa NPP
The condition of the pressure-retaining compo-
nents of Loviisa 1 and 2 is ensured with regular in-
service inspections. The components of the primary 
circuit are inspected by means of non-destructive 
examination methods. These regularly repeated 
examinations are carried out during outages ac-
cording to Guide YVL 3.8. The results of the in-
service inspections are compared with the results 
of the previous inspections and of the preservice 
inspections which have been carried out before the 
commissioning.
The in-service inspection plans are submitted to 
STUK for approval before each individual inservice 
inspections. Programmes and related inspection 
procedures are changed when necessary, taking 
into account the development of requirements 
and standards in the ﬁeld, the advancement of ex-
amination techniques and inspection experiences 
as well as operating experiences in Finland and 
abroad.
Those areas have been tried to select as inspec-
tion objects where defects arise most probably. 
42
STUK-B 80
These kinds of areas are e.g. objects susceptible to 
fatigue due to temperature variations. The selec-
tion of inspection objects is subject to a continuous 
development.
The length of the inspection period of the 
regular inspections (e.g. ASME Code, Section XI) is 
normally ten years. Inspection programmes have 
been complemented with additional inspections 
as regards the reactor pressure vessel and the pri-
mary circuit piping, and the length of the inspec-
tion period of the reactor pressure vessel has been 
reduced to eight years. The length of the inspection 
period of the objects susceptible to thermal fatigue 
is often 3 years.
Guide YVL 3.8 and the latest revisions of the 
ASME Code, Section XI are applied as approval 
bases for the in-service inspection programmes and 
procedures.
The reliability of the non-destructive examina-
tion methods for the primary circuit piping and 
components has been essentially improved after 
the commissioning of the plant. Guide YVL 3.8 
calls for the qualiﬁcation of the entire NDT-system; 
equipment, software, procedures and personnel. 
Several inspection systems are already qualiﬁed. 
New qualiﬁcation cases have been started and 
reasonable amount of qualiﬁcation cases are in 
progress. Inspection systems are qualiﬁed or in 
progress for the new phased array technique. 
Several new qualiﬁcation cases are under design 
phase. Implementation of input data for qualiﬁca-
tion and design of relevant test pieces is going on. 
STUK follows the development and implementa-
tion of the plans closely.
In addition to the inspections mentioned above, 
physical inspections concerning the condition and 
reliability of pressure equipment are carried out 
as regular pressure equipment inspections accord-
ing to the Finnish pressure equipment legislation. 
Such inspections are a full inspection, an internal 
inspection and an operational inspection. These 
inspections include non-destructive examinations 
as well as pressure and tightness tests. The inspec-
tions of piping have been deﬁned in the system-
speciﬁc monitoring programmes. These periodic 
inspections are dealt with in Guides YVL 3.0, YVL 
3.3, YVL 5.3, YVL 5.4, YVL 5.7. The periodic inspec-
tion programmes fulﬁl the requirements of YVL 
Guides, as regards the number and techniques of 
inspections.
In-service inspections in Olkiluoto NPP
The condition of pressure retaining components 
of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 is assured through regular 
in-service inspections. Periodically repeated in-
spections are performed during the outages to the 
safety-signiﬁcant components by non-destructive 
testing methods according to the Guide YVL 3.8. 
Results of in-service inspections are compared with 
the results of earlier inspections and with the re-
sults of pre-service inspections conducted before 
the commissioning.
In-service inspection programmes are supplied 
to STUK for approval before each inspection. The 
programmes and related inspection procedures 
are changed when necessary, taking into account 
the development of requirements and standards in 
the area, the development of inspection techniques 
as well as inspection experience and operational 
experience from nuclear power plants in Finland 
and elsewhere.
The objective has been to choose areas where 
initiation of defects is most likely as inspection 
items. Such ones are the items that are susceptible 
to thermal fatigue and stress corrosion.
The length of an inspection period is usually ten 
years. The inspection periods for items susceptible 
to stress corrosion are ﬁve, three or two years and 
for items susceptible to thermal fatigue, respec-
tively, three years.
Guide YVL 3.8 and the latest editions of the 
ASME Code, Section XI are used as the acceptance 
criteria of in-service inspection programs, proce-
dures and results.
Olkiluoto NPP has qualiﬁed most of the entire 
NDT-system; equipment, software, procedures and 
personnel according Guide YVL 3.8. In the near fu-
ture, focus is to maintain all the qualiﬁcations and 
complement qualiﬁcations with new techniques. 
Main focus is also to verify that all the in-service 
inspection items are covered with qualiﬁed inspec-
tion techniques. In addition to the aforementioned 
inspections, physical inspections that concern the 
condition and reliability of pressure equipment 
are performed at regular intervals according to the 
Finnish pressure equipment legislation.
Ageing management
The Finnish regulatory approach to ageing of sys-
tems, structures and components (SSCs) is laid 
down in the YVL Guides. Further dedicated regu-
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lation is expected from their renewals and the on-
going review of the Decision of the 395/1991. The 
current YVL 1.0 underlines ageing consideration in 
the design stage and in provision for the associated 
surveillance, repair and replacement activities. In 
the context of operating licence application, YVL 
1.1 requires an ageing management plan which 
identiﬁes all signiﬁcant ageing and wearout mech-
anisms and incorporates the design and qualiﬁca-
tion of the components, their operation and operat-
ing experience, as well as in-service inspections, 
tests and maintenance in a comprehensive pro-
gramme. The detailed technical requirements have 
been issued in the relevant guidelines for pressure 
equipment, concrete structures, and electric and 
I&C systems and components.
The regulatory oversight of ageing in operat-
ing plants focuses on operating licence renewals 
and Periodic Safety Reviews (PSRs) where the 
conformance to the relevant regulations and YVL 
Guides, including experiences with ageing and its 
management, will be investigated. STUK’s ﬁndings 
from other regulatory control practices stipulated 
in YVL 1.1, particularly the periodic inspection 
programme, are used as veriﬁcation. The periodic 
inspections are done on plant site according to an-
nual schedules and tackle both the technical as-
pects of each discipline and the process of ageing 
management. Regular analysis of the results gives 
feedback to further planning of the programme. 
STUK also receives from each unit annual reports 
on ageing management activities within each tech-
nical discipline.
Ageing management in Loviisa NPP
Radiation embrittlement of the reactor pressure 
vessel (RPV) has dominated the ageing related ac-
tivities in the Loviisa NPP since the early years of 
operation. For details, see section ”Ensuring prima-
ry circuit integrity” in ANNEX 3. The current age-
ing management programme, known as LO-PLIM 
-process, was established in the mid-1990’s. This 
process controls operation and maintenance with 
procedures like long-term planning, modiﬁcation 
proposals and annual audits. The Plant Technology 
unit has nominated system responsibles to take 
care of the SSCs belonging to the programme. The 
SSCs have been assigned to categories A through 
D based on their technoeconomical replacebility. 
SSC failures in category A would limit plant life-
time and thus deserve a part-assembly-wise break-
down of ageing related remedies. Data indicative 
of plant status and trends are collected with op-
eration, maintenance and inspection IT systems, 
R&D activities and via experience exchange in the 
WANO and NUMEX Groups. The consequent rat-
ings of operability, remaining service life and nec-
essary actions for each SSC are stored on the plant 
computer.
In 2006, the operating utility Fortum Power and 
Heat Oy submitted to the Government an applica-
tion to continue the operation of unit 1 and 2 until 
the end of 2027 and 2030, respectively, meaning a 
20-year extension to the original design life-time. 
The permits to operate the RPVs until 2012 and 
2010, respectively, would stay in effect and would 
have to be continued via approved updating of 
the current RPV safety analyses. The rationale of 
this application had become obvious in LO-PLIM 
project clariﬁcations, including fatigue analyses 
covering the whole 50 years’ life span with due ac-
count of the environmental effects.
Technical justiﬁcation was submitted to 
STUK, including the updated fatigue analyses 
and documents on In-Service Inspection Summary 
Programme, Ageing Management Programme 
Principles and Implementation, and SSC Status 
and Service Life Extensibility. The SSCs assigned 
to category A, i.e. the RPV, main coolant pump, 
steam generator, pressurizer, containment and re-
actor building, were addressed in detail while RPV 
internals and electical and I&C components were 
dropped to a lower category due to their replacebil-
ity. Projects are underway to replace cables in con-
tainment due to its detected ambient temperature 
rise, and for plant-wide replacing of protection and 
plant automation systems and components. Safety 
is thus adequately implemented in the programme 
though it is not among the direct attributes of SSC 
categorization.
In its review, STUK made a general point that 
the state-of-the-art permitted a quantitative life-
time evaluation only in case of ageing by fatigue. 
Uncertainties exist e.g. with corrosion phenomena. 
However, the potential mechanisms of each part 
assembly have been identiﬁed, and the utility re-
lies on its resources to monitor, inspect, mitigate 
and repair as needed. Further positive arguments 
were found from the organisation’s well demon-
strated capability to surpass forthcoming ageing 
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issues in the past: investigations leading to more 
reliable direct fracture toughness determination 
from irradiated RPV material with the Master 
Curve method, successful recovery of Loviisa 1 
RPV critical weld properties by annealing in 1996, 
unanticipated primary circuit thermal mixing and 
stratiﬁcation management with instrumentation 
developed by the utility, and ageing management 
R&D enabling the plant modernisation and power 
uprating in 1997–98. The review of the electric and 
I&C systems and components prompted a request 
to clarify the coverage of their ageing surveillance, 
and to improve their annual reporting.
Ageing management in Olkiluoto NPP
The ageing management activities in Olkiluoto 
NPP arose from a struggle against wide-spread 
inter-granular stress corrosion cracking (ISCC) in 
reactor auxiliary system piping. Early replacement 
of entire piping systems, achievable with modest 
doses to maintenance staff, considerably mitigated 
IGSCC and led the way to the utility’s current 
strategy of seeing to the critical SSCs so that a 
remaining plant life-time of 40 years (design life-
time) could be always demonstrated.
Since 1991, a Working Group of Lifetime 
Management has taken care of these activities by 
gathering information of possibly needed future 
actions from several sources and by preparing and 
updating a table of recommended major modiﬁca-
tions, replacements, repairs and overhauls. The 
modernization and power uprating of both units 
by 16% in 1994–96 evolved from these recommen-
dations and was completely undertaken by the 
utility’s technical support organization residing 
on plant site. Maintenance planning also plays an 
important part in Olkiluoto NPP’s ageing manage-
ment implementation. The SSCs are assigned based 
on their availability requirements and preven-
tive maintenance needs to four equipment groups, 
each characterized by a common type or location 
(e.g. all containment isolation valves) while the 
systems typically differ. Denominated equipment 
group owners and their technical support persons 
analyse the entire maintenance programme and its 
experiences with regard to the anticipated ageing 
phenomena and induced failure potential, and as-
sist in selection of the most effective maintenance 
works according to established guidelines. The 
ﬁndings from each equipment group are docu-
mented annually and stored into a relational data 
base on the plant computer, and a summary report 
is sent to STUK for information.
STUK reviewed TVO’s clariﬁcation on the ac-
tual condition and ageing implications of the main 
SSCs in its statement to support the current oper-
ating licences, expiring in 2018. In context of the 
next PSR, scheduled for 2008, a similar review is 
expected. STUK has additionally required that 
a pilot project be undertaken for updating the 
fatigue analyses to incorporate the environmen-
tal effect. The organizational processes were the 
subject of periodic inspection on plant site in 2005. 
In spite of the staff ’s good involvement and good 
records in terms of load factor, STUK found that, 
compared to international guidelines, the ageing 
management still consists of separate routines and 
thus misses a description as a programmatic entity 
where the responsibilities, SSC selection, ageing 
mechanisms and means of their management are 
clearly deﬁned. The utility’s response is underway 
and will be evaluated in the course of next PSR. 
The recent technical reviews have centred around 
ageing mechanisms, surveillance and replacements 
speciﬁc to each discipline and have produced no 
major comments.
The implemented modernizations of the electri-
cal and I&C systems have, except the improvement 
of the plant monitoring and control, replaced the 
out of date equipment with more modern technol-
ogy. The ageing of the cam material of the safety 
relays and the observer zink whiskers have caused 
relay changing campaing during the years 2004–
2006. Some types of relays and other components 
are under ageing consideration and will propably 
be replaced.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 14.
2.11 Article 15. Radiation protection
Each contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that in all operational 
states the radiation exposure to the workers 
and the public caused by a nuclear installa-
tion shall be kept as low as reasonably achiev-
able and that no individual shall be exposed 
to radiation doses which exceed prescribed 
national dose limits.
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Radiation Act includes the ALARA requirement 
for radiation protection. Occupational dose limits 
and dose limits for the general public are set forth 
in the Radiation Decree. These limits are in con-
formity with the ICRP 60 Recommendation (1990). 
Government decision 395/1991 includes regulations 
for limiting the radiation exposure of the general 
public and the releases of radioactive materials 
into the environment, arising from the operation 
of a nuclear power plant. These sections also cover 
design limits for releases in anticipated operation-
al occurrences and accidents. There are several 
YVL Guides which deal with radiation protection 
and monitoring as regards the design and opera-
tion of nuclear power plants, e.g. YVL 1.0, YVL 7.1 
(revised in 2006), YVL 7.6 (revised in 2006), YVL 
7.9, YVL 7.10, YVL 7.11 (revised in 2004) and YVL 
7.18. The changes in the revised Guides YVL 7.1 
and 7.6 concern e.g. the requirement of BAT (best 
available technologies) in radioactive efﬂuent puri-
ﬁcation. The major changes of the Guide YVL 7.11 
implied more in depth requirements e.g. on the 
requirement speciﬁcations, suitability analysis and 
the whole regulatory process.
STUK carries out regulatory control and inspec-
tions for ensuring that the radiation protection re-
quirements are complied with during the operation 
of nuclear facilities. Experience gained from the 
operation of Finnish nuclear facilities shows that 
the ALARA principle has been followed and that 
the dose limits have not been exceeded. The results 
of environmental surveillance programmes show 
that the amount of radioactive materials originat-
ing from the Finnish nuclear facilities has been 
very low in their environment. Radiation safety is 
discussed in more detail below.
2.11.1 Topical issues on the radiation 
safety of workers
The radiation safety of workers depends on the 
constructional structure and maintenance activi-
ties of a plant as well as on radiation protection 
measures in connection with works. The factors 
affecting safety at the plant are partly the same 
as for the safety of the surrounding population (in-
tegrity of nuclear fuel, materials/water chemistry, 
functioning of puriﬁcation systems). In addition, 
e.g. the realisation of the work planning and per-
mits of radiation protection as well as radiation 
measurements contribute to radiation safety.
Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants 
have developed and implemented plant-speciﬁc 
ALARA programmes. Key issues in this ALARA 
implementation are e.g. proper maintenance work 
and outage planning, real-time dosimetry, training 
and contamination control. The plant operators 
have also paid special attention to water chemistry 
conditions and the proper selection of materials, 
when changing primary circuit equipment and 
components. The activity levels in the primary cir-
cuit water have been reasonably low. STUK has fol-
lowed the work and made also its own judgement 
on the results.
Loviisa nuclear power plant has carried out a 
reassesment of the factors of the operational radia-
tion protection in 2006. They have recruited addi-
tional radiation protection staff in 2006 and 2007.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant has outsourced 
the TL dosimetry service as a whole. Preparation 
and detailed plans of the renewal of installed ra-
diation monitoring systems were done in 2006 and 
2007. Based on approval of STUK ﬁrst installation 
and commissioning of these new equipment started 
successfully in 2007 at unit 2.
The Finnish nuclear power plants run a joint 
annual training of contractor’s key radiation pro-
tection experts as well as basic radiation protec-
tion training for all workers accessing the nuclear 
power plant. STUK is observing also international 
development to give further instructions of enhanc-
ing this educational system.
In 2006, there was a change of the Radiation 
Act concerning a periodic approval of the personal 
dosimetry services in Finland. The approval can 
be granted by STUK for a time period which shall 
not exceed 5 years. TVO dosimetry service already 
got the approval until 2011. Fortum has submit-
ted additional substantiation based on the STUK 
requirements for their application.
Monitoring of occupational radiation doses and 
the reporting of measurement data in the central 
dose register of STUK are based to YVL Guide 
7.10. The Finnish and Swedish competent authori-
ties for radiation safety agreed already in 1983 on 
the practice that the radiation doses of the nuclear 
power plant workers received in other country are 
reported in the central register of the home coun-
try of the workers. This practice and the results are 
assessed annually. The radiation doses received 
in other countries than Finland and Sweden are 
46
STUK-B 80
reported to STUK with a speciﬁc dose record, the 
use of which is also imposed by the regulations of 
European Union.
2.11.2 Radiation exposure of workers 
at the Loviisa NPP
According to Guide YVL 7.9 the objective for the 
limitation of the collective radiation exposure 
of operating nuclear power plant workers is 2.5 
manSv per 1 GW of net electric power, calculated 
for one reactor unit and averaged over two succes-
sive years. At the preset power level of the Loviisa 
plant, this corresponded with the average of 1,22 
manSv a year for one reactor unit. If this value 
is exceeded as a result of the operation for two 
successive years, radiation protection shall be im-
proved at the unit in question. Exceeding of the set 
goal occurred at Loviisa 1 in 2005, this was mainly 
because of the inﬂuence of the previous year main-
tenance activities. The utility has clariﬁed the situ-
ation and basic reasons. Some further actions are 
requested by STUK aiming to improve the effec-
tiveness of radiation protection measures in the vi-
cinity of the primary piping and steam generators 
during outages. The collective dose depends also on 
the extent and nature of works in annual outages.
The dose limit for the exposure of a worker 
is 50 mSv a year. In addition it is provided, that 
the radiation exposure of a person engaged in ra-
diation work is limited so that the added dose does 
not exceed 100 mSv for the period of 5 years. The 
personal radiation doses at the Loviisa NPP have 
remained under the set dose limits. The largest 
dose of a Finnish worker during a 5 years period 
2002–2006 was received during working at Loviisa 
nuclear power plant, and it was 70,4 mSv.
The radiation dose statistics are presented in 
Table 1 and Figure 8.
STUK’s review ﬁnding is that the limitation of 
personnel’s radiation exposure has been arranged 
appropriately at the Loviisa plant. Measures for 
limiting radiation exposure are to be continued ac-
cording to the ALARA principle.
2.11.3 Radiation exposure of workers 
at the Olkiluoto NPP
The occupational collective and personal radiation 
doses at the Olkiluoto NPP have clearly remained 
under the set dose limits. The radiation dose statis-
tics are presented in Table 2 and Figure 9.
Table 1. Radiation doses at Loviisa NPP in 2004–2006.
Year
Collective 
dose 
[manSv]
Maximum 
personal dose  
[mSv]
Average 
dose*) 
[mSv]
2004 2.49 15.8 3.49
2005 0.81 13.5 1.65
2006 1.66 13.6 2.39
*) calculated by using the registered radiation doses, which are ≥ 0.1 
mSv/month.
Table 2. Radiation doses at Olkiluoto NPP in 2004–2006.
Year
Collective 
dose 
[manSv]
Maximum 
personal dose  
[mSv]
Average 
dose*) 
[mSv]
2004 1.51 13.0 1.26
2005 2.29 11.9 1.53
2006 2.20 12.2 1.46
*) calculated by using the registered radiation doses, which are ≥ 0.1 mSv/
month.
Figure 8. Collective occupational doses and distribu-
tion of individual annual worker doses at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant.
Figure 9. Collective occupational doses and distribu-
tion of individual annual worker doses at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant.
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At the present power level of the Olkiluoto 
plant, the YVL 7.9 limit 2.5 manSv per 1 GW of 
net electric power correspond to 2,15 manSv a 
year for one reactor unit. The collective doses of 
the Olkiluoto plant is in general clearly smaller 
compared to the average values gained from the 
boiling water reactor plants of the same vintage. 
Extensive outage works in 2005 and 2006 have 
increased these from the base line.
STUK’s review ﬁnding is that the limitation of 
personnel’s radiation exposure has been arranged 
appropriately at the Olkiluoto plant. Measures for 
limiting radiation exposure are to continued ac-
cording to the ALARA principle.
2.11.4 Radioactive efﬂuents
In the operation of a nuclear power plant radioac-
tive materials are produced and mainly remain 
within the nuclear fuel. Radioactive materials are 
produced also in the reactor coolant circuit, and 
are further transferred in water, gas and waste 
treatment systems. A very small part of radioactive 
materials is released in the air and water of the 
surroundings.
Fuel rods at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear 
power plants have had low failure rates. There 
has been 0–2 observed leakages during one an-
nual operational period of the Olkiluoto reactors 
during the period 2004–2006. There were no ob-
served leakages at Loviisa NPP during 2004–2006. 
Puriﬁcation and waste systems of the both plants 
have operated properly.
Both nuclear power plants have efﬁciently im-
plemented measures to reduce the releases of 
radioactive substances into the environment. 
Radioactive releases into the environment from 
the Finnish nuclear power plants have been well 
below authorised limits (for important nuclides 
and pathways, of the order of 0.01% to 0.1% of set 
values based on the requirements of Guides YVL 
7.1, YVL 7.2, YVL 7.3 and YVL 7.6). The radioac-
tive efﬂuents in 2004–2006 are shown in Tables 3 
and 4.
The limit for the dose commitment of an indi-
vidual of the population, arising from the normal 
operation of a nuclear power plant in any pe-
riod of one year, is 0,1 mSv (Decision 395/1991). 
Calculated radiation exposures to the individual 
of the critical group living in the environment of 
the nuclear power plants are shown in Figure 10. 
Doses have been clearly under the limit.
2.11.5 Environmental radiation monitoring
Environmental radiation monitoring in the vicinity 
of nuclear power plants has been very comprehen-
sive and implemented according to the require-
ments of YVL Guide 7.7. The experience from the 
surveillance was taken into account when the nu-
clear power utilities proposed and STUK approved 
new monitoring programmes to be implemented 
2003–2007. Changes were minor; in addition a trial 
of carbon-14 measurements from indicator samples 
in the vicinity of the sites is to be done during this 
5-years period.
An outside contracted laboratory collects and 
analyzes about 350 samples (air, fallout, sediment, 
Table 3. Radioactive efﬂuents from the Loviisa NPP. Between brackets is presented the %-proportion of the 
release limit.
Airborne efﬂuents Liquid efﬂuents 
excluding tritium 
[Bq]Year Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. [Bq]
Iodine I-131 ekv. 
[Bq]
Aerosols 
[Bq]
2004 6,58E+12 (0.03%) 1,11E+07 (0.005%) 1,16E+08 1,34E+09 (0.2%)
2005 6,61E+12 (0.03%) 6,22E+04 (0.00003%) 1,07E+08 8,75E+08 (0.1%)
2006 5,78E+12 (0.03%) 3,00E+05 (0.0001%) 1,06E+08 6,49E+08 (0.1%)
Table 4. Radioactive efﬂuents from Olkiluoto NPP. Between brackets is presented the %-proportion of the release 
limit.
Airborne efﬂuents Liquid efﬂuents 
excluding tritium 
[Bq]Year Noble gases Kr-87 ekv. [Bq]
Iodine I-131 ekv. 
[Bq]
Aerosols 
[Bq]
2004 under MDA under MDA 2,14E+07 4,87E+08 (0,2%)
2005 1,52E+11 (0.0009%) 6,88E+07 (0,06%) 4,08E+07 6,80E+08 (0,2%)
2006 6,49E+11 (0.004 %) 1,56E+08 (0,1%) 3,11E+07 6,27E+08 (0,2%)
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indicator organisms, milk etc) per year from the 
environment of each NPP. Very small quantities of 
radioactive substances of local origin were detected 
in 2004–2006 on some samples from the environ-
ment of each nuclear power plant. Concentrations 
of the radioactive substances were very low, and 
health effects for the public are insigniﬁcant.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 15.
2.12 Article 16. Emergency preparedness
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that there are on-
site and off-site emergency plans that are 
routinely tested for nuclear installations 
and cover the activities to be carried out 
in the event of an emergency. For any new 
nuclear installation, such plans shall be 
prepared and tested before it commences 
operation above a low power level agreed 
by the regulatory body.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure that, insofar as 
they are likely to be affected by a radio-
logical emergency, its own population and 
the competent authorities of the States in 
the vicinity of the nuclear installation are 
provided with appropriate information for 
emergency planning and response.
3. Contracting Parties which do not have a 
nuclear installation on their territory, in-
sofar as they are likely to be affected in the 
event of a radiological emergency at a nu-
clear installation in the vicinity, shall take 
the appropriate steps for the preparation 
and testing of emergency plans for their 
territory that cover the activities to be car-
ried out in the event of such an emergency.
On-site arrangements
The basic regulations for on-site emergency plan-
ning are given in the Nuclear Energy Act and in 
Decision 397/1991. Rewriting of YVL Guide 7.4 
(revision 2002) belongs to a pilot project of a ma-
jor revision of YVL guides under preparation in 
2007. The licensee is responsible for the on-site 
emergency response arrangements. Emergency re-
sponse arrangements shall also be consistent with 
the rescue service and emergency plans made by 
the authorities in provision against nuclear power 
plant accidents. Appropriate training and exercises 
shall be arranged to maintain operational prepar-
edness.
Since the Third Review Meeting emergency re-
sponse procedures at Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear 
power plants have been further developed based on 
the requirements of Guide YVL 7.4 and the experi-
ences in training and exercises. These procedures 
have been regularly tested in annual exercises that 
are part of the plants’ emergency preparedness 
training. STUK has approved major changes to 
the emergency plans of nuclear power plants, and 
carries out annual inspections to assess the emer-
gency preparedness regime, including emergency 
training and exercises. Among other things, the 
maintenance and adequacy of emergency rooms 
and equipment, communication and alarm systems, 
computerised support systems as well as personnel 
training and qualiﬁcations are inspected. Main ob-
servations in the inspections have concerned new 
Figure 10. Calculated annual radiation exposures to the members of critical groups in the environment of the 
Finnish nuclear power plants. Doses have been clearly under the limit 100 microSv.
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equipment and methods for keeping logbook and 
changing information, instructions for emergency 
situation, annual and long-term training.
For the new unit under construction at Olkiluoto 
site, the utility has provided STUK with a prelimi-
nary emergency plan. STUK also veriﬁes in the 
inspections the emergency arrangement for the 
whole site, training for construction workers and 
co-operation arrangements with local rescue au-
thorities.
Annual on-site emergency exercises are con-
ducted so that at least the licensee personnel, local 
off-site emergency management group and STUK 
participate in them. There are observers from 
STUK and several other organisations assessing 
the performance of exercising teams. The 2005 
exercise was a typical annual emergency exercise 
in Loviisa NPP including notiﬁcation and com-
munications, assessment of accident situation and 
interactions with off-site organisations. In 2006 the 
Olkiluoto exercise was a table-top exercise focusing 
on the decision making and changing situation re-
view between the emergency organisations of NPP 
and authorities. Full-scale emergency exercises 
with the participation of local authorities were car-
ried out in Loviisa NPP in 2006 and in Olkiluoto 
NPP in 2005.
On 9 January 2005 an exceptional increase in 
the sea water level in the Gulf of Finland brought 
about an emergency standby situation at Loviisa 
NPP. The plant sent STUK the relevant notices 
and started up the operation of its own emergency 
stand-by organisation in order to ensure the safety 
level of the plant. STUK’s organisation was partly 
summoned at STUK’s emergency centre to follow 
the situation and communicate with Loviisa NPP 
as well as key authorities and partners of co-opera-
tion. The see water level increase of 1,73 m higher 
than the average caused no leaks into the plant’s 
rooms or other corresponding phenomena that 
would endanger the plant’s safety; both reactor 
units were in normal operation. The event was 
later classiﬁed as INES Level 0.
Off-site arrangements
In addition to the on-site emergency plans estab-
lished by the licensees, off-site emergency plans 
required by the rescue legislation (468/2003) are 
prepared by local authorities. The requirements 
for off-site plans and activities in a radiation emer-
gency are provided in the Decree of the Ministry 
of Interior (774/2001). STUK is an expert body to 
support the Ministry of Interior in the emergency 
response in the case of nuclear and radiological 
accidents. STUK publishes VAL Guides for emer-
gency response. Guide VAL 1.1 (2001) “Protective 
Actions in Nuclear or Radiological Emergency” pro-
vides detailed guidance. In the case of an accident 
the local authorities are alerted by the operating 
organisation of the plant. In the beginning of 2004 
all over in Finland the counties took over the res-
cue obligation which was formerly a responsibility 
of municipalities. In this way there is a larger pool 
with well trained resources available.
STUK has an Emergency Preparedness Manual 
for its own activities in the case of a nuclear ac-
cident or radiological emergency. STUK has an ex-
pert on duty for 24 hours a day, in order to be able 
to immediately give advice to local and govern-
mental authorities on needed emergency response 
actions. These actions can include, i.e., warning 
the population with a message which can be heard 
through all radio channels. The message on an 
exceptional event (alarm) can be received from the 
operating organisations of the facilities, or auto-
matically from the radiation monitoring network 
that is dense in the whole country (300 measuring 
stations), or from foreign authorities.
The on-site and off-site plans include provisions 
to inform the population in the case of an acci-
dent. In addition, written instructions on radiation 
emergencies, emergency planning and response ar-
rangements have been provided to the population 
living within the 20 km Emergency Planning Zone. 
Basic information on radiological emergencies and 
response is given in the telephone directories of 
Finland. The published regional directories (about 
the EPZ area) contain similar but more detailed 
instructions.
The regulations and guides are tested in off-site 
emergency exercises conducted every third year. 
Full scale off-site emergency and rescue exercise 
was carried out in Finland in 2005 based on the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant accident scenario. In 
2006 the national exercise concerned the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant. The rescue manager with his 
staff was for the ﬁrst time located in the provincial 
capital Porvoo. This emergency operations facility 
had been newly planned and the off-site emergency 
plan totally revised. This progress and success-
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ful emergency management was noted generally 
very positively with numerous detailed comments 
concerning maintaining the preparedness continu-
ously and further improvements.
International co-operation
Finland is a party to the Convention on Early 
Notiﬁcation of a Nuclear Accident and the 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency, done in 
Vienna in 1986. Being a member of the European 
Union the Council Decision (87/600/EURATOM) on 
Community arrangements for the early exchange 
of information in the event of a radiological emer-
gency applies in Finland, too. In addition, Finland 
has respective bilateral agreements with Denmark, 
Germany, Norway, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. 
Accordingly, arrangements have been agreed to di-
rectly inform the competent authorities of these 
countries in the case of an accident.
In addition to the domestic nuclear emergency 
exercises held annually on each nuclear power 
plant site, STUK has taken part in international 
emergency exercises. STUK has also participated 
as a co-player in emergency exercises arranged by 
the Swedish nuclear power plants and authorities. 
Neighbouring countries have been actively invited 
to take part in the Finnish exercises.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 16.
2.13 Article 17. Siting
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that appropriate proce-
dures are established and implemented:
i. for evaluating all relevant site-related fac-
tors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear 
installation for its projected lifetime;
ii. for evaluating the likely safety impact of a 
proposed nuclear installation on individu-
als, society and the environment;
iii. for re-evaluating as necessary all rele-
vant factors referred to in sub-paragraphs 
(i) and (ii) so as to ensure the continued 
safety acceptability of the nuclear instal-
lation; for consulting Contracting Parties 
in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear in-
stallation, insofar as they are likely to be 
affected by that installation and, upon 
request providing the necessary informa-
tion to such Contracting Parties, in order 
to enable them to evaluate and make their 
own assessment of the likely safety impact 
on their own territory of the nuclear instal-
lation.
2.13.1 Regulatory approach to siting
Requirements for the siting of a nuclear power 
plant and for an environmental impact assess-
ment are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act and 
the Nuclear Energy Decree. The application for a 
Decision-in-principle has to include e.g.:
• an outline of the ownership and occupation of 
the site
• a description of settlement and other activities 
and town planning arrangements at the site 
and its vicinity
• an evaluation of the suitability of the site and 
the restrictions caused by the nuclear facility on 
the use of surrounding areas
• an assessment report in accordance with the 
Act on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure (468/1994) as well as a description 
of the design criteria the applicant will observe 
in order to avoid environmental damage and to 
restrict the burden to the environment.
More detailed requirements on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment are provided in the Decree 
(792/1994).
In the design of a nuclear plant, site-related 
external events have to be taken into account. 
Decision 395/1991 provides as follows: “The most 
important nuclear power plant safety functions 
shall remain operable in spite of any natural phe-
nomena estimated possible on site or other events 
external to the plant. In addition, the combined 
effects of accident conditions induced by internal 
causes and simultaneous natural phenomena shall 
be taken into account to the extent estimated pos-
sible”. STUK issued in 2001 a Guide YVL 1.10, 
“Safety criteria for siting a nuclear power plant”, 
that describes generally all requirements concern-
ing the site and surroundings of a nuclear power 
plant, gives requirements on safety factors affect-
ing site selection as well as covers regulatory con-
trol. Speciﬁc provisions against earthquakes are 
provided in Guide YVL 2.6.
Deterministic analyses are made to assess the 
impact of various natural phenomena and other ex-
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ternal events. The probabilistic safety analysis re-
quired as part of the safety review for Construction 
and Operating Licences provides information on 
risks caused by external events.
In connection with the construction of the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants in the 1970s, princi-
pal safety requirements were deﬁned for the siting 
of nuclear power plants and for the population 
density and human activities in the surrounding 
area. These requirements include also restrictions 
for industrial facilities and air trafﬁc. In a sparsely 
populated country like Finland the safety require-
ments were quite easily and practically achiev-
able.
The operating licences for nuclear facilities are 
granted for a limited period of time. For the licence 
renewal and Periodic Safety Review, a comprehen-
sive re-assessment of safety, including the environ-
mental safety of the nuclear facility and the effects 
of external events on the safety of the facility, shall 
be done. STUK reviews the licence application, 
including all site-speciﬁc safety reports. These re-
ports deal e.g. with meteorology, hydrology, popula-
tion and use of land and sea area as well as other 
items mentioned above. During the operation of 
the nuclear facility, FSAR, including the descrip-
tions of its site-speciﬁc parts, has to be periodically 
reviewed and updated as needed.
Finland is a party to the Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-
boundary Context, done in Espoo in 1991. The 
Finnish policy is (Act 468/1994) to provide full par-
ticipation to all neighbouring countries, which can 
be affected by the nuclear facilities in question. In 
1976, an agreement was done between Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden as regards nuclear 
power plants to be constructed near the borders. 
This agreement includes provisions for exchanging 
information on such plants. The bilateral agree-
ments mentioned under Article 16 include provi-
sions to exchange of information on the design and 
operation of nuclear facilities.
In 1998, Teollisuuden Voima Oy and Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy launched the Environmental 
Impact Assessment procedure (EIA) of a new nu-
clear power plant. The EIA reports were ﬁnalised 
in 1999. In 1999, STUK issued to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry statements on the EIA reports 
from the radiation and nuclear safety point of view. 
Based on the Espoo Treaty, Finland also received 
statements on the EIA from the neighbouring 
countries. The co-ordination authority, Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, gave its statement on the EIA 
Report in 2000.
In November 2000, TVO submitted to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry an application 
for a Decision–in–principle for the new nuclear 
reactor unit to be constructed at the existing sites 
either in Olkiluoto or in Loviisa. The application 
was reviewed by all stakeholders. STUK made a 
preliminary safety assessment in early 2001. After 
September 11, 2001, STUK updated the deﬁnitions 
for external threats to better reﬂect the change in 
international experience base. This update was 
formulated as an Addendum to the preliminary 
safety assessment of the new unit, and speciﬁes as 
aircraft crash design requirement both a military 
aircraft and a large passenger aircraft. Certain 
other identiﬁed malevolent external actions were 
also explicitly included in the design requirements. 
The Addendum was provided to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry in January 2002. The state-
ments in favour of a new nuclear power plant unit 
were given by the two candidate site municipali-
ties. Ministry of Trade and Industry prepared the 
issue for the decision of the Government. The 
Government decided in favour of the Decision–in–
principle in February 2002, and this decision was 
conﬁrmed by a vote of 107 to 92 by the Finnish 
Parliament in May 2002. TVO decided that the 
new power plant will be constructed at Olkiluoto 
site and applied for the construction licence early 
in 2004. STUK prepared the safety assessment 
of the new unit in early 2005. The construction 
licence was issued by the Government in February 
2005 and the construction works started in full.
In 2007, initiatives of building one more nu-
clear power plant were taken. Environmental 
Impact Assessment programs of TVO for a possible 
Olkiluoto 4 unit and at the same time of Fortum 
for a possible Loviisa 3 unit were prepared and 
launched for a review. STUK will give its state-
ment to the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 
September 2007. Altogether nine countries near 
the Baltic See have been requested for comments 
by the Finnish Environmental Ministry.
A new nuclear power company Fennovoima 
has been founded in 2007. The company has also 
started a preliminary site survey process, mainly 
in the area of the North West cost of the Gulf of 
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Bothnia (Baltic See northern gulf). Revision of 
Regional Plans of land use surrounding Olkiluoto 
and Loviisa NPP sites are also underway by the 
regional authorities and the municipalities con-
cerned.
2.13.2 Protection against external 
events in the Loviisa NPP
The structures of the Loviisa plant have been de-
signed taking into account the loads caused by 
natural phenomena applied in Finland. The risks 
caused by natural phenomena and human activi-
ties such as oil transports have been later reviewed 
by Fortum as part of the Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis (PSA). Several modiﬁcations of plant sys-
tems and procedures have been implemented based 
on the PSA results. External missiles, like aircraft 
crashes or other effects of events caused by human 
actions, have been taken into account in the plant 
design to a smaller extent than required for new 
nuclear power plants. Aircraft crashes are under 
re-evaluation in 2007.
The effects of an earthquake were evaluated to 
be small at the time when the Loviisa plant was 
designed. They were not separately taken into 
account in the design, but it was considered that 
safety factors related to structures and components 
are adequate for taking into account earthquakes. 
The fulﬁlment of the earthquake requirements has 
been assessed in the probabilistic safety analysis 
made by Fortum. According to its results, the risks 
arising from earthquakes are small as compared 
with other risks.
Loss of off-site electric power supply has been 
taken into account in the plant design. The plant is 
currently also equipped with a direct connection to 
the Ahvenkoski hydro power station to ensure the 
power supply.
In the recent years special attention has been 
paid to the risks arising from oil spills in the Gulf 
of Finland (eastern bay of the Baltic Sea). Though 
no major oil accidents have so far taken place in 
the Gulf of Finland, the accident risk has been esti-
mated signiﬁcant in this area with busy sea trafﬁc. 
An increasing part of the Russian oil exports is 
nowadays transported through routes passing the 
Loviisa NPP. Fortum has done pioneering work on 
oil risk analysis, including studies of oil accident 
frequencies and simulations of oil spill trajectories. 
At the Loviisa NPP, modiﬁcations of plant systems 
and operating procedures have been implemented 
to ensure residual heat removal in case of blockage 
of the seawater intake due to oil slick or organic 
material in seawater.
2.13.3 Protection against external 
events in the Olkiluoto NPP
Usual natural phenomena in Finland such as snow 
and wind loads and annual temperature changes 
were taken into account, when the structures of the 
existing Olkiluoto plant were designed. Unusual 
natural phenomena, from the standpoint of plant 
cooling systems were especially studied when the 
weather risk analysis was conducted by the TVO 
during 1990’s as part of the Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis. Risks that arise from natural phenom-
ena such as storms, algae, ﬂuctuation of the sea 
water level, warm air, warm sea water, formation 
of frazil ice and drifting of snow arising from snow 
storms were studied. Risks have been reduced by 
improving e.g. the suction air system of the die-
sel generators and sea water cooling of the plant 
against severe weather conditions. During recent 
years maximum sea water temperatures have been 
higher than earlier. As a preparative measure for 
still higher temperatures the capacity of the shut-
down service water systems is increased.
Large air plane crashes or some other external 
events caused by man were not taken into account 
in the original plant design. Furthermore, the 
combined effects of external and internal events 
have not been taken into account in the design 
of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 in the manner required by 
the Guide YVL 1.0. These events have been ex-
amined later in connection with the probabilistic 
safety analysis. Air craft crash sensitivity was 
re-evaluated after September 2001. Immediate 
catastrophic consequences were found unlikely. 
All site buildings were included in the assessment. 
The assessment criteria were risk of core damage 
and risk of large radioactivity release. Structural 
response evaluations were performed for three 
aircraft types: business jet, large passenger air-
craft, large wide-body passenger aircraft. It was 
concluded that the plant design provides relatively 
good protection from aircraft impacts based on  
the four spatially separated safety trains. The con-
tainment and the fuel pools are not breached. A 
key aspect of reducing the risk in the event of an 
aircraft strike is the location of equipment of each 
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of the four safety trains in distinct quadrants of the 
buildings. Even if safety equipment is lost in some 
of the quadrants, but equipment of one or more of 
the trains survive, safe shutdown capacity is likely 
maintained.
The effects of earthquakes were assessed as in-
signiﬁcant, when the existing Olkiluoto plant was 
designed. The effects were not taken particularly 
into account during the design, but it was consid-
ered, that the safety factors included in the design 
of structures and devices were adequate for taking 
earthquakes into account. The risks arising from 
earthquakes have been examined later in con-
nection with the probabilistic safety analysis con-
ducted by the TVO. The analysis identiﬁed certain 
improvement needs such as the anchoring of direct 
current accumulator batteries and rectiﬁer cabi-
nets. After this the rectiﬁer cabinets, some of the 
electronic cabinets and the cabinets next to them 
and the accumulator batteries of two parallel sub-
systems have been anchored on both plant units to 
prevent them from moving. The control room ceil-
ings including lighting ﬁxtures have been rebuilt. 
These improvements reduce considerably the risks 
arising from earthquakes.
Olkiluoto 3
Protection against external events and ﬁres in Olki-
luoto 3 were presented and analysed in Olkiluoto 
3 PSAR and PSA documents. Documents were 
accepted by STUK as part of OL3 Construction 
License documentation. Olkiluoto 3 design copes 
with all Olkiluoto 1/2 external hazard aspects. In 
addition, Olkiluoto 3 airplane crash is addressed 
as a design feature from the very beginning. STUK 
also performed additional analyses with respect to 
aircraft protection by technical support organisa-
tions during the Construction License process.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 17.
2.14 Article 18. Design and construction
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. the design and construction of a nuclear 
installation provides for several reliable 
levels and methods of protection (defence 
in depth) against the release of radioac-
tive materials, with a view to preventing 
the occurrence of accidents and to mitigat-
ing their radiological consequences should 
they occur;
ii. the technologies incorporated in the design 
and construction of a nuclear installation 
are proven by experience or qualiﬁed by 
testing or analysis;
iii. the design of a nuclear installation al-
lows for reliable, stable and easily manage-
able operation, with speciﬁc consideration 
of human factors and the man-machine 
interface.
2.14.1 Defence in depth
According to the Decision 395/1991, several levels 
of protection have to be provided in the design 
of a nuclear power plant. The design of the nu-
clear facility and the technology used is assessed 
by STUK when reviewing the application for a 
Decision-in-principle, Construction License and 
Operating License. Design is reassessed against 
the advancement of science and technology, when 
the Operating License is renewed.
In the design, construction and operation, prov-
en or otherwise carefully examined high quality 
technology shall be employed to prevent operation-
al transients and accidents. A nuclear power plant 
shall encompass systems by means of which opera-
tional transients and accidents can be quickly and 
reliably detected and the aggravation of any event 
prevented. Effective technical and administrative 
measures shall be taken for the mitigation of the 
consequences of an accident. The design of a nucle-
ar power plant shall be such that accidents leading 
to extensive releases of radioactive materials are 
highly unlikely.
Decision 395/1991 requires that dispersion of 
radioactive materials from the fuel of the nuclear 
reactor to the environment shall be prevented by 
means of successive barriers which are the fuel 
and its cladding, the cooling circuit of the nuclear 
reactor and the containment building. Provisions 
for ensuring the integrity of the fuel, primary cir-
cuit and containment are included.
Decision 395/1991 requires that in ensuring 
safety functions, inherent safety features attain-
able by design shall be made use of in the ﬁrst 
place. If inherent safety features cannot be made 
use of, priority shall be given to systems and com-
ponents which do not require an external power 
supply or which, in consequence of a loss of power 
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supply, will settle in a state preferable from the 
safety point of view (passive and fail-safe func-
tions). Systems which perform the most important 
safety functions shall be able to carry out their 
functions even though an individual component in 
any system would fail to operate and additionally 
any component affecting the safety function would 
be simultaneously out of operation due to repairs 
or maintenance. In ensuring the most important 
safety functions, systems based on diverse opera-
tion principles shall be used to the extent possible. 
Furthermore, a nuclear power plant shall have 
sufﬁcient on-site and off-site electrical power sup-
ply systems. Detailed requirements are given in 
Guides YVL 1.0, YVL 2.0, YVL 2.4, YVL 2.7, YVL 
3.0, YVL 4.3, YVL 5.2, YVL 5.5, YVL 6.2.
An assessment of the design of the facility and 
related technologies is made by STUK for the ﬁrst 
time when assessing the application for a Decision-
in-principle. Later on, the evaluation is continued 
when the Construction Licence application is re-
viewed. Finally, the detailed evaluation of systems 
and equipment is carried out through their de-
sign approval process. The design of Loviisa plant 
units was reassessed by STUK in 2006-2007 and 
Olkiluoto plant units in 1997-1998. The design 
of Olkiluoto plant units will be reassessed by 
STUK again in connection with the Periodic Safety 
Review which will be completed by 2008.
Severe accidents were not taken into account 
in the original design of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants. However, since their commissioning, many 
improvements have been implemented in the plant 
structures and systems, as well as procedures to 
enhance safety and to mitigate the consequences of 
severe accidents. Improvements have been imple-
mented to enhance the safety of the plants and to 
mitigate the consequences of severe accidents.
Modernisation of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants is discussed in Annex 2.
Olkiluoto 3
Possibilities to mitigate the consequences of the 
severe accidents are taken into account in the early 
design phase of Olkiluoto 3. This is achieved by 
implementing features to ensure containment in-
tegrity. Thus, it can be demonstrated that the need 
of stringent countermeasures during the severe 
accident are restricted to the immediate vicinity 
of the plant. In line with the deterministic design 
targets, two categories of events for risk reduction 
were introduced:
• Prevention of core melt
• Prevention of large releases.
Design provisions for the reduction of the residual 
risk are:
• Primary system discharge into the containment 
in case of total loss of secondary side cooling
• Features for corium spreading and cooling, for 
hydrogen recombination, and for containment 
heat removal in case of severe accidents.
In addition, aircraft crash design requirements for 
both a military aircraft and a large passenger air-
craft are to be taken into account.
Application of the Defence in Depth principle 
in the design of the new reactor is presented in the 
PSAR. In addition to PSAR, TVO has performed a 
self assessment on the fulﬁlment of Government 
Decision 395/1991 requirements. The application 
of Defence in Depth principle of the new reactor 
follows the principles laid down in the design of 
existing reactors and in some cases even further 
enhanced Defence in Depth principles. Technical 
principal solutions presented in the design follow 
the design of the reference reactors.
2.14.2 Proven technology
The requirement to use proven or otherwise quali-
ﬁed technology is stated in Decision 395/1991 as 
follows: In design, construction and operation prov-
en or otherwise carefully examined high quality 
technology shall be employed to prevent operation-
al transients and accidents (preventive measures). 
The respective detailed requirements are provided 
in many YVL Guides.
At the Loviisa plant, the automation systems 
are currently being renewed. The project began in 
2002 with basic conceptual design; implementation 
begun in 2004 with construction of new buildings 
to accommodate the new systems. The project is 
intended to be completed in 2014. The renewal is 
proceeding in carefully designed phases such that 
automation systems are renewed piecemeal, allow-
ing each renewed system to be taken into opera-
tion during normal refueling outages. Old systems 
remain in use until replaced by the new; hence 
there is need for separate space for new systems. 
Control room facilities are also renewed in phases 
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with the system renewal. For example, large screen 
display devices were installed in the control rooms 
in 2006 and 2007. Between 2004 and 2007 STUK 
has reviewed the licensing documents related to 
the project, such as Conceptual Design (includ-
ing Defence-in-Depth and Diversity assessment), 
System pre-inspection documents for various sys-
tems, and also Preliminary Suitability documents 
pertaining to the qualiﬁcation of the digital I&C 
platforms being used in the project. The ﬁrst safety 
related phase of the project will consist of imple-
menting preventive protection systems at both 
units in 2008.
2.14.3 Reliable, stable and easily 
manageable operation
Decision 395/1991 requires that a nuclear power 
plant’s control room shall contain equipment which 
provide information about the plant’s operational 
state and any deviations from normal operation 
as well as systems which monitor the state of the 
plant’s safety systems during operation and their 
functioning during operational transients and ac-
cidents. Furthermore, it requires that a nuclear 
power plant shall contain automatic systems that 
maintain the plant in a safe state during tran-
sients and accidents long enough to provide the op-
erators a sufﬁcient time to consider and implement 
the correct actions. Special attention shall be paid 
to the avoidance, detection and repair of human er-
rors. The possibility of human errors shall be taken 
into account both in the design of the nuclear pow-
er plant and in the planning of its operation so that 
the plant withstands well errors and deviations 
from planned operational actions.
Plant systems reliability and human factors are 
systematically considered in the probabilistic safety 
analyses. The analyses support the efforts to elimi-
nate accidents or to mitigate their consequences. 
The probabilistic safety analyses are subject to the 
approval of STUK. Human factors in relation to the 
monitoring and control of Finnish nuclear power 
plants are described in 2.8.2 and 2.8.3.
Both plants are on a way to modernise their 
control rooms. At the Loviisa plant this is included 
in a large automation modernisation project. At 
the Olkiluoto plant changes in the control room are 
made gradually. Digital instrumentation and con-
trol technology has already been implemented in 
modernised systems. The safety systems man-ma-
chine-interface is still of conventional technology. 
The development of detailed safety requirements 
and procedures to ensure adequate reliability of 
such systems is still underway.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices 
are in compliance with Article 18.
2.15 Article 19. Operation
Each Contracting Party shall take the appro-
priate steps to ensure that:
i. the initial authorization to operate a nu-
clear installation is based upon an appro-
priate safety analysis and a commissioning 
programme demonstrating that the instal-
lation, as constructed, is consistent with 
design and safety requirements;
ii. operational limits and conditions derived 
from the safety analysis, tests and opera-
tional experience are deﬁned and revised 
as necessary for identifying safe bounda-
ries for operation;
iii. operation, maintenance, inspection and 
testing of a nuclear installation are con-
ducted in accordance with approved pro-
cedures;
iv. procedures are established for respond-
ing to anticipated operational occurrences 
and to accidents;
v. necessary engineering and technical sup-
port in all safety-related ﬁelds is available 
throughout the lifetime of a nuclear instal-
lation;
vi. incidents signiﬁcant to safety are reported 
in a timely manner by the holder of the rel-
evant licence to the regulatory body;
vii. programmes to collect and analyse op-
erating experience are established, the re-
sults obtained and the conclusions drawn 
are acted upon and that existing mecha-
nisms are used to share important experi-
ence with international bodies and with 
other operating organizations and regula-
tory bodies;
viii. the generation of radioactive waste re-
sulting from the operation of a nuclear 
installation is kept to the minimum prac-
ticable for the process concerned, both in 
activity and in volume, and any necessary 
treatment and storage of spent fuel and 
waste directly related to the operation and 
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on the same site as that of the nuclear in-
stallation take into consideration condi-
tioning and disposal.
2.15.1 Initial authorisation based 
on safety analysis and a 
commissioning programme
The Operating Licence is needed before fuel load-
ing into the reactor. Initial authorization for fuel 
loading is given by STUK after its speciﬁc inspec-
tion where readiness of the power plant and op-
erating organization is checked. Furthermore, ac-
cording to the Nuclear Energy Decree, the vari-
ous steps of the commissioning, i.e. criticality, low 
power operation and power ascension, are subject 
to the approval of STUK.
Requirements for the commissioning pro-
gramme are set forth in Guide YVL 2.5. According 
to Guide YVL 2.5, the purpose of the commission-
ing programme is to give evidence that the plant 
has been constructed and will function according to 
the design requirements. Through the programme 
possible deﬁciencies in design and construction can 
also be observed.
The commissioning programme is described in 
the Preliminary and Final Safety Analysis Reports. 
The participation of the operating staff in the com-
missioning programme is a requirement of Guide 
YVL 1.6. The commissioning programme is to be 
submitted to STUK for approval. The detailed com-
missioning test programmes for systems in safety 
classes 1, 2 and 3 are submitted separately to 
STUK for approval. STUK witnesses commission-
ing tests and assesses the test results before giving 
stepwise permits to proceed in the commissioning.
Trial tests in the Loviisa NPP for 
power uprate in the 1990’s
Fortum planned and carried out a trial test pro-
gramme, by which it has been made sure of the 
effects of the nominal power increase on the func-
tioning of the systems and components of the plant. 
Normal operation and in a limited way also tran-
sient behaviour of the plant were studied in the tri-
al tests. Studies made by means of the plant simu-
lator and the results of transient analyses were 
used in the planning of the trial test programme. 
Due to the small number of plant modiﬁcations re-
quired for the power increase of the Loviisa plant, 
a simple trial test programme supported by the 
simulator studies was considered as appropriate 
and acceptable. Trial tests and disturbance tests 
can not be considered only as type tests, but their 
purpose was to make sure of the appropriate func-
tioning of the components of both units.
The trial operation of both units was carried out 
at the various reactor powers, increasing stepwise 
the power level (103%, 105%, 107% and 109%). 
The trial operation at the power levels 103–107% 
continued at both units for several months. At the 
ﬁnal target power level 109% the operation of the 
Loviisa 1 continued for fourteen days and the op-
eration of the Loviisa 2 eight days. According to the 
trial test programme, transient tests and extensive 
measurements concerning the state of the plant 
were carried out at various power levels.
Transient tests were carried out at the power 
levels 105% and 109% at both units. They were 
selected so that by means of tests the acceptability 
of the functioning of the most important process 
and control systems of the primary and secondary 
circuit could be veriﬁed, the number of the tests be-
ing as small as possible. Stopping of a reactor cool-
ant pump and stopping of a main feedwater pump 
(without starting up an emergency pump) as well 
as a turbine load trip (only at the Loviisa 1) were 
carried out as transient tests.
Based on the trial tests it was considered that 
the units operate as planned also at the increased 
power level. However, e.g. following observations 
were made during the trial tests:
• in the determination of the reactor heat power a 
fault was noticed at Loviisa 1
• steam ﬂow rate has from time to time exceeded 
the original target value 40 m/s of the steam 
piping at both units
• a hidden fault was detected in the protection 
system limiting reactor power at Loviisa 1; the 
system was unnecessarily launched due to the 
fault.
As a result of the observations mentioned the nec-
essary corrective measures were planned and im-
plemented.
In conclusion it was noted that the trial tests of 
the Loviisa plant, performed in connection with the 
modernisation, were carried out with acceptable 
results and to the extent necessary for the planned 
power increase. The increase of the power level was 
licensed in 1998.
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Trial tests in the Olkiluoto NPP 
for power uprate in the 1990’s
An essential part of the modernisation and power 
uprating projects at the Olkiluoto plant units has 
been the test operation. The objective of the test 
operation is to demonstrate planned and safe op-
eration of modiﬁed systems and the plant integra-
tion made up of these systems in normal operating 
conditions and in certain probable transient condi-
tions. Test operation has also been used as a part 
of design, when such modiﬁcations have been made 
to the systems of the plant units and set limits of 
the control systems that enabled the operation of 
the units at the uprated power level and improved 
their transient behaviour and mitigated sensitivity 
for the transients.
Test operation included system related tests, 
plant unit related transient tests and so-called 
long-term test operations, during which the reac-
tor was operated at an uprated constant power 
for a longer period of time. Test operations were 
conducted in stages at different power levels under 
STUK’s supervision and within the frames permit-
ted by STUK. Before uprating the reactor power 
to a higher power level STUK conducted a safety 
review concerning the test operation for the power 
level in question and asked the Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Committee for a statement concerning 
the review before granting the test operating li-
cense.
Test operation programs that included the en-
tire plant units and were drawn up by TVO, were 
based on the original commissioning programs 
that were run through during the start-up phase 
and that were modiﬁed taking into account the test 
requirements caused by the modernised systems. 
One principle was also to minimise the loads to 
structures and equipment caused by the test op-
eration, due to which the different transient tests 
concerning the behaviour of the entire plant units 
were evenly distributed, when possible, to both 
plant units.
For the long-term test operation of the plant 
units the reactor powers were uprated step by step 
from the nominal power of 2160 MW to 2500 MW. 
The test operation begun at Olkiluoto 1 after the 
1996 refuelling outage after the reactor power up-
rate to 105% level from the nominal power of 2160 
MW. In 1997 the test operation was continued at 
Olkiluoto unit 1and was begun at Olkiluoto 2 unit 
at a 109% level on both units. The reactor powers 
were uprated to the ﬁnal level of 115.7% (2500 
MW), designed in the modernisation, after the 
1998 annual maintenance outage.
The most signiﬁcant plant transient tests of the 
test operation were the load rejection test, turbine 
trip test and the by-pass test of the high-pressure 
preheaters. Furthermore, tripping tests of con-
densate and feed water pumps were conducted. In 
addition to the plant transient tests the function-
ing of the most important control systems was 
tested in separate pressure, power and feed water 
transient tests. During the long-term tests the fol-
lowing matters, for example, have been monitored: 
the behaviour of the reactor core, the functioning 
of condensate and reactor water clean-up systems, 
erosion and corrosion effects, vibration levels of 
pipelines and turbine generator, temperatures of 
rooms and electric appliances, radiation levels in 
systems and rooms of the reactor plant.
No such matters emerged in the test operation 
that could have formed an obstacle to a continuous 
and safe operation of the plant units at the 2500 
MW reactor power level. Based on the observations 
made during the test operation, several modiﬁca-
tions were made to the plant systems to comple-
ment the plant and the system design that were 
conducted in connection with the modernisation 
or to repair deﬁciencies. Some of the observations 
were made only after a longer period of lower pow-
er level test operation. STUK considered it neces-
sary to continue the test operation at the 2500 MW 
power level for about two months before issuing a 
statement in favour of continuing the operation of 
the plant units at the 2500 MW power level. The 
increase of the power level was licensed in 1998.
2.15.2 Operational Limits and Conditions
Nuclear Energy Decree requires that the applicant 
for an Operating License must provide STUK with 
the Technical Speciﬁcations (Operational Limits 
and Conditions). The Technical Speciﬁcations shall 
at least deﬁne limits for the process quantities that 
affect the safety of the facility in various operating 
states, provide regulations on operating restric-
tions that result from component failures, and set 
forth requirements for the testing of components 
important to safety. Technical and administrative 
requirements and restrictions for ensuring the safe 
operation of a nuclear power plant shall be set 
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forth in the plant’s Technical Speciﬁcations. Guide 
YVL 1.1 requires that the minimum staff availabil-
ity in all operational states and the limits for the 
releases of radioactive substances are also deﬁned 
in the document.
The Technical Speciﬁcations have been estab-
lished for each nuclear power plant unit. The 
Technical Speciﬁcations are updated based on op-
erational experiences, tests, analyses and plant 
modiﬁcations. The Technical Speciﬁcations are 
subject to the approval of STUK prior to the 
commissioning of a facility. Strict observance of 
the Technical Speciﬁcations is veriﬁed by STUK 
through a regular inspection programme. The 
Technical Speciﬁcations, operating procedures and 
other plant documentation need to be updated af-
ter plant modiﬁcations.
Loviisa NPP
Fortum has established the Technical Speciﬁcations 
for the Loviisa 1 and 2, and STUK has reviewed 
and accepted them. The Technical Speciﬁcations 
are continuously updated, and all the changes 
need to be approved by STUK. The limitations and 
conditions of the reactor and plant operation, the 
requirements for periodic tests and the essential 
administrative instructions are presented in the 
Technical Speciﬁcations.
Olkiluoto NPP
The Technical Speciﬁcations determine the limits 
of process parameters that affect the plant safety, 
for different operating modes, set the provisions for 
operating limits caused by component inoperabil-
ity and set forth the requirements for the tests that 
are conducted regularly for components important 
to safety. Furthermore, the Technical Speciﬁcations 
include the bases for the set provisions.
The Technical Speciﬁcations have to be supplied 
to the STUK, when the operating licence is applied, 
and the Technical Speciﬁcations have to be kept 
updated during the entire time of plant operation. 
STUK’s approval has to be applied, if any modiﬁca-
tions are to be made to the Speciﬁcations.
Figure 11 presents the number of exemptions 
and deviations from the Operational Limits and 
Conditions. Since 1993–1994 the number of exemp-
tions and deviations from the Operational Limits 
and Conditions has been decreasing except the 
years 2002–2003. The main reason for the large 
number of exemptions at the Loviisa NPP was 
the project to renew the radiation monitors that 
required exemptions in all operational states. The 
peak in 1993–1995 relates to the modiﬁcation of 
ventilation systems that needed several exemp-
tions. In the case of the Olkiluoto NPP the main 
reason for the exemptions has been the conduct of 
maintenance and repair works.
2.15.3 Operation and maintenance in 
accordance with approved procedures
Requirements related to procedures are provid-
ed in Decision 395/1991: Appropriate procedures 
shall exist for the operation, maintenance, in-serv-
ice inspections and periodic tests as well as tran-
sient and accident conditions of a nuclear power 
plant. Detailed guidance is given in the guides 
YVL 1.1, YVL 1.8 and YVL 1.9. YVL 1.9 requires 
that documents and operating procedures needed 
by the control room operators have to be deﬁned, 
Figure 11. Number of exemptions and deviations from the Operational Limits and Conditions in the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto NPP’s.
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and that these documents and procedures shall 
be continuously updated. The responsibilities and 
administrative procedures indicating how to take 
care of these actions are described in the Quality 
Assurance Programme. Regulatory requirements 
for maintenance are given in Guide YVL 1.8.
The procedures for operation, maintenance, in-
spection and testing have been established at both 
Finnish nuclear power plants. The procedures shall 
be approved by the licensee itself, and most of them 
are required to be submitted to STUK for informa-
tion. Detailed requirements are presented in ap-
propriate YVL Guides. STUK veriﬁes by means of 
inspections and audits that approved procedures 
are followed in the operation of the facility.
Loviisa NPP
Operating activities of Loviisa 1 and 2 are based 
on written procedures and on operating orders pre-
pared when needed. An operating order is prepared 
e.g. when the operating state or power of the unit 
is changed, or for measures related to the reactor 
or nuclear fuel. The operating procedures of the 
Loviisa plant are covered by the quality assurance 
programme. The most important procedure types 
are:
• Administrative procedures including Organisa-
tional Manual and Administrative Rules
• Operating procedures and testing procedures
• Procedures for emergency and transient situa-
tions
• Fuel handling procedures
• Radiation protection procedures
• Maintenance procedures.
The updating and coverage of the procedures are 
subjects to inspection in the STUK’s inspection pro-
gramme for the operation of the Loviisa plant. In 
addition, during all inspections of the programme 
individual instructions are evaluated.
An advanced and updated system of procedures 
exists at the Loviisa plant. It includes about 2300 
separate procedures. The procedures cover well 
work processes and functions important to safety 
and availability. The system of procedures is a part 
of the quality system of the plant. Strict require-
ments have been set in the Quality Assurance 
Manual for the coverage, responsibilities, updating 
and observance of the procedures. According to the 
Manual the evaluation of the system of procedures 
is included in the annual review of the coverage 
and effectiveness of the quality assurance pro-
gramme. Among other things the requirements, 
adequacy and need for updating of the procedures 
and the fulﬁlment of the set requirements are 
considered in this review. The state of the plant 
procedures is good at the Loviisa plant. Procedures 
are maintained, evaluated and developed system-
atically and in a controlled way.
By means of a work order system it is ensured 
i.e. that the plant operators are aware of the state 
of the unit. Fortum has developed, and develops 
further, its work order system based on accumulat-
ed operating experiences. In addition to the work 
order system the operators in the main control 
room of the units follow failures, repairs and pre-
ventive maintenance of the components referred 
to in the Technical Speciﬁcations. A shift supervi-
sor gives a permit to start a speciﬁc work when he 
has evaluated the work plans speciﬁed in the work 
order system, taking into account the operability 
requirements of the systems and components set 
in the Technical Speciﬁcations. The main control 
room is provided with information on the operat-
ing states of the systems and components and on 
the conditions of room spaces as well as on possible 
deviations existing. The deviations are responded 
according to the procedures for operation and tran-
sients.
Maintenance
The maintenance activities of Loviisa 1 and 2 cover 
preventive, predictive and repairing maintenance 
as well as implementation of modiﬁcation works, 
spare part maintenance and activities during out-
ages. The Maintenance Group of the plant takes 
part into the annual maintenance outages plan-
ning together with the Technology and Operation 
Units and prepares the annual maintenance out-
ages together with the Operating Group. Special 
attention has been paid to the reliable activities 
of subcontractors as well as to the technical com-
petence of external human resources. Both the 
utility and STUK control companies that perform 
inspection activities and the technical competence 
of organisations that carry out various duties. In 
addition to the normal monitoring activities, the 
preventive and predictive maintenance programme 
include continuous measuring methods, such as 
vibration measurements of the control rod drive 
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units, reactor coolant pumps and turbogenerators, 
the monitoring of the primary circuit loadings as 
well as the monitoring of leakages, water chemis-
try and lose parts.
The maintenance procedures at the Loviisa 
plant have been programmed in the plant compu-
ter according to the work order system. Some parts 
of the system are available to STUK for reading.
The functioning of the systems and components 
is ensured with regular tests. The systems and 
components to be tested and the time periods of the 
tests are presented in the Technical Speciﬁcations. 
At least the respective periodic tests are required 
after the modiﬁcation and repairing works and 
maintenance activities requiring dismounting. The 
performance test programme to be carried out 
after an essential modiﬁcation is required to be 
approved by STUK in advance. In addition, inspec-
tions regarding to the functioning and condition of 
components are carried out when necessary based 
on operating experiences from other plants and on 
the advancement of technical knowledge. Other op-
erating organisations of VVER-type reactors have 
been essential sources of operating experiences in 
this respect.
STUK controls monitoring and maintenance 
activities as well as repair and modiﬁcation works 
with regular inspections. During inspections it is 
aimed to make sure that the utility has adequate 
resources, such as a competent staff, instructions, 
a spare part and material storage as well as tools 
for the sufﬁciently effective implementation of the 
monitoring and maintenance activities. Special 
subjects are the condition monitoring programmes 
for the carbon steel piping and their results.
Modiﬁcation management development
Proper planning and scheduling are the key fac-
tors in modiﬁcation management. An analysis of 
reported events often reveals that deﬁciencies of 
modiﬁcation management have been a contribut-
ing factor. Such deﬁciencies include late planning, 
lack of co-ordination with other works, last mo-
ment changes, documentation defects, unﬁnished 
disassembling works and delayed updating of the 
documentation. The Loviisa plant has complet-
ed an extensive training course on project man-
agement in 2000 for the staff members involved 
with modiﬁcations in the operating organisation. 
Participation in the projects for plant modernisa-
tion and power uprating was important for com-
petence development. From the beginning of 2002 
modiﬁcation process has been managed by the 
Technology Unit.
The scheduling of the modiﬁcation planning for 
the next outage is ﬁxed in order to get enough time 
for preparations. Minor modiﬁcations are concen-
trated to every second annual maintenance outage 
and major works are carried out every fourth year. 
This is accomplished by starting from a long term 
investment planning which converts into a long 
term modiﬁcation plan. During the maintenance 
outage the scheduling ofﬁce is now directing their 
efforts from the earlier control of the overall sched-
ule to controlling the individual work packages 
including also the modiﬁcation works. In the main 
schedule more time is allocated to tests related to 
start-up. New arrangements for handling the work 
orders in the main control room have been intro-
duced. The idea is to even up the work load in the 
main control room and decrease the disturbance of 
the operators.
Quality procedures for executing modiﬁcations 
have recently been updated. The authority to make 
decisions on last moment changes in the scope or 
schedule of the modiﬁcation works has been clari-
ﬁed.
Olkiluoto NPP
The measures that are followed in the operation 
and maintenance of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are based 
on written procedures and on Operating or Fuel 
Orders and Operating Notices that are drawn up 
if necessary. The Operating Order is drawn up 
e.g. when the operating condition or power of the 
plant is modiﬁed or when measures are directed 
to the reactor or fuel handling in the reactor. The 
Fuel Order is drawn up on fuel handling activities 
in fuel pools. The Operating Notice, on the other 
hand, is drawn up on unusual procedures that will 
not be permanent.
The administrative and technical procedures 
needed in the operation of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 have 
been gathered into the Operating Manual. The 
Procedures have been inspected by STUK. The 
checking/updating of the procedures is a continu-
ous task.
The Operating Manual contains necessary tran-
sient and emergency procedures for unusual condi-
tions.
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The Maintenance Manual includes the admin-
istrative and technical procedures needed in main-
tenance. The most important procedures have been 
inspected by STUK. The power company checks 
the procedures periodically, approximately in four-
year-intervals.
Updating and comprehensiveness of the pro-
cedures are among the inspection issues included 
in the STUK’s periodical inspection programme. 
Furthermore, other procedures that relate to the 
topic of inspection are reviewed in all inspections 
of the STUK’s program.
The Work Request System ensures that the 
operators of the plant are aware of the plant state. 
TVO has developed its Work Request System and 
will continue to do so, on the basis of operational 
experience. In the main control room of the plant 
units, the operators follow, in addition to the Work 
Request System, the failures, repairs and preven-
tive maintenance of the components speciﬁed in 
the Technical Speciﬁcations. The Shift Supervisor 
grants the permission to begin a single work, when 
he/she inspects the work plans that are in accord-
ance with the Work Request System, by taking 
into account the operability requirements for the 
systems and components set forth in the Technical 
Speciﬁcations. The control room is informed from 
the operational conditions of systems and com-
ponents as well as from the room conditions and 
their possible deviations. The proper response to 
deviations is speciﬁed in the operating and tran-
sient procedures.
Maintenance
The maintenance of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 covers pre-
ventive and corrective maintenance as well as the 
design and execution of modiﬁcations, spare part 
service, outage actions and the related quality 
control. The Maintenance Department plans and 
builds up the annual maintenance outages togeth-
er with the Operation Department and Technical 
Support Department. Special attention has been 
paid to the reliable work of the subcontractors and 
to the technical competence of the external work 
force. The technical expertise of testing laborato-
ries and contractors is controlled both by the power 
company and STUK.
TVO has available a computer-aided preven-
tive maintenance programme, which includes all 
systems and components that are essential for the 
safety and operability. The program includes the 
normal preventive maintenance measures that are 
in accordance with the Work Request System such 
as calibrations of measuring systems, frequency 
measurements of rotating components, checks of 
oil levels, lubrications and greasing. The compre-
hensiveness of the programme is assessed on the 
basis of observations made in connection with op-
erational experience and preventive maintenance. 
As far as the spare part service is concerned, it has 
been made sure that completely assembled com-
ponents, which can be easily used to replace the 
failed component, exist for as many safety-signiﬁ-
cant systems as possible.
In addition to the measures listed in the pre-
ventive maintenance programme, systems, com-
ponents and rooms are controlled in connection 
with the normal operation and daily tour routes. 
Some of the most important components such as 
the main circulation pumps and the turbine are 
provided with on-line monitoring equipment. The 
operability of systems and components is ensured 
by regularly conducted tests.
The systems and the components that will be 
tested as well as the test dates are presented in 
the Technical Speciﬁcations. Periodical testing that 
correspond at least to the aforementioned, are re-
quired after maintenance measures that require 
modiﬁcations, repairing or disassembling. STUK’s 
approval is required in advance for a functional 
test programme that is conducted after a sig-
niﬁcant modiﬁcation. Inspections that concern the 
operability and condition of components are also 
conducted, if necessary, on the basis operational 
experience received from elsewhere and develop-
ment of technical knowledge. The most signiﬁcant 
sources of experience, in this sense, have been the 
Swedish BWR plants and international communi-
cation organs.
STUK controls the condition monitoring and 
maintenance as well as the modiﬁcation and repair 
work by regularly repeated inspections. The inspec-
tions aim to ensure that the power company has 
adequate resources such as a competent personnel, 
instructions, a spare part and material storage as 
well as the tools for adequately efﬁcient implemen-
tation of condition monitoring and maintenance 
actions. Special items are the condition monitoring 
programmes of the carbon steel pipelines and their 
results.
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Modiﬁcation management development
The modiﬁcation handling procedure at the 
Olkiluoto plant has been under continuous devel-
opment since the early 1980’s. After the moderni-
sation programme and several reviews of TVO’s 
working methods, experiences have been collected 
in a separate development project. The project was 
realised during the years 1997–1999 and it had 
participants from operation, maintenance, qual-
ity assurance, safety, modiﬁcation planning and 
refuelling planning. Special attention was placed 
also on the new modern automation and on modi-
ﬁcations during the ﬁeld installation phase. The 
project started with exploring current procedures 
and comments collected from the internal, exter-
nal and regulatory audit results of TVO’s working 
methods as well as experiences from the moderni-
sation programme of Olkiluoto 1and 2. As a result, 
about 60 remarks on the state of the modiﬁcation 
process were collected to be taken into account in 
the development work. The target state was de-
ﬁned and it was also checked that all remarks had 
been taken into account. In addition, many new 
ideas were found by the project group itself.
In the development work, detailed procedures 
were deﬁned making the decision process more 
exact and taking into account the opinions of all 
parties in TVO’s organisation. Some of the most 
signiﬁcant modiﬁcations included:
• enhanced information ﬂow on modiﬁcations 
within TVO
• procedure for surveys to use the knowledge of 
the whole TVO organisation and to enable also 
safety unit to analyse the safety signiﬁcance 
already in the early stage of the project
• better commitment of personnel responsible for 
the work
• consideration for independent review on modiﬁ-
cations
• establishment of a basic plan for system modiﬁ-
cations and more exact speciﬁcation for system 
level pre inspection material
• enable comments for the modiﬁcation process in 
early stage
• more exact content for the modiﬁcation plan 
pointing out environmental matters, training, 
commissioning, spare parts
• principle of continuous improvement
• better follow up for modiﬁcation process 
progress
• consideration of changes to the plant documen-
tation in an early stage.
The practice has shown that there is still need 
for continuous improvement to keep the person-
nel motivated and to take into account all aspects 
to ensure safe and reliable long term operation of 
the power plant. General training, discussion and 
development seminars have been arranged to con-
tinue the modiﬁcation process development and to 
get the working organisation committed to the new 
procedure.
2.15.4 Procedures for anticipated operational 
occurrences and accidents
Decision 395/1991 deﬁnes the levels of protection 
needed for ensuring nuclear safety. Together with 
the requirements to prevent transients and ac-
cidents by the plant system design, it is stated 
as follows: Effective technical and administrative 
measures shall be taken for the mitigation of the 
consequences of an accident. Counter-measures for 
bringing an accident under control and for prevent-
ing radiation hazards shall be planned in advance. 
Appropriate procedures shall exist for the opera-
tion, maintenance, in-service inspections and peri-
odic tests as well as transient and accident condi-
tions of a nuclear power plant.
At both Finnish nuclear power plants, proce-
dures for anticipated operational occurrences and 
accidents are in use. To the extent found necessary, 
the procedures have been veriﬁed during operator 
training at the plant simulators. At both nuclear 
power plants there are also advanced safety pan-
els for monitoring critical safety functions. STUK 
has independently evaluated the appropriateness 
and comprehensiveness of the procedures for an-
ticipated operational occurrences and accidents. 
Plant speciﬁc symptom based EOPs (Emergency 
Operating Procedures) have been available at the 
Olkiluoto units since late 80’s.
The Loviisa speciﬁc EOP-project was launched 
by Fortum in summer 2000. The initial aim of the 
project was to develop full set of accident and tran-
sient procedures for initial conditions starting at 
full power. Before the project, an extensive feasibil-
ity study of different approaches was carried out. 
The project was based on French approach of com-
bined event and symptom based procedures. The 
development was carried out together with EdF, 
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Framatome ANP and Fortum Nuclear Services. 
French consortium was mainly responsible for 
creating strategies for the set of procedures as well 
as transferring knowledge of the training and EOP 
layout. Fortum Nuclear Services together with 
Loviisa NPP ﬁnalized the procedures as well as 
carried out the validation and veriﬁcation routines. 
The project was ﬁnalized in early 2006. The EOP 
development continues now as normal routine at 
the Loviisa plant. Fortum Nuclear Services is re-
sponsible for the strategies and the Loviisa plant 
for the validation, training and procedure layout. 
Framatome is used frequently for reviewing.
2.15.5 Availability of engineering 
and technical support
The requirements in Guide YVL 1.7 also cover 
technical support. Competence of the engineering 
and technical support is supervised by the licen-
see. In addition, STUK carries out inspections and 
audits by which also the competence of the support 
staff is evaluated. According to the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, only organisations and their employees ap-
proved by STUK are allowed to carry out non-de-
structive testing of a nuclear power plant’s struc-
tures and components. The approval procedures 
are described in Guide YVL 1.3.
Some concern was related to the adequacy of 
engineering and technical support available to 
TVO when its Operating License was renewed in 
1998. This was due to the fact that, TVO had quite 
independently designed and implemented some 
safety modiﬁcations at the plant, and the tendency 
was expected to continue. This issue was raised 
again in a preliminary safety assessment by STUK 
related to the Decision-in-principle for the ﬁfth re-
actor in Finland. It was stated that if the Decision-
in-principle is approved by the Parliament, TVO 
should in a very early phase start to develop its 
organisation and expertise to ensure the safety of 
the plant in case there is no comprehensive design 
service available in the market.
There has also been some concern about how to 
sustain the expertise of nuclear safety personnel 
in a deregulated environment. This concern has 
especially touched Fortum Engineering that was 
recently exposed to divestment. However, a new 
company, Fortum Nuclear Services Ltd, was found-
ed and nuclear safety engineering was transferred 
to this company so that the divestment of Fortum 
Engineering has not reduced the nuclear safety 
expertise of the company.
2.15.6 Reporting of incidents
Guide YVL 1.5 provides in detail the reporting 
requirements on incidents. The Guide provides a 
number of examples of operational disturbances 
and events, which have to be reported to STUK. It 
also deﬁnes requirements for the contents of the re-
ports and the administrative procedures for report-
ing, including time limits for submitting of various 
reports. STUK publishes the operational events in 
its quarterly reports on nuclear safety that are also 
available to the general public through internet 
or paper reports in Finnish. STUK Annual Report 
on nuclear safety (see Reference 1) summarizes 
events from the whole year and is available to the 
general public through internet or paper reports 
both in Finnish and in English.
Figures 12 and 13 present the number of events 
and INES classiﬁed events at the Finnish nuclear 
power plants. The total number of event reports 
has varied typically between 15 and 25 annually 
during the last ten year period. At the same time 
Figure 12. Annual total number of event reports (operational transient reports) submitted by Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
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frame number of INES classiﬁed events (level 1 
or above) have been between 0 and 7 annually. 
Number of IRS reports produced during the last 
ten year period is 16. Recently one IRS report has 
been produced annually.
INES-classiﬁed events
Loviisa NPP
Three events in 2004, one event in 2005 and 3 
events in 2006 were classiﬁed on the International 
Nuclear Event Scale (INES). In 2006 there was 
one level 1 event and the classiﬁcation of the other 
events was 0. The level 1 event was a contamina-
tion spread incident at Loviisa 2 during the annual 
refuelling outage. Piping of a reactor cleaning tool 
was decontaminated externally and transported 
unpacked, which lead to spreading some contami-
nation on the ﬂoor from inside the piping. Some 
contamination spread outside the plant by trans-
port vehicles tires. New procedures have been tak-
en into use after the incident.
Olkiluoto NPP
In 2005 six events and in 2006 four events were 
classiﬁed on the International Event Scale (INES). 
In 2005 there were three events rated at level 1. 
These events are described below:
A setting error was detected in the relay protec-
tion of the electrical power supply circuit breakers 
shared by Olkiluoto 1 and 2, which could have 
brought about disturbances in the power supply 
connections between the units in case of need. 
Electric cable connections have been established 
between the diesel-backed 660 V switchgears of 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 to feed diesel-backed electrical 
power from one unit to the other, if necessary. The 
cable connections are equipped with eight identi-
cal supply circuit breakers to implement electrical 
power supply. The set values of all circuit breakers 
were checked and incorrect values were replaced 
with design values. In addition, the appropriate-
ness of the preventive maintenance and relay test-
ing programmes for equivalent circuit breakers 
has been ascertained.
During the annual maintenance of Olkiluoto 2 a 
power failure occurred that stopped the operation 
of some plant unit components ensuring nuclear 
safety, such as pumps ensuring decay heat removal 
during the outage, until the back-up diesel genera-
tors started up. The power failure was due to an 
electrical couplings isolation error made during 
electrical systems modiﬁcations. Due to the event, 
the work in question was discontinued and the 
plans were reviewed for the safety couplings of the 
modiﬁcations and the timetables were veriﬁed. In 
addition, improvements were planned in the co-
ordination of the testing of systems important to 
safety.
At Olkiluoto 1 and 2 the alarm testing of the 
carbon-dioxide ﬁre suppression system for the die-
sel generator rooms were not done once a week as 
required in the Technical Speciﬁcations. The sys-
tem is intended for the automatic or manual sup-
pression of a possible ﬁre in the waste building or 
in the back-up diesel generator rooms. Due to the 
incident, the Technical Speciﬁcations was updated 
and document uniformity was reviewed.
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Figure 13. Annual total number of events at INES Level 1 and above at the Finnish nuclear power plants.
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2.15.7 Programmes to collect and 
analyse operating experience
Decision 395/1991 requires the following: Operating 
experience from nuclear power plants as well as 
results of safety research shall be systematically 
followed and assessed. For further safety enhance-
ment, actions shall be taken which can be regarded 
as justiﬁed considering operating experience and 
the results of safety research as well as the ad-
vancement of science and technology. Guide YVL 
1.11 provides detailed requirements and admin-
istrative procedures for the systematic evaluation 
of operating experiences, and for the planning and 
implementation of corrective actions. Foreign op-
erational occurrences have to be assessed as well, 
from the point of view of their safety signiﬁcance. 
The licensees have developed the required proce-
dures for analysing operating experiences. The pro-
cedures for root cause analyses are in use. Further 
attention is, however, still needed to avoid recur-
rence of incidents.
STUK veriﬁes by means of inspections and au-
dits that the activities of the licensees as regards 
incident evaluation are effective. When necessary, 
a special investigation team is appointed by STUK 
to evaluate a certain incident. The evaluation of 
foreign operational occurrences and incidents is 
based on the reports of the IRS Reporting System 
(IAEA/NEA) and on the reports of other national 
regulatory bodies. IRS-reports are also evaluated 
by the licensees. Reports for the IRS System on 
safety-signiﬁcant occurrences at Finnish nuclear 
power plants are written by STUK.
Special attention was paid to incident evalua-
tion methods and operating experience in Finland 
in 1999. A study was conducted by the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland, VTT, to evaluate op-
erating experience feedback systems and incident 
evaluation methods in the Finnish nuclear indus-
try. Several development areas were identiﬁed to 
enhance incident evaluation and to close the oper-
ating experience loop in order to avoid recurrence 
of events. Implementation of these measures was 
included to the continuous development of quality 
systems.
Experiences gained from plant operations are 
directly shared with utilities operating similar 
types of plant (same NSSS vendor), and appropri-
ate reports are also distributed through WANO. 
Both plants co-operate with WANO and countries 
having similar reactor types. This co-operation is 
more closely described below. STUK has also par-
ticipated in co-operation between international 
organisations such as the IAEA, the OECD/NEA 
and the EU, which exchange information on safety 
issues and operating events. Other forums that 
STUK uses to obtain information are WENRA, 
the VVER Forum and the NERS Forum as well as 
some bilateral agreements. A special exchange of 
information between Rostechnadzor and STUK on 
the operation of the Kola and Leningrad nuclear 
power plants and of Finnish nuclear power plants 
takes place semiannually.
Exchange of operational experience with 
similar power plants in the Loviisa NPP
VVER reactor operating experience is collected, 
screened and evaluated by a dedicated operating 
experience feedback group composed of engineers 
from the plant operation organisation and from 
Fortum Nuclear Services. The group can give rec-
ommendations on further studies and measures to 
the operating organisation. The main information to 
be handled comes from WANO (World Association 
of Nuclear Operators) Moscow Centre which links 
all the VVER reactor operators. Additional reports 
are received from the IAEA, OECD/NEA and NRC, 
and naturally the activities of the operation experi-
ence feedback group are not limited only to VVER 
reactors.
The plant managers of VVER-440 reactors run 
a so-called VVER Club with periodic meetings. The 
plant operation problems, modernisation, back-ﬁt-
ting, plant life management and safety questions 
are handled and experiences are exchanged in 
these meetings and in further individual contacts.
Loviisa Power Plant participates in the WANO 
Peer Review Programme by sending peers to other 
plants including VVER plants. In February–March 
2001 WANO Moscow Centre organised a Peer 
Review at Loviisa Power Plant. Several peers in-
cluding the team leader came from other VVER 
plants. A follow-up review was carried out in March 
2004. This co-operation between plants of the same 
design serves also the exchange of relevant opera-
tion experiences.
Fortum Nuclear Services has been a partner in 
several international and Finnish safety and qual-
ity related support programmes. The Loviisa plant 
has participated in some of these projects and has 
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had a possibility to widen the organisation’s expe-
rience on current development with other VVER 
operators. The same applies to a couple of direct 
commercial consultation projects which have been 
managed by the Loviisa plant.
Exchange of operational experience with 
similar power plants in the Olkiluoto NPP
TVO’s operating experience feedback group con-
sists of 9 members. This onsite group gives recom-
mendations to the line organisation that makes 
decisions on eventual corrective actions. The indus-
try operating experience from similar reactor types 
is followed by several means. The main sources 
of information are ERFATOM, KSU, WANO and 
Forsmark. These are explained in more detail be-
low. Information is also coming directly from sev-
eral sources (IAEA and OECD/NEA (IRS), Loviisa 
power plant (e.g. operating experience meetings 
and reports), vendors (Westinghouse Atom, Alstom 
Power Sweden AB), component manufacturers, the 
WANO Network, BWROG (BWR Owners Group) 
and BWR Forum (FANP).
ERFATOM was founded by the Swedish utili-
ties and TVO as a consequence of the so called 
Barsebäck incident (1992). Activities started 
in 1994 in the premises of former ABB Atom 
(Västerås, Sweden). Nowadays ERFATOM is part 
of the NOG (Nordic Owners Group) and issues 
reports every two weeks and topical reports when 
needed. ERFATOM also gives recommendations. 
ERFATOM co-operates very closely with KSU 
(Swedish nuclear training and safety center). KSU 
concentrates on operational safety issues and they 
have the responsibility to screen out external (in-
ternational) operating events. ERFATOM screens 
out internal events from Swedish Nuclear Power 
Plants and from Olkiluoto.
TVO is a member of WANO. Although KSU 
screens out important events reported through the 
WANO Network, TVO reviews independently all the 
SOERs (Signiﬁcant Operating Experience Reports) 
and SERs (Signiﬁcant Event Reports) reported by 
WANO. Forsmark units 1 and 2 in Sweden can be 
called as “sister units” of Olkiluoto 1 and 2. Reports 
from Forsmark 1 and 2 (e.g. licensee event reports) 
and minutes of the meetings of the Forsmark safety 
committee are reviewed regularly.
In addition to the above, TVO participates 
actively in WANO programmes and in several in-
ternational technical groups (such as valve group, 
reactor group and turbine group) which have regu-
lar meetings about twice a year.
2.15.8 Radioactive waste from the operation 
of a nuclear installation and the 
treatment and storage of spent fuel 
and radioactive waste on site
Management of low and intermediate level waste 
takes place at the NPP sites. At the Olkiluoto site 
the necessary facilities are already in place while 
at the Loviisa site, a solidiﬁcation facility will be 
commissioned in late 2007. At both NPP sites, ﬁnal 
disposal facilities of rock cavern type are in opera-
tion for low and medium level radioactive wastes. 
As these facilities are operated by the nuclear 
power plant utilities, the technical feasibility and 
economic motivation to minimise the generation of 
radioactive waste are evident.
The detailed requirement for radioactive waste 
minimisation is included in Guide YVL 8.3. It calls 
for a limitation of waste volumes in particular from 
repair and maintenance works, and segregation of 
wastes on the basis of activity. Clearance of wastes 
from regulatory control, prescribed in the Nuclear 
Energy Decree and in Guide YVL 8.2, aims at limit-
ing the volumes of waste to be stored and disposed 
of. Guide YVL 6.2 provides for prevention of fuel 
failures, which also contributes to the limitation of 
activity accumulation in waste from reactor water 
cleanup systems.
Guide YVL 8.3 also requires that besides the 
short-term radiation protection objectives, also the 
long-term properties of waste packages with re-
spect to ﬁnal disposal shall be taken into account 
in the conditioning and storage of waste. The Guide 
includes also more speciﬁc requirements for the 
conditioning and interim storage of wastes. Guide 
YVL 8.1 calls for a waste type description, to be ap-
proved by STUK, for each category of reactor waste 
to be disposed of. In the description of waste type, 
the most important characteristics of waste with 
respect to the safety of disposal are deﬁned.
In 2004–2006 one of the objectives to minimise 
the waste production at Olkiluoto has been the 
reduction of ion exchange resin consumption in 
the water puriﬁcation systems. Resin qualities 
have been optimised regarding good separating 
capacities and long duty cycles. To minimise the 
volume of disposed metallic waste, a crusher was 
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taken in use at the Olkiluoto site in 2004. Disposal 
containers can be ﬁlled more effectively, when 
crushed metal is placed to unused spaces of con-
tainers. Surface contaminated metal scraps are 
decontaminated in the new deco-box by blasting 
with glass marbles. Decontaminated metals are 
released from control, if the activity levels of clear-
ance are reached.The average accumulation of low 
and medium level waste at the Olkiluoto NPP has 
been about 85 cubic meters per reactor year. In 
addition, a total of 1000 cubic meters of metallic 
waste was formed due to the replacement of the 
reheaters in 2005 and 2006.
At the Loviisa NPP, conditioning and disposal of 
liquid low and intermediate leval waste will start 
in 2007 through commissioning of the cementa-
tion plant and the extension of the repository for 
solidiﬁed waste. The management of solid low 
and intermediate level waste will be developed by 
building new facilities for the treatment, activity 
monitoring and interim storage of waste. A plan for 
upgrading the management system has prepared 
and will be implemented in 2006–2009.
By the end of the year 2006, 6010 cubic meters 
of low and medium level operating waste has accu-
mulated at the Olkiluoto NPP and 2990 cubic me-
ters at the Loviisa NPP. About 76% of the Olkiluoto 
waste and 46 % of the Loviisa waste has been 
disposed of in the on-site repositories. Low and 
medium level waste not yet disposed of is stored 
inside the plants.
Guide YVL 1.0 requires that provision for a 
nuclear power plant’s decommissioning shall be 
made already during the plant’s design phase. One 
criterion when deciding the plant’s materials and 
structural solutions shall be that volumes of de-
commissioned waste are to be limited. Guide YVL 
7.18 calls for selection of such construction materi-
als that limit the degree of activation and spread 
of contamination and makes decontamination of 
surfaces feasible.
Interim storage facilities for spent fuel are 
available at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites. Both 
are wet-type storages. At the Loviisa plant, spent 
fuel was earlier transported back to Russia. 
Amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act issued in 
1994 requires that spent fuel generated in Finland 
has to be treated, stored and disposed of in Finland. 
Accordingly, spent fuel shipments to Russia were 
terminated at the end of 1996, and an extension 
of the spent fuel storage facility was completed 
in 2000 at the Loviisa site. By the end of the year 
2006 the spent fuel accumulation at the Olkiluoto 
NPP was about 1147 tons of uranium and that at 
the Loviisa NPP about 402 tons of uranium.
For taking care of the spent fuel ﬁnal disposal, 
a joint company Posiva Oy has been established 
by Fortum and Teollisuuden Voima Oy. Research, 
development and planning work for spent fuel 
disposal is in progress and the disposal facility 
is envisaged to be operational in about 2020. The 
Decision-in-principle on the spent fuel disposal 
facility was made by the Government in 2000. The 
facility will be constructed in the vicinity of the 
Olkiluoto NPP site. To conﬁrm the suitability of the 
site, construction of an underground rock charac-
terisation facility was commenced in mid-2004.
Safety regulation for spent fuel disposal is in-
cluded in Decision 478/1999 and STUK’s Guides 
YVL 8.4 and YVL 8.5.
To ensure that the ﬁnancial liability for future 
spent fuel and nuclear waste management and de-
commissioning of NPPs is covered, the utilities are 
obliged to set aside the required amount of money 
each year to the State Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund. At the end of 2006 the funded money covered 
almost the whole liability, about 1 500 million euros.
A detailed description of spent fuel and radio-
active waste management and related regulation 
is included in the Finnish National Report on the 
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and Radioactive 
Waste Management (STUK-B-YTO 243, October 
2005).
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and prac-
tices, presented in subchapters 2.15.1-8, are in 
compliance with Article 19.
2.16 Concluding summary on the 
fulﬁlment of the obligations
In the above the implementation of the obligations 
of the Convention, Articles 4 and 6 to 19, is evalu-
ated. Based on the evaluation it can be concluded 
that Finnish regulations and practices continue 
to be in compliance with the obligations of the 
Convention.
Safety improvements have been annually imple-
mented at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants since 
their commissioning. There exists no urgent need 
for additional improvements to upgrade the safety 
of these plants in the context of the Convention.
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The Finnish regulatory control system includes 
both periodic safety review and continuous safety 
review processes. Actions for safety enhancement 
are to be taken whenever they can be regarded 
as justiﬁed, considering operating experience, the 
results of safety research and the advancement of 
science and technology. In the following some spe-
ciﬁc issues and challenges for safety assessment in 
Finland are presented.
3.1 Achievements in safety related 
activities since preparation 
of previous report
Qualiﬁcation of non-destructive testing
The organisation of qualiﬁcations of NDT systems 
taking into account also the small amount of in-
dependent and competent personnel resources re-
quires special attention in Finland. International 
activities and co-operation will be closely followed 
(see chapter 2.10.5). During the period 2004–2006 
the qualiﬁcation organisation has been established 
and nine guidelines for qualiﬁcation practice have 
been published. The licensees have established the 
Steering Committee for Qualiﬁcation and nomi-
nate its members on annual basis. The Steering 
Committee for Qualiﬁcation is guiding and super-
vising the practical qualiﬁcation work with the help 
of a separate Technical Support Group, which has 
been nominated and supervised by The Steering 
Committee.
Based on a contract with the licensees, Inspecta 
Certiﬁcation is responsible for the practical ar-
rangement of qualiﬁcation as the Qualiﬁcation 
Body. The tasks of Inspecta Certiﬁcation are 
speciﬁed in the contract. When needed Inspecta 
Certiﬁcation uses also experts outside of its own 
organisation for individual qualiﬁcations. Those 
experts can also be outside of Finland. Inspecta 
3 Planned activities to improve safety
Certiﬁcation prepares a proposal of composition 
of Qualiﬁcation Body to the Technical Support 
Group. The composition of Qualiﬁcation Body is 
in accordance with the recommendations of ENIQ 
Recommended Practice 7. The Qualiﬁcation Body 
has adequate
• expert knowledge on inspection method (includ-
ing equipment and inspection procedures)
• at least one qualiﬁed level 3 expert
• practical inspection experience and training
• previous qualiﬁcation experience
• expert knowledge necessary for evaluation of 
inspection procedures and data
• expert knowledge necessary for evaluation of 
technical justiﬁcation and used modelling
• knowledge necessary for designing test pieces 
with intended defects and understanding on the 
difﬁculties of manufacturing test blocks.
Qualiﬁcation Body has a chairman and at least 
two members. One of these is from Inspecta 
Certiﬁcation. Member of Inspecta Certiﬁcation is 
responsible for quality assurance and conﬁdenti-
ality. Members of the Qualiﬁcation Body are in-
dependent from procedures and personnel, which 
have to be qualiﬁed and they are familiar with the 
documents and the operating principles applied 
in qualiﬁcation. If necessary, the Qualiﬁcation 
Body may invite also other experts to the meet-
ings. These experts can be specialized on questions 
related to materials, strength analysis or operation 
of nuclear power plants.
The system applied in Finland to the qualiﬁca-
tion of non-destructive in-service inspections of 
nuclear power plants is described in the document 
“The Finnish Qualiﬁcation Practise for nuclear 
power plant inspections. General principles, SP-1”. 
More detailed guidelines “The Finnish Qualiﬁcation 
Practise for nuclear power plant inspections, SP-
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2…SP-9” are given in order to guide the practical 
qualiﬁcation work based on YVL 3.8. In the content 
of these guidelines the requirements presented 
in YVL 3.8, in the European Methodology for 
Qualiﬁcation (EUR 17299) and in its recommenda-
tions have been taken into account. The purpose of 
the guideline “The Finnish Qualiﬁcation Practise 
for nuclear power plant inspections. Qualiﬁcation 
body, SP-2” is to describe the formation, activities 
and operation modes of the qualiﬁcation body. The 
Steering Committee for Qualiﬁcation is responsi-
ble for updating the document “General principles, 
SP-1”. Inspecta Certiﬁcation is responsible for re-
viewing and updating the guidelines used in quali-
ﬁcation. It will assess annually the guidelines and 
their needs for up-dating. The changes proposed 
to the guidelines are approved by the Technical 
Support Group. The guidelines have been ﬁnally 
approved by STUK.
About 15 qualiﬁcations have been totally ap-
proved by STUK until now.
Reliability of digital automation
Practical implementation of the new safety require-
ments and procedures to ensure adequate reliabil-
ity of digital instrumentation and control systems 
in the modernization project of the operating power 
plants and in the design of the new nuclear power 
plant can be considered as one of the major chal-
lenges for the next ten years. This includes also the 
issues related to the digital control rooms.
The major digital automation projects in 
Finland have advanced steadily between 2005 
and 2007. With accumulating experience on the 
technology and its licensing, the practical imple-
mentation of guidance developed earlier (in Guide 
YVL 5.5, published in 2002) is now maturing. The 
volume and time span of such projects is in the or-
der of 5 to 10 years, whence the current evolution 
is likely to go on for some time to come. Signiﬁcant 
effort has been devoted by the regulator and utili-
ties involved in the assessment of modern control 
room concepts. Existing plants are moving towards 
so-called hybrid control rooms, where normal oper-
ation is based on digital controls and video screens, 
but safety backups are still implemented also us-
ing traditional mosaic displays, analog indicators 
and switches. Olkiluoto 3 will also have a hybrid 
control room.
Provision for plant ageing
Ageing management programmes in operating 
Finnish NPPs largely developed from their expe-
riences with emerging ageing issues: radiation 
embrittlement, inter-granular stress corrosion 
cracking, erosion corrosion, thermal fatigue, age-
ing of cables and obsolescence of I&C components. 
STUK has recognized the growing importance of 
ageing management and, since preparation of pre-
vious report, updated the general Guide YVL 1.1 
on STUK’s regulatory control to include e.g. re-
quirements concerning a comprehensive ageing 
management programme and ageing evaluation as 
part of the periodical safety review. Ageing related 
requirements in the recently updated guides YVL 
5.2 and 5.5 on electric and I&C components, and in 
the new guide YVL 3.5 on mechanical components, 
have been also under implementation. A new Guide 
on Maintenance, condition monitoring and ageing 
management in a NPP is under development.
Implementation of YVL 3.5, entitled Ensuring 
the strength of NPP pressure equipment, imposed 
a requirement for updating of the fatigue analy-
ses to incorporate the environmental effects. For 
the Loviisa plant this was already completed for 
the primary circuit components as part of the 
recent operating licence renewal with acceptable 
results, largely thanks to the conservative design 
fatigue curves of the originally applied Soviet de-
sign standard. A second requirement dealt with 
establishing a data base of valid strength analysis 
reports to ensure knowledge management of the 
original strength related design bases, which has 
proved to be a challenge in some important modi-
ﬁcations. Knowledge management has also coinci-
dentally become an issue in the area of in-service 
inspections.
In 2004, STUK approved the utility’s applica-
tion to continue the service of reactor pressure ves-
sel of Loviisa Unit 1 until 2012. The approval was 
based on a revised safety analysis pertaining to the 
radiation embrittlement. As described in Annex 3, 
considerable efforts have been expended on this is-
sue until successful annealing of the critical weld 
in 1996. The current activities deal with the re-em-
brittlement rate and reﬁning the nonductile failure 
analysis methodology. In the plant licence renewal 
in 2007, even more attention was given to steam 
generators whose replaceability is questioned for 
lay-out reasons. After primary and feedwater col-
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lector modiﬁcations since 1994, the overall steam 
generator performance has been good and the tube 
pluggings, now totalling 55 in unit 1 and 28 in unit 
2, have been well below VVER plant averages. An 
abrupt rising trend since mid-1990’s is of interest, 
though, considering that the secondary circuit wa-
ter chemistry was changed from neutral to alkaline 
in 1994–95 and the power upratings took place in 
1997–98. How much of this increase is explained 
by the upgraded in-service inspections, using eddy 
current techniques, is as yet uncertain.
Thermal fatigue susceptibility in the primary 
circuit mixing and stratiﬁcation points requires 
continuous attention in both NPPs. Permanent and 
transferable thermocouples have been installed to 
sensitive locations, serving multiple purposes: op-
erating practice improvements, in-service inspec-
tion targeting, transient book-keeping and fatigue 
analysis validity evaluation. The programmes and 
the resulting documentation have been keenly 
followed in STUKs recent periodic inspections, at-
tended by the utility’s operation, system, material 
and stress analysis specialists.
STUK’s recent regulatory inspection of the de-
sign documents concerning a dissimilar transition 
weld between the reactor pressure vessel nozzle 
and the safe end of Olkiluoto 3 led to a require-
ment for a 10-year long ageing surveillance pro-
gramme. A unique combination of weld material 
(Alloy 52) and technology (narrow-gap TIG without 
buttering) has been introduced here, mainly to im-
prove resistance against stress-corrosion cracking. 
However, preliminary tests indicate unexpected 
fracture behaviour in low temperatures, featuring 
a crack propagation jump from the heat-affected 
zone of the ferritic vessel material to the fusion 
line, which results in a reduced fracture toughness 
at low temperatures. The required surveillance 
aims to verify that the heat treatments of manu-
facturing and the operation will not cause signiﬁ-
cant further embrittlement due to thermal ageing.
Maintaining competence
Based on the evaluation of human resources in the 
nuclear ﬁeld in Finland, further measures are need-
ed during the next 5 to 10 years in order to avoid 
loosing competence. Finnish organisations have 
started co-operation to provide professional train-
ing in nuclear safety. These measures need to be 
enhanced further in the speciﬁc ﬁelds where the re-
source basis is narrow. Chapters 2.4 Ensuring com-
petence and 2.7.2 Human resources provide descrip-
tion on the recent development in the regulatory 
body and in the operating organization of NPP’s.
Risk informed regulation
In Finland, the regulatory authority (STUK) and 
licensees have introduced probabilistic safety anal-
ysis (PSA) as a widely used method in the nuclear 
safety regulation and safety management. Risk-in-
formed regulation means an approach where both 
the PSA results and the deterministic criteria com-
bined with engineering judgment are considered 
and they complement each other in the regulatory 
decision-making. The general aim of the risk in-
formed methods is to use the available resources in 
the most efﬁcient way to maintain and increase the 
nuclear safety.
The essence of the risk informed regulation and 
safety management is that the Living PSA works 
as an interactive communication platform between 
the licensee and STUK. Accordingly a PSA model, 
performed by the licensee and reviewed by STUK, 
is used for resolution of safety issues by both par-
ties. For this purpose the licensees provide STUK 
with the PSA model in electronic form and regular-
ly maintain and update it. In the regulatory proc-
ess the deterministic and probabilistic approaches 
work in parallel and interact. The results of de-
terministic assessment provide necessary input 
for models and data used in PSA. Secondly PSA 
provides insights on adequacy of design require-
ments and design basis and thirdly PSA provides 
assessment on the need to improve the reliability 
of safety functions and plant systems.
The risk-informing of regulatory and risk man-
agement activities is a step by step process. STUK 
has introduced the PSA in regulation and safety 
management of NPPs since 1987 when the regu-
latory guide YVL 2.8 was issued. Accordingly the 
PSA is formally integrated in the regulatory proc-
ess of NPPs already in the early design phase and 
it is to run through the construction and operation 
phases all through the plant service time. STUK 
will review the PSAs and makes an assessment 
of the acceptability of the design phase PSA/ con-
struction phase PSA prior to giving a statement 
about the construction licence/operating licence 
application. This approach is used in the licensing 
process of Olkiluoto 3. 
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Living PSA models have been developed for 
both the Olkiluoto and Loviisa plants. The PSA 
studies include level 1 and level 2 models. Level 
1 comprises the calculation of severe core dam-
age frequency (probability per year) and level 2 
the determination of the size and frequency of the 
release of radioactive substances to the environ-
ment. At the moment, level 1 studies for full power 
operation cover internal events, area events (ﬁres, 
ﬂoods), and external events such as harsh weather 
conditions, and seismic events. The shutdown and 
low power states of level 1 PSA cover internal 
events and some area and external events. The 
Level 2 studies include all power states and initiat-
ing events of Level 1. In order to achieve the full 
scope PSAs the analyses of a few lacking initiators 
are in progress both at the level 1 and 2.
PSA has got an important role in the evaluation 
of needs for plants modiﬁcations of operating plant 
units. The licensee has to provide STUK with the 
assessment of safety signiﬁcance of each proposed 
modiﬁcation. The risk assessment is to be submit-
ted to STUK independent of the safety class of the 
systems to be changed. Thanks to the plant modi-
ﬁcations performed the core damage frequency of 
the Loviisa plant has decreased with a factor of 
ten, in the course of past several years.
In the area of operational events, PSA is a 
standard tool to assess the safety signiﬁcance of 
component failures and incidents. Today risk fol-
low-up studies are a common practice at STUK. 
Since 1995 STUK has performed systematic risk 
follow-up studies on the annual basis for each 
Finnish nuclear power plant unit.
A risk informed approach has been used to 
analyse the Allowed Outage Times (AOT). Certain 
inconsistency of AOTs in comparison with the re-
spective risk impact has been identiﬁed between 
various safety systems. Risk assessment has also 
questioned the traditional conclusion that in all 
faulted states the shutdown of the plant would 
be the safest course of action. If systems used for 
decay heat removal are seriously degraded (CCF), 
it may be safer to continue operation than to 
shut down the plant immediately, although shut-
down may be required by the current Technical 
Speciﬁcations. Hence the licensees has to re-evalu-
ate the relevance of allowed outage times (AOT) of 
most important safety systems and to ﬁgure out 
those failure states of the plant where it is safer 
to continue operation than to shut down the plant 
immediately.
If a licensee applies for an exemption from 
Technical Speciﬁcations the licensee has to submit 
a risk analysis to STUK and indicate that the risk 
resulted from the exemption is tiny. STUK reviews 
the licensees’ analysis and makes its own risk as-
sessment for comparison as necessary.
STUK allows on-line preventive maintenance 
during power operation provided that the deter-
ministic safety criteria are fulﬁlled (e.g. single 
failure criterion) and the risk contribution is small. 
According to the ﬁrst Olkiluoto PSA study in 1989, 
the risk contribution of on-line preventive main-
tenance was about 5 % of the total core damage 
frequency. Since the maintenance schedule was op-
timised with PSA, the risk contribution of on-line 
preventive maintenance could be reduced approxi-
mately to 1 % of the total core damage frequency.
Pilot projects on Risk-Informed In-service 
Inspections (RI-ISI) of piping both in the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto have been completed by STUK in 
cooperation with the licensees. STUK’s risk-in-
formed procedure combines both the plant speciﬁc 
PSA information and the traditional insights in 
support of the system speciﬁc detailed in-service 
inspection programme planning. Finnish licensees 
are running RI-ISI projects for risk-informing their 
in-service inspection programmes. RI-ISI approach 
is used also at Olkiluoto 3.
STUK is in progress of effecting the regulatory 
inspection programmes and conducting the inspec-
tions at site. A special PSA Info system has been 
developed in order to use the insights of PSA for 
training the inspectors, to upgrade their risk per-
ception and to demonstrate the importance of most 
signiﬁcant accident sequences.
3.2 Challenges for future work
The role of nuclear power in energy policies is be-
ing discussed both in Finland and elsewhere in the 
world. In Finland, activities in relation to the sit-
ing and construction of new nuclear power plants 
seem to be increasing. One new unit, Olkiluoto 3, 
is under construction. For the second new unit, en-
vironmental impact assessment is going on. A new 
company with the aim to construct a nuclear power 
plant in Finland has been established, and it has 
started to survey the site for an additional power 
plant. Countries considering nuclear power expan-
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sion strive to create harmonised safety require-
ments and uniform procedures for safety regula-
tion during construction. Olkiluoto 3 project is the 
ﬁrst new-generation nuclear power plant, whose 
safety requirements and regulatory process may 
serve as reference for national and international 
development efforts.
The European Commission has proposed that 
the general requirements for nuclear power plant 
safety and nuclear waste management be harmo-
nised in the EU. In Finland, the safety regulations 
that are within the scope of the Nuclear Energy 
Act will also be updated early in the current strat-
egy period. The structure of the detailed safety re-
quirements (YVL Guides) published by STUK will 
also be updated.
New technologies appear that require new ap-
proach and revision of existing regulatory guidance 
and operating practices. Old nuclear power plants 
increase their lifetime that requires renewal of sys-
tems and components and modernization of tech-
nologies. The regulation of existing nuclear power 
plants emphasises the management of ageing and 
the quality of plant operations. The automation 
and other systems at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants are undergoing modernization, and extra 
care is needed to ensure operational safety during 
this work. STUK emphasises the importance of me-
ticulous planning and controlled implementation of 
changes in its regulatory inspections. International 
cooperation for learning lessons from experiences 
in nuclear power plant operation must be improved 
so that risks identiﬁed anywhere can be controlled 
efﬁciently everywhere. STUK actively participates 
in the development of a network and interaction 
between different countries and ensures on its own 
part that essential information is transmitted be-
tween nuclear power plants in Finland and other 
countries.
Security arrangements in nuclear power produc-
tion and the use of high-activity radiation sources 
also call for efﬁcient supervision. One must be 
prepared for the possibility that nuclear materials 
or other radioactive substances are used in inter-
national terrorism. The procedures, preparations 
and information exchange involved in antiterror-
ism activities will be enhanced worldwide. As con-
cerns nuclear material control in Finland, this will 
mean a stronger focus on security arrangements, 
border control, import and export control, security 
arrangements for other radioactive materials and 
research in the ﬁeld. Development is carried out in 
cooperation with other authorities.
In a public discussion about uranium explora-
tion, STUK is frequently asked to provide informa-
tion on radiation safety of this activity. The need 
for more intensive cooperation with other authori-
ties is also becoming obvious. STUK must enhance 
its knowledge and develop analysis methods in 
order to be well prepared for evaluating potential 
mining projects at the investigation stage.
Final disposal of spent fuel in the Olkiluoto 
bedrock is a major task in nuclear waste manage-
ment. Posiva Oy is a company established for this 
purpose, and it is preparing for the construction of 
the ﬁnal disposal facilities and repository. STUK 
invests in its processes and resources during the 
strategy period to ensure that the related regu-
latory tasks are correctly scheduled and of high 
quality.
The European Commission promotes worldwide 
co-operation to further develop nuclear, radiation 
and waste safety through its INSC- and former 
TACIS- and PHARE-programmes. STUK has been 
and will be a supporter of this European develop-
ment and involvement. Currently, three fourths 
of STUK’s service volume comprises promotion of 
radiation and nuclear safety in Eastern European 
countries.
The current development requires new research 
and development programmes and more resources. 
To develop and maintain Finnish competence in 
nuclear safety, STUK provides guidance to the na-
tional research programme on nuclear and waste 
safety. Research on the health effects of ionising 
radiation carried out in STUK’s laboratory will 
be used to support the reassessment of radiation 
risks. Topical research themes during the current 
strategy period include low radiation doses, non-
targeted effects of radiation, non-cancer diseases 
and individual susceptibility. One of the perma-
nent duties of STUK is to survey our living condi-
tions from the point of radiation safety. Analyses of 
environmental samples provide information about 
the occurrence of radioactive substances in the 
environment, drinking water, foodstuffs and hu-
mans. A national network of measurement stations 
provides real-time information about the dose rate 
of external radiation in Finland. Environmental 
monitoring also functions as an alarm system for 
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potential radiation accidents. All abnormal ob-
servations are investigated and their reasons are 
determined and reported.
The retirement of large age groups will affect 
public administration throughout, including STUK. 
The above activities require additional manpower 
and efforts from the nuclear power companies and 
regulatory body for strengthening their activies. 
Ageing manpower and organizations optimized for 
operation and control of current nuclear facilities 
require further development in organizational ar-
rangements and activities. Human resources will 
have to be allocated with great care in the future. 
STUK’s resources are to be developed in such a 
way that the key tasks in radiation and nuclear 
safety can be taken care of at all times. Education 
and training programmes are emphasised.
Communication will become an increasingly 
important success factor for STUK and power 
companies. Interest in radiation and nuclear safety 
topics will continue to increase. The media plays an 
important role in communication.
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4 Conclusions on beneﬁts from 
the previous review meetings
The Convention on Nuclear Safety is the ﬁrst le-
gally binding international instrument for nuclear 
safety in countries that have ratiﬁed it. The con-
tent of the Convention is consistent and covers well 
the safety concerns connected to the use of nuclear 
energy. The Convention calls for regular reporting 
on how its obligations have been implemented in 
the participating countries and communities.
In Finland the Convention was cordially wel-
comed, and Finland was also among the ﬁrst signa-
tories of it. Based on the experience gained during 
and after the First Review Meeting in 1999, it can 
be said that this international legal instrument 
can be – and it is foreseen to be case also in future 
– a very powerful tool for enhancing the safety of 
the nuclear community.
In Finland the Convention and the review 
mechanism included in it are considered fruitful 
i.e. for the following reasons:
• The preparation of the national reports requires 
a certain amount of self-evaluation. Some short-
ages and development needs of the own regula-
tory framework are ﬁxed and managed before 
reporting the situation to the international 
community.
• The preparation of the review report – if pre-
pared in co-operation with national regulators, 
the nuclear industry and licensees, and the 
technical support organisations – contributes to 
the establishment of a common national under-
standing on prioritising the important safety 
issues.
• The reports, as such, form a comprehensive da-
tabase of nuclear programmes not only in the 
own country but also in the sense of providing 
information on other countries’ frameworks and 
programmes. Many Contracting Parties have 
made their reports publicly available through 
the Internet, but also others could be encour-
aged to do the same.
• The publication of reports provides for transpar-
ency, which is in today’s world one of the basic 
requirements for gaining general acceptability 
for using nuclear power. Furthermore, the open-
ness in reporting can be considered to be one 
expression of a well-developed safety culture.
• Conﬁdentiality of discussions during the review 
meetings is essential for providing an effective 
and direct atmosphere for the experts to change 
views on the prioritisation of safety issues and 
regulatory policies. Also the way of public re-
porting of the results of review meetings with-
out making comparisons between contracting 
parties and without pointing out any countries 
together with some country-speciﬁc needs to en-
hance the safety level of their nuclear facilities 
is a necessity for an effective review process.
Taking into account the discussions and observa-
tions in the First Review Meeting, the following list 
of items requiring further actions was prepared by 
STUK and responded. The list was also published 
on the Internet after the First Review Meeting.
• Reassessment of the requirements for modiﬁca-
tions planned by the power company and their 
independent veriﬁcation (see Article 14).
• Reassessment of the procedures and requirements 
for the submission of documents to authorities for 
approval and information (see Article 7).
• Assessment of the degree of detail and control 
of the regulatory guides and other regulations 
(see Article 7).
• Incorporation of safety culture related know-
how into a uniform national programme (see 
Article 10).
• Development of the methods for evaluating the 
appropriateness and functionality of the over-
sight of licensee organisations and strengthen-
ing the control and resources in this sector (see 
Articles 8 and 10).
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• Enhancement of the plant modiﬁcation data-
base with adequate technical data (see Article 
14).
• Training to increase awareness and considera-
tion of seismic risks at the nuclear facilities and 
updating of the requirements related to the con-
trol (see Articles 14 and 17).
• Development and maintenance of STUK’s Qual-
ity System and benchmarking with other regu-
lators (see Article 13)
• Evaluation of the independence of the technical 
support to STUK (see Article 8).
These items were addressed in the second report 
under Articles 6–19, as indicated in brackets.
The Second Review Meeting did not rise any 
speciﬁc points to be corrected in Finland. The 
Summary Report of Second Review Meeting listed 
several speciﬁc issues that were wished to be ad-
dressed in the third National Report. These issues 
were described in the report as follows (number 
refers to the corresponding Article):
• Information on regulatory practices such as ef-
fectiveness of quality management, regulatory 
guidance, adequacy of TSO support, open and 
proactive policy of providing information to the 
public, international co-operation (Art. 7, 8, 13);
• Inspection, monitoring and assessment of the 
operational safety of nuclear installations 
through the use of performance indicators, ana-
lysing important events in nuclear installations 
taking into account human performance and 
organizational issues; safety management and 
safety culture; trends in occupational doses and 
releases to the environment; periodic safety re-
views, safety of on-site radioactive waste man-
agement (Art. 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19);
• Information on maintaining competence, simu-
lator training and plant speciﬁc simulators, as 
well as results of national and international 
emergency exercises (Art. 8, 11, 12 16);
• Further and more detailed information on the 
status of safety improvement programmes, back 
ﬁtting of NPPs to meet the current standards, 
information on periodic safety reviews and op-
erating licence renewals, role of advanced safety 
assessment methods such as PSA and updated 
safety analysis reports, measures for severe 
accident management and containment issues, 
operating procedures including symptom based 
procedures, and guidelines for severe accident 
management (Art. 6, 14, 17, 18, 19);
• Information on provisions in place for ﬁnanc-
ing safety improvement programmes; status of 
decommissioning plans and funds (Art. 11);
• Addressing design principles with respect to 
new reactor concepts (Art.17, 18).
The Third Review Meeting in 2005 identiﬁed some 
challenges and recorded some planned measures 
to improve safety in Finland. On request of the 
Review Meeting these issues are included in this 
fourth national report of Finland.
These items are (given in brackets the articles, 
in which the issues are addressed):
• Ageing of regulatory staff (see article 8)
• Maintaining competence during extended re-
tirement (see articles 8 and 11)
• Developing risk informed regulation (see arti-
cles 7 and 8 and chapter 3)
• Regulatory control of construction of new 
Olkiluoto NPP unit 3 (see article 7)
• Replacement of I&C at Loviisa NPP (see Annex 
2)
• Maintaining and enhancing safety culture (see 
article 10)
• Completing the NDT qualiﬁcation programme 
(see article 14 and chapter 3)
• Ageing management at Finnish NPPs (see arti-
cle 14 and chapter 3)
• Renewal of operating licenses for Loviisa NPP 
units 1 and 2 (see article 6)
• Periodic Safety Review (PSR) for Olkiluoto NPP 
units 1 and 2 (see article 6).
As a conclusion, in Finland the First, Second and 
Third Review Meetings were considered very 
fruitful and it is believed that the Fourth Review 
Meeting will also follow the same lines.
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ANNEX 1 List of main regulations
Legislation (as of 21.9.2007)
1. Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987)
2. Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988)
3. Act on Third Party Liability (484/1972)
4. Decree on Third Party Liability (486/1972)
5. Radiation Act (592/1991)
6. Radiation Decree (1512/1991)
7. Regulations for the Safety of Nuclear Power 
Plants (395/1991)
8. Regulations for Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Power Plants (396/1991)
9. Regulations for Emergency Response 
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(397/1991)
10. Regulations for the Safety of a Disposal Facility 
for Reactor Waste (398/1991)
11. Regulations for Safety of Disposal of the Spent 
Fuel (478/1999)
12. Act and Decree on the Finnish Centre for 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety (1069/1983 and 
1515/1991)
13. Decree on Advisory Committee on Nuclear 
Safety (164/1988)
14. Decree on Advisory Committee on Nuclear 
Energy (163/1988).
YVL Guides (per 21.9.2007)
General guides
YVL 1.0 Safety criteria for design of nuclear power 
plants 12 Jan 1996
YVL 1.1 Regulatory control of safety at nuclear 
facilities 10 Feb 2006
YVL 1.2 Documents pertaining to safety control of 
nuclear facilities 11 Sep 1995
YVL 1.3 Mechanical components and structures of 
nuclear facilities. Approval of testing and inspec-
tion organizations 17 Mar 2003
YVL 1.4 Quality assurance of nuclear power plants 
20 Sep 1991
YVL 1.5 Reporting nuclear facility operation to 
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 8 Sep 
2003
YVL 1.6 Nuclear power plant operator competence 
(available in Finnish only) 5 Oct 2006
YVL 1.7 Functions important to nuclear power 
plant safety, and training and qualiﬁcation of per-
sonnel 28 Dec 1992
YVL 1.8 Repairs, modiﬁcations and preventive 
maintenance at nuclear facilities 2 Oct 1986
YVL 1.9 Quality assurance during operation of nu-
clear power plants 13 Nov 1991
YVL 1.10 Requirements for siting a nuclear power 
plant 11 Jul 2000
YVL 1.11 Nuclear power plant operating experi-
ence feedback 22 Dec 1994
YVL 1.12 INES classiﬁcation of events at nuclear 
facilities 16 Jan 2002
YVL 1.13 Nuclear power plant outages 9 Jan 1995
YVL 1.14 Mechanical equipment and structures of 
nuclear facilities. Control of manufacturing 4 Oct 
1999
YVL 1.15 Mechanical components and structures 
in nuclear installations. Construction inspection 
(available in Finnish only) 19 Dec 1995
YVL 1.16 Regulatory control of nuclear liability 
insurances 22 Mar 2000
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Systems
YVL 2.0 Systems design for nuclear power plants 
1 Jul 2002
YVL 2.1 Nuclear power plant systems, structures 
and components and their safety classiﬁcation 26 
Jun 2000
YVL 2.2 Transient and accident analyses for jus-
tiﬁcation of technical solutions at nuclear power 
plants 26 Aug 2003
YVL 2.4 Primary and secondary circuit pressure 
control at a nuclear power plant (available in 
Finnish only) 24 Mar 2006
YVL 2.5 The commissioning of a nuclear power 
plant 29 Sep 2003
YVL 2.6 Seismic events and nuclear power plants 
19 Dec 2001
YVL 2.7 Ensuring a nuclear power plant’s safety 
functions in provision for failures 20 May 1996
YVL 2.8 Probabilistic safety analysis in safety 
management of nuclear power plants 28 May 2003
Pressure equipment
YVL 3.0 Pressure equipment of nuclear facilities 9 
Apr 2002
YVL 3.1 Nuclear facility pressure vessels (avail-
able in Finnish only) 1 Jul 2005
YVL 3.3 Pipings at nuclear facilities (available in 
Finnish only) 26 Jun 2006
YVL 3.4 Approval of the manufacturer of nuclear 
pressure equipment 14 Jan 2004
YVL 3.5 Ensuring the ﬁrmness of pressure vessels 
of a NPP (available in Finnish only) 5 Apr 2002
YVL 3.7 Pressure vessels of nuclear facilities. 
Commissioning inspection 12 Dec 1991
YVL 3.8 Nuclear power plant pressure equipment. 
In-service inspection with non-destructive testing 
methods 22 Sep 2003
YVL 3.9 Nuclear power plant pressure equipment. 
Construction and welding ﬁller materials (avail-
able in Finnish only) 5 Nov 2004
Buildings and structures
YVL 4.1 Concrete structures for nuclear facilities 
22 May 1992
YVL 4.2 Steel structures for nuclear facilities 19 
Dec 2001
YVL 4.3 Fire protection at nuclear facilities 1 Nov 
1999
Other structures and components
YVL 5.1 Nuclear power plant diesel generators and 
their auxiliary systems (available in Finnish only) 
23 Jan 1997
YVL 5.2 Electrical power systems and components 
at nuclear facilities 24 Jun 2004
YVL 5.3 Regulatory control of nuclear facility 
valves and their actuators 7 Feb 1991
YVL 5.4 Supervision of safety relief valves in nu-
clear facilities (available in Finnish only) 6 Apr 
1995
YVL 5.5 Instrumentation systems and components 
at nuclear facilities 13 Sep 2002
YVL 5.6 Air-conditioning and ventilation systems 
and components of nuclear facilities 25 Nov 2004
YVL 5.7 Pumps at nuclear facilities 23 Nov 1993
YVL 5.8 Hoisting appliances and fuel handling 
equipment at nuclear facilities 5 Jan 1987
Nuclear materials
YVL 6.1 Control of nuclear fuel and other nuclear 
materials required in the operation of nuclear pow-
er plants 19 Jun 1991
YVL 6.2 Design bases and general design criteria 
for nuclear fuel 1 Nov 1999
YVL 6.3 Regulatory control of nuclear fuel and con-
trol rods 28 May 2003
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YVL 6.4 Transport packages and packagings for 
radioactive material 4 Apr 2005
YVL 6.5 Transport of nuclear material and nuclear 
waste 4 Apr 2005
YVL 6.7 Quality management of nuclear fuel 17 
Mar 2003
YVL 6.8 Storage and handling of nuclear fuel 27 
Oct 2003
YVL 6.9 The national system of accounting for and 
control of nuclear material (available in Finnish 
only) 23 Sep 1999
YVL 6.10 Reports to be submitted on nuclear mate-
rials (available in Finnish only) 23 Sep 1999
Guide YVL 6.11 Physical protection of nuclear 
power plants, 13.7.1992 (not publicly available)
Guide YVL 6.21 Physical protection of nuclear fuel 
transports, 15.2.1988 (not publicly available)
Radiation protection
YVL 7.1 Limitation of public exposure in the envi-
ronment of and limitation of radioactive releases 
from a nuclear power plant (in Finnish and in 
Swedish) 22 Mar 2006
YVL 7.2 Assessment of radiation doses to the popu-
lation in the environment of a nuclear power plant 
23 Jan 1997
YVL 7.3 Calculation of the dispersion of radioactive 
releases from a nuclear power plant 23 Jan 1997
YVL 7.4 Nuclear power plant emergency prepared-
ness 9 Jan 2002
YVL 7.5 Meteorological measurements of a nuclear 
power plant 28 May 2003
YVL 7.6 Monitoring of discharges of radioactive 
substances from a nuclear power plant (available 
in Finnish only) 22 Mar 2006
YVL 7.7 Radiation monitoring in the environment 
of a nuclear power plant (available in Finnish only) 
22 Mar 2006
YVL 7.8 Environmental radiation safety reports of 
a nuclear power plant (available in Finnish only) 
22 Mar 2006
YVL 7.9 Radiation protection of workers at nuclear 
facilities 21 Jan 2002
YVL 7.10 Monitoring of occupational exposure at 
nuclear facilities 29 Jan 2002
YVL 7.11 Radiation monitoring systems and equip-
ment of a nuclear power plant 13 Jul 2004
YVL 7.18 Radiation safety aspects in the design of 
a nuclear power plant 26 Sep 2003
Radioactive waste management
YVL 8.1 Disposal of low and intermediate level 
waste from the operation of nuclear power plants 
10 Sep 2003
YVL 8.2 Premises for removal of regulatory control 
from nuclear waste 25 Mar 2002
YVL 8.3 Treatment and storage of low and inter-
mediate level waste at a nuclear power plant 29 
Jun 2005
YVL 8.4 Long-term safety of disposal of spent nu-
clear fuel 23 May 2001
YVL 8.5 Operational safety of a disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel 23 Dec 2002
Only the guides without a language 
marking are available in English.
The guides are available on the 
Internet at www.edilex.ﬁ/stuklex/en/
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ANNEX 2 The latest large plant 
modernization and power uprating projects 
in the Finnish nuclear power plants
Loviisa NPP
Modernization and power uprating 
of Loviisa NPP in 1994–97
The project for the modernization and power up-
rating of Loviisa NPPs gave an excellent possibil-
ity to take advantage of the latest development 
in the nuclear power plant technology. The key 
aspects were to verify the plant safety, to improve 
production capacity and to give a good basis for 
the extension of the plant’s lifetime to at least 50 
years, which corresponds to the additional 20 years 
of operation applied for both units of the Loviisa 
NPP in 2006.
Feasibility study and project objectives
In the ﬁrst phase, before starting the project, a 
feasibility study for uprating of the reactor ther-
mal power was carried out. The main result was 
in short that no technical or licensing issues could 
be found which would prevent the raising of the 
reactor thermal output up to 1500 MW from the 
original level of 1375 MW.
The carefully prepared feasibility study gave a 
good picture of the necessary plant modiﬁcations 
as well as essential areas in the analysis work, 
which was of use in planning the critical works 
and the time schedule of the project. The feasibility 
study focused on the following tasks:
• the optimisation of the power level and deﬁni-
tion of the new parameters of the main process
• reactor core and fuel studies, including RPV ir-
radiation embrittlement
• safety analyses and licensing
• the main components and systems
• project planning and risk assessment.
The main objectives for the project were based on 
the feasibility study:
(1) Plant safety level as a whole will be checked 
and, if needed, improvements will be made.
(2) Plant units will be licensed for 1500 MW reactor 
thermal output.
(3) Gross electric output of the plant units will be 
raised to about 510 MW.
(4) Assistance to the life time extension of the plant 
units.
(5) The long-term availability of the plant is not 
impaired.
(6) Increase in the expert knowledge of staff.
Time schedule and project organisation
The feasibility study concerning the reactor power 
upgrading and improvements of the turbine efﬁ-
ciency was started in spring 1994. After good results 
from the study, the preparation of the project plan 
began in summer 1995. Critical works in the time 
schedule, such as the revision of the Final Safety 
Analysis Report and the preparation of certain plant 
modiﬁcations, were started immediately.
The ﬁrst step of the trial run at 103% reac-
tor power could be started in January 1997. Test 
runs continued step by step during the year, and 
the last transient test at ﬁnal reactor power 109% 
was completed successfully in December 1997. 
Measures to improve the efﬁciency of the steam 
turbines continued in the annual maintenance out-
ages until the year 2002.
The implementation of the project was car-
ried out in co-operation between Loviisa NPP 
and Fortum Nuclear Services (former Fortum 
Engineering). In addition, many other organisa-
tions such as the Technical Research Centre of 
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Finland (VTT) participated in the work. Special at-
tention was paid to the QA routines in the project 
as well as to the co-ordination of the work in sev-
eral organisations. One example of this was the 
particular subject-speciﬁc specialist groups which 
were established to overview essential sections 
such as nuclear safety and commissioning.
The work was divided into the following ten 
sub-projects each having a responsible person from 
the organisations of both Loviisa NPP and Fortum 
Engineering:
(1) Operating licenses
(2) Other licenses
(3) Safety analyses and basic data management
(4) FSAR revision and comparison of the plant with 
regulatory body guidelines
(5) PSA (including level 2 PSA)
(6) Modiﬁcation of the turbines
(7) Electricity systems
(8) Reactor and fuel
(9) Process systems and automation
(10) Commissioning and revision of instructions.
Technical implementation and 
experience of the trial operation
Increasing the electrical output by about 50 MW 
at each unit was part of the Loviisa modernisation 
programme. After completing the uprating of the 
reactor thermal output in April 1998, more than 
80% of the total increase in the electrical output 
was fulﬁlled. The rest of the power increase was 
available when the measures to improve the steam 
turbines were completed in 2002.
The reactor power uprating from 1375 MW to 
1500 MW was planned on the basis of optimising 
the need for major plant modiﬁcations. In the pri-
mary side and the sea water cooling system, the 
mass ﬂow rates were not affected, but the tempera-
ture difference has been increased in proportion to 
the power upgrading. In the turbine side, the live 
steam and the feedwater ﬂow rate were increased 
by about 10%; the live steam pressure was not 
changed.
The reactor fuel loading was considered on the 
basis of the previous limits set for the maximum 
fuel linear power and fuel burn-up. The increase in 
the reactor thermal output was carried out by op-
timising the power distribution in the core and the 
power of any single fuel bundle was not increased 
above the maximum level before power upgrading. 
In parallel with this work, more advanced options 
related to the mixing rate of the cooling water in 
the fuel subchannels and the increasing of fuel en-
richment were investigated. The dummy elements 
installed on the periphery of the core in Loviisa 1 
and 2 were preserved to minimise irradiation em-
brittlement of the reactor pressure vessel.
The VVER 440 design margins in the primary 
side are rather large and the hardware modiﬁca-
tions needed there were quite limited. Replacement 
of the pressuriser safety valves was indicated al-
ready during the feasibility study as a necessary 
measure because of the power upgrading. Most 
of the other substantial measures in the primary 
side were carried out on the basis of the continuing 
effort to maintain and raise the safety level of the 
plant, and they were not directly included in the 
power upgrading.
It was necessary to carry out more extensive 
measures in the turbine plant and to the electrical 
components. Steam turbines were modiﬁed to a 
higher steam ﬂow rate. Because of these measures, 
also the efﬁciency and operation reliability has im-
proved. Certain modiﬁcations were carried out in 
the electrical generators and the main transform-
ers to ensure reliability in continuous operation 
with the upgraded power output.
The last step in the process to uprate the reactor 
thermal power was the long-term trial run to verify 
the main process parameters as well as plant oper-
ation in both steady state and transient situations. 
The trial run was carried out at gradually uprated 
reactor power with a power level of 103%, 105%, 
107% and ﬁnally 109%. Transient tests deﬁned in 
the test programme were performed with a reactor 
thermal power of 105% and 109%. The test results 
correspond very well with all analyses and calcula-
tions. All the acceptance criteria for the tests were 
fulﬁlled.
Licensing procedure and safety analyses
The modernization programme as a whole was 
started from the basis of the positive safety progress. 
This was applied by taking advantage of the latest 
development in calculation codes and technology as 
well as feedback of the operating experience, exper-
tise in the ageing processes and safety reassessment 
coupled with the evolution of safety standards.
STUK was closely involved at every stage of 
the project, from the early planning of the concept 
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to the evaluation of the results from the test runs. 
STUK examined all the modiﬁcation plans that 
might be expected to have an impact on plant 
safety. Individual permits were granted stage by 
stage, based on the successful implementation of 
previous work.
The renewal of the operating license for the 
increased reactor power was carried out in the fol-
lowing steps:
• permission from the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry to make plant modiﬁcations and test 
runs with upgraded reactor power under the 
existing operating license and under the control 
of STUK
• assessment of the environmental impact (EIA-
procedure) of the project
• STUK’s approval of the Final Safety Analyses 
Report (FSAR), the safety-related plant modiﬁ-
cations, test programmes and results
• the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the respon-
sible authority for the NPP operating licenses, 
received a statement from several local and 
national organisations
• The operating license was prepared by the Min-
istry of Trade and Industry, and the Govern-
ment awarded the license in their session on 2 
April 1998. The license is awarded to 1500 MW 
nominal reactor thermal power until the end of 
the year 2007.
The environmental impact has been assessed in 
the EIA Report, which was completed in December 
1996. This was the ﬁrst time in Finland (parallel 
with TVO plant having a corresponding moderni-
sation programme) the EIA Procedure has been 
applied to a nuclear power plant. The law and the 
decree set certain procedures, including a public 
hearing for screening, scoping and the EIA state-
ment, which are the stages of this procedure.
The result was that the reactor thermal power 
uprating has no other considerable environmental 
impact than a slight increase in the outlet tem-
perature of the cooling water. This means that 
the maximum temperature increase of the cooling 
water in the main condenser, before released back 
to the sea, is about 1°C higher than the previous 
temperature increase, which was typically close to 
10°C.
An extensive safety review and comparison 
of the plant with the latest national regulatory 
body guidelines (YVL guides) have been carried 
out. This work was performed taking into ac-
count many international standards, such as the 
IAEA report “A Common Basis for Judging the 
Safety of Nuclear Power Plants Built to the Earlier 
Standards INSAG-8”. As a result of the work, a 
particular safety review report has been com-
pleted.
A part of the safety review and the licensing 
process of the reactor power uprating was the re-
newal of the Final Safety Analysis Report. New 
accident analyses were made concerning the con-
tainment pressure, loss of coolant accident (LOCA) 
and main steam line break (MSLB), for example. 
In addition to the accident analyses, there are a 
large number of transient situations that were also 
analysed. The risk for a radioactive release to the 
environment was probabilistically considered (PSA 
level 2) for the ﬁrst time for Loviisa NPP.
The latest plant modiﬁcations in the 
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant (2005–2007)
Construction of a back-up decay 
heat removal system
A new reactor decay heat removal system has been 
constructed at Loviisa plant. It is designed for use 
during the unavailability of the normal decay heat 
removal system. It takes care of the decay heat re-
moval when the reactor has cooled down enough to 
facilitate decay heat removal by cooling down the 
water recirculated on the steam generator second-
ary side. The pumps and heat exchangers of the 
system normally used for this purpose are located 
in the plant unit’s turbine hall and could be lost 
in a turbine hall ﬁre. Before the completion of the 
new system, it would have been impossible to bring 
the reactor into a cold shutdown state in such a 
situation; instead, it would have been necessary to 
release decay heat as steam into the atmosphere 
through the relief valves of the steam generator. In 
such a situation, the temperature of the primary 
circuit would have exceeded 100°C.
The pumps and heat exchangers of the new 
system are located in a separate building (external 
to the turbine hall). Piping and their connections 
to the steam lines and the feed water lines are in a 
section of the turbine hall that is protected against 
ﬁres. Power supply for the system is ascertained 
such that it can be connected to the emergency 
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diesel generators of both Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 
as well as to a bus supplied electrical power by 
the nearby Ahvenkoski hydropower station. The 
system is shared by both Loviisa plant units and 
it can, where necessary, bring either one or both of 
the two reactors into cold shutdown. The system’s 
heat exchangers can be cooled using the service 
water systems of either plant unit. The service 
water systems are modiﬁed, too, to improve the 
reliability of decay heat removal in the event of the 
occurrence of frazil ice, algae and ﬂooding.
The construction of the system started in the 
spring of 2002 and the piping modiﬁcations were 
made in the winter of 2004. Test operation began 
in the 2004 outages and was completed during a 
shutdown relating to a 2005 outage. The service 
water circuit installations are completed in 2007.
The emergency operating 
procedures were revised
The emergency operating procedures of Loviisa 
nuclear power plant were revised in the so called 
HOKE project, launched in 2000. The project en-
compassed the drawing up of diagnosis procedures 
for transients and emergencies arising from prima-
ry and secondary leaks, procedures for operators 
and the safety engineer as well as action sheets for 
onsite measures. Some old procedures have been 
removed and the rest have been revised as appro-
priate i.a. as regards transition between old and 
new procedures.
In accordance with the new procedures, nuclear 
power plant operators follow their own separate 
procedures and initiate the necessary actions in 
their ﬁelds of responsibility in the event of an 
emergency or a transient. The shift manager co-or-
dinates these actions and reviews the main actions 
and parameters using his own procedures. The 
safety engineer in parallel with the operators inde-
pendently oversees safety functions using separate 
procedures to ensure that plant behaviour is as 
planned.
The revised procedures consist of guidelines 
and instructions presented as ﬂow charts. The 
guidelines deﬁne strategy and give grounds for op-
erator actions during emergencies and transients. 
It serves as a basis for actual control room proce-
dures containing operator procedures. The guide-
lines are used for training purposes as well.
The revised control room procedures of the 
Loviisa plant are based on French nuclear power 
plant procedures. The project’s French experts 
also participated in the validation and veriﬁca-
tion of the procedures and their background ma-
terial in co-operation with the plant’s own per-
sonnel. Validation ascertains authenticity of the 
procedures i.a. by comparison with the plant and 
by simulator tests. Veriﬁcation authenticates i.a. 
correlation and functioning of the new procedures 
with other plant procedures. The project included 
training given to the control room personnel of the 
Loviisa plant in the use of the new procedures. Due 
to the revision’s signiﬁcance, both structurally and 
contents-wise, STUK required that shift supervi-
sors and operators working in the control room 
have given shift-speciﬁc proof of workmanship 
prior to the introduction into use of the revised 
procedures.
In December 2005, STUK authorised the in-
troduction into service of the revised emergency 
operating procedures.
Replacement of high pressure 
emergency cooling system pumps
Pumps of the high pressure emergency cooling 
system are replaced with a new type of pump at 
both Loviisa units. The new type of pump was 
introduced because of the reduced availability of 
spare parts for the old pumps, and to improve sys-
tem reliability. At Loviisa 2 annual maintenance in 
2006, two out of four pumps were replaced, one for 
each redundant system section, and the necessa-
ry piping modiﬁcations were made. Corresponding 
work at Loviisa 1 will be done in the 2008 annual 
maintenance outage.
Protection against ﬁres in the Loviisa NPP
The possibility of ﬁres and nuclear accident risks 
caused by them were not adequately taken into 
account initially in the functional design and the 
lay-out design of the Loviisa plant. Therefore, ﬁre 
compartments were not implemented in many 
parts so that the plant safety functions could be 
maintained during all ﬁre situations considered 
possible. For this reason the signiﬁcance of an ac-
tive ﬁre ﬁghting (ﬁre alarm and extinguishing sys-
tems as well as operative ﬁre ﬁghting) is important 
along with structural ﬁre protection arrangements.
Fire safety has been improved with several 
measures at the Loviisa plant after its commis-
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sioning. These measures have been implemented 
in various ﬁelds of ﬁre protection. As a result, the 
plant safety against the effects of ﬁres has been es-
sentially improved.
For a provision against oil ﬁres in the turbine 
hall several measures have been taken. Fire in-
sulators of the load-bearing steel structures of 
the turbine building have been installed. The tur-
bine hall has been equipped with an automatic 
sprinkler system and the signiﬁcant parts of the 
turbines have been protected. Later on, the ﬁre 
wall of the turbine hall has been built up to pro-
tect components important to reactor decay heat 
removal. Furthermore, the additional emergency 
feedwater system has been built for the case that 
all feedwater and emergency feedwater systems 
would be lost in a turbine hall ﬁre. In Loviisa decay 
heat removal systems are in turbine hall. That´s 
why there is the separate building for additional 
decay heat removal system outside turbine hall 
(built in 2005). The new system is needed for cool-
ing the plant to cold shutdown, if normal systems 
are not operable.
The main transformers have been protected 
with a sprinkler system which essentially reduces 
the risk that a ﬁre would spread into the surround-
ing buildings, especially into the turbine hall. The 
risk to lose the AC-power during transformer ﬁres 
has been reduced by protecting the diesel genera-
tors against ﬁres. The 110 kV net connection has 
been physically separated from the 400 kV con-
nection so that the loss of both connections as a 
result of a transformer ﬁre is improbable. Several 
improvements against ﬁres have been done in off-
site power supply arrangements and in diesel gen-
erators. The original ﬁre water pumps are supplied 
only from the off-site electrical network. Therefore, 
an additional ﬁre water pump station has been 
constructed at the plant. It has been equipped with 
diesel-driven ﬁre water pumps and with a separate 
ﬁre water tank. Fire water piping and ﬁre extin-
guishing systems as well as their coverage have 
been improved. A new addressed ﬁre alarm system 
was completed in 1999 at Loviisa 1 and in 2001 at 
Loviisa 2. Several structural improvements for ﬁre 
safety have been done, or are under design.
The level of the operative ﬁre protection has 
been improved by establishing a plant ﬁre ﬁght-
ing crew which is permanent, constantly ready to 
depart and has the proper equipment. As regards 
ﬁre protection and ﬁre risks also plant instructions 
have been complemented.
Results of PSA
All the improvements of the plant mentioned above 
have been taken into account in the updated risk 
analyses related to the internal ﬂoods, ﬁres, severe 
weather conditions and internal initiating events 
(level 1). Fortum provided STUK with these analy-
ses in 1994–2007. At the end of 2007 the results of 
the risk analyses are the following:
• internal initiating events, 1.0 × 10–5 a year
• ﬁres and earthquakes, 1.9 × 10–5 a year
• ﬂoods, 0.4 × 10–5 a year
• severe weather conditions, 0.8 × 10–5 a year
• outages, 4.1 × 10–5 a year, internal initiating 
events, ﬂoods and severe weather conditions.
The calculated estimate for the total frequency 
of reactor core damage is about 8.2 × 10–5 a year. 
This estimate takes into account all the factors 
presented above.
Level 1 PSA – Internal initiating events
The 1989 analysis contained an evaluation of the 
risks caused by various plant transients, ruptures 
of the cooling pipes and disturbances in the electri-
cal network (internal initiating events). The result 
of the analysis concerning the probability of reac-
tor core damage was about 2 × 10–3 a year. Reasons 
for that high estimate were simpliﬁed assump-
tions related to event sequences which are difﬁ-
cult to model: some events, such as e.g. exceeding 
the design temperature in the rooms of electrical 
systems were assumed to result in a reactor core 
damage. For decreasing the importance of these 
event sequences new redundant air cooling system 
for instrumentation rooms were implemented, af-
ter which their probability became so small that 
they had no signiﬁcant effect on the total risk. In 
the same connection other improvements such as 
primary coolant pumps improved antireverse con-
trol system and new stopping signal based on the 
low seal coolant ﬂow were implemented to prevent 
seal LOCA. After the improvements of the plant in 
1990 the probability of reactor core damage was 
estimated to be about 1.4 × 10–4 a year.
In addition, since 1991 several modiﬁcations of the 
plant have been made, reducing essentially the 
risk:
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• The reliability of reducing the pressure of the 
primary circuit was improved by making pos-
sible the emergency spray of the pressurizer by 
means of the pumps of the high-pressure safety 
injection system. The modiﬁcation makes more 
effective the reducing of the primary circuit 
pressure to the level of the secondary circuit e.g. 
in connection with a leak from the primary to 
secondary circuit (PRISE). In this way the pri-
mary-secondary leak in a steam generator can 
be stopped.
• A new safety injection water tank was installed 
in order to cool the reactor and extend the time 
available to operators when coolant is lost from 
the primary circuit due to the primary-second-
ary leak through an open-stuck relief valve of 
the steam generator.
• Radiation monitoring equipment was installed 
in the secondary circuit for making a more effec-
tive detection of leaks from the primary circuit 
to the secondary circuit in a steam generator.
• A new protection signal was installed for isolat-
ing the feedwater line and the steam line and 
for stopping the reactor coolant pump in the 
case of a high water level in a steam generator.
• The reliability of the emergency core cooling 
was improved. The old minimum circulation 
lines leading to the emergency injection water 
tank have been replaced with the new mini-
mum circulation lines which lead directly from 
the delivery side of the safety injection pumps 
to the suction side of the pumps. They have also 
been equipped with a separate cooling system. 
After the modiﬁcation the possibility has been 
eliminated for the alternate turnover of the 
suction source of the pumps between the tank 
and the containment emergency sumps. In con-
nection of a turnover a valve failure might occur 
resulting in loss of emergency cooling.
• An automatic PCP seal water intake from make-
up system was installed for the case of loss of 
normal seal water cooling.
• The risks of containment outside leakages have 
been decreased with several plant modiﬁcations, 
e.g. by installing an automatic isolation system 
of certain leakages outside containment.
• The previously mentioned latest plant modiﬁca-
tions (2005–2007).
Level 1 PSA – Fires
Plant ﬁre risks were evaluated in the analysis com-
pleted in 1992. The probability of reactor core dam-
age caused by ﬁres was estimated to be 1 × 10–3 a 
year. This ﬁgure was conservative, because simpli-
ﬁed pessimistic assumptions had to be done in the 
modelling of ﬁre progress and consequences due to 
a lack of well established methods. For reducing 
ﬁre risks several modiﬁcations of the plant were 
made:
• installation of sprinkler system for the main 
transformer area
• removal of standby transformer from the main 
transformer area
• permanent closing of some ﬁre doors
• additional emergency feedwater system to back 
up the auxiliary feedwater system in case of 
turbine hall ﬁre
• additional ﬁre pump station
• isolation/rerouting of the most critical cables
• additional sprinklers for protection of cables 
important to safety
• ﬁre protection of control and power supply ca-
bles was improved
• ﬁre protection of important pressurised air pip-
ing was improved
• structural protection of the hydraulic oil sta-
tions of the turbine bypass valves as well as 
sprinkler protection of the stations was im-
proved for preventing high pressure oil sprays
• ﬁre alarm system renewed.
Level 1 PSA – Floods
The probability of reactor core damage caused by 
ﬂoods was estimated to be about 1 × 10–5 a year in 
the analysis completed in 1994. The analysis re-
sulted in many modiﬁcations of the plant for reduc-
ing the risks related to internal ﬂoods:
• A wall against ﬂoods was constructed for pre-
venting the spreading of a ﬂood from the tur-
bine hall to the lower rooms of the reactor build-
ing through cable spaces. In the lower rooms a 
ﬂood could cause failures in the cooling system 
of the reactor coolant pumps and in the emer-
gency core cooling system.
• Drainage of the cable spaces in the control room 
building was improved so that the ﬂooding wa-
ter accumulating on the ﬂoor would not cause 
the exceeding of the design load of the ﬂoor.
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• For reducing the ﬂood risks of the control room 
building the cooling water pipes related to the 
standard ventilation units were removed from 
the cable spaces below the control room to more 
secure routes.
• Drainage on the level of the feedwater tanks 
was improved so that the ﬂooding water ac-
cumulating on the ﬂoor would not cause the 
exceeding of the design load of the ﬂoor.
• To protect the ﬂoor of the feedwater tanks 
against possible high pressure jet forces, jet 
shelters were installed on the welded joints 
of the feedwater piping to control the reaction 
forces in leak situations. Furthermore, the pipes 
crossing the feedwater tank level were replaced 
by pipes made out of better material.
Level 1 PSA – Weather
In the analysis concerning weather risks, complet-
ed in 1994, seawater phenomena, a bad snow storm 
and algae were evaluated as signiﬁcant risks. The 
probability of reactor core damage was estimated 
to be about 5 × 10–4 a year. The following modiﬁca-
tions of the plant were implemented to reduce the 
risks:
• To reduce the breaking risk of the travelling 
basket screen in the sea water intake channel, 
a system was installed which stops sea water 
pumps one by one based on the increase of the 
pressure difference in the screen. As a result of 
this change the access of the algae into the sea 
water cooling piping and heat exchangers is 
prevented.
• To protect the intake air channels of the diesel 
generators against clogging caused by a snow 
storm, the type of the intake air ﬁlters has been 
changed. In addition, the intake air of the diesel 
generators can now be taken from the interiors 
through the automatically opening air inlet 
dampers, if the intake air channel clogged.
• To protect frazil ice of causing blockage of serv-
ice water system a new procedure to utilize 
service water and condenser water in warming 
up water intake at low intake water tempera-
tures.
• To protect sea vegetation and frazil ice causing 
blockage of service water system a new proce-
dure was developed to utilize siphon through 
the main condensers after the circulating water 
pumps have stopped.
• The ultimate heat sink was secured (see above 
the modiﬁcations in 2005–2007)
Level 1 PSA – Outages
The probability of reactor core damage caused by 
internal initiating events during refuelling out-
ages was estimated to be about 2,8 × 10–5 a year in 
the analysis completed in 1997. Heavy hoisting in 
containment building was to be a very important 
risk factor. By means of the outage risk analysis 
Fortum has justiﬁed following improvements:
• Changes were made in the operating and test-
ing instructions based on the observations done 
in PSA.
• To reduce the risk related to the hoisting of 
heavy loads procedures were changed.
• To ensure the cooling of the instrument spaces 
important to safety, a modiﬁcation was made in 
the change-over automation of the ventilation 
units. This will ensure the proper functioning 
also in the case of a fuse failure.
Level 2 PSA
Fortum has also provided STUK with the level 2 
PSA in which the integrity of the containment and 
the release of radioactive materials from the plant 
to the environment are evaluated. In 1997 it was 
estimated that the probability of a large release to 
the environment is about 5 × 10–6 a year, caused by 
the internal initiating events at power. The PSA 
level 2 study in 2007 includes internal initiating 
events, ﬂoods and severe weather conditions in at 
power states. The total frequency of of large release 
in these categories is estimated to be 8.3 × 10−6 a 
year:
• internal initiating events, 5.8 × 10−6 a year
• ﬂoods, 0.5 × 10−6 a year
• severe weather conditions, 2.0 × 10−6 a year.
The biggest part of the calculated risk in the cat-
egories above result from containment bypass se-
quences in internal events, high wind velocities 
and failure of the containment external spray in 
severe weather conditions.
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The calculated estimate for the total frequency 
of large release is about 2.7 × 10−5 a year, which 
includes a rough estimate of yet unﬁnished work 
with the following studies:
• ﬁres and earthquakes, 2.9 × 10−6 a year
• outages, 1.6 × 10–5 a year, internal initiating 
events, ﬂoods and severe weather conditions.
The calculated risk estimate takes into account 
the modiﬁcations of the Loviisa plant designed for 
severe accidents. These are: the external cooling of 
the reactor pressure vessel, the measures aimed 
for preventing such loading situations which break 
the reactor cavity, the improved control of hydro-
gen and the new procedures for severe accident 
management. These modiﬁcations have been im-
plemented by 2003.
Olkiluoto NPP
Enhanced safety and improved 
production through modernization 
at Olkiluoto NPP in 1994–98
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 units have been in op-
eration about 25 years. The performance indicators 
have been favourable. For instance, the average 
capacity factor for the last ten years is well above 
90%.
Already before modernization the plant design 
was reasonably modern due to the following ad-
vanced features included in the original design:
• internal main circulation pumps
• ﬁne motion control rod drives
• 4 × 50% redundant safety systems
• inerted pre-stressed concrete containment, back 
ﬁtted against severe accidents.
Numerous design modiﬁcations have been im-
plemented since the commissioning of the units. 
TVO’s policy has been to keep the plant continu-
ously up–to–date.
Principles and goals
From the beginning, the following principles were 
followed in the program:
• technical development was exploited
• new safety requirements
• advanced design solutions
• operational experiences were utilised
• own experiences
• experiences from other plants
• own staff was used as much as possible
• losses in electricity production were avoided
• plant modiﬁcations presupposing shutdown 
were implemented during normal refuelling 
and maintenance outages
• cost/beneﬁt approach was applied.
The main goals of the modernisation were as fol-
lows:
• reviewing safety features and enhancing safety, 
when feasible
• improving the production related performance
• ﬁnding factors limiting the plant lifetime and 
eliminating them, when feasible
• enhancing the expertise of the own staff and 
improving productivity.
The goals supported each other. For instance, it is 
easier to license the reactor uprating if safety is 
simultaneously enhanced. On the other hand, the 
cost of safety improvements can be compensated 
for by the additional output working for lower pro-
duction cost.
Safety enhancement
In order to achieve the safety goal, the existing 
plant design has been reviewed and compared by 
the TVO to the present and foreseeable safety re-
quirements. The most important requirements are 
included in the YVL Guides issued by STUK for 
new nuclear power plants. Compliance with the 
European Utility Requirements (EUR) has also 
been reviewed.
The feasibility of fulﬁlling new requirements 
set for the new nuclear power plants has been con-
sidered case by case. The living PSA model of the 
plant has been utilised in this context.
The most important safety related modiﬁca-
tions included in the modernisation program are 
listed below:
• Reactor pressure relief system has been diversi-
ﬁed by installing two additional relief valves.
• ATWS behaviour has been improved by modify-
ing some trip signals and making boron injec-
tion automatic and more effective.
• Additional severe accident mitigation measures 
have been implemented.
• Earthquake resistance of the plant has been 
checked and related modiﬁcations have been 
made.
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• Partial scram function has been strengthened.
• Generator breaker was replaced with a new 
one, which is able to break also short circuit 
current.
• Protection against frazil ice at the seawater in-
take has been improved.
• Protection against snowstorms at the air intake 
of the emergency diesels has been improved.
The modernization program as a whole reduced 
the severe core damage frequency estimate by a 
factor of three.
The radiation exposure of the population was 
reduced in accordance with the ALARA principle. 
Liquid releases have been reduced by a factor of 
ten by improving the liquid waste handling sys-
tems. Also occupational doses have been reduced. 
In practice, this means minimising the cobalt 
content in the primary circuit. Renewal of steam 
dryers has reduced the occupational doses remark-
ably, because the moisture of the steam has been 
reduced.
Production improvement
Four ways were followed to increase the electricity 
production:
Reducing the unplanned capacity loss factor
There have not been many operational disturbanc-
es until now, but there will be more due to the age-
ing of equipment and components. Replacement 
of the components helps in itself. In addition to 
that, favourable system solutions have been real-
ised that tolerate more component failures without 
an adverse impact on the plant operation. For in-
stance, the original one out of two turbine protec-
tion and control systems have been replaced by 
new two out of three systems.
Shortening refuelling and 
maintenance outages
Olkiluoto outages have not been very long in the 
past. However, there is still room for improvement. 
For instance, the refuelling machine has been 
speeded up by modernising its instrumentation.
Improving thermal efﬁciency
The low pressure turbines have been replaced and 
in that way about 30 MW additional production 
capacity in each unit has been achieved.
Uprating the reactor thermal power
The following facts made power uprating possible:
• development of the BWR technology
• margins revealed by operational experience
• plant modiﬁcations due to other reasons.
The most important development in this respect 
has taken place in fuel technology. The operation 
was started with 8×8 bundles and now 10×10 bun-
dles are used. The new bundles have 40 percent 
lower average linear heat rating than the old ones.
The reactor uprating is a sensitive matter that 
must be treated with extreme care. The following 
criteria have been applied:
• safety level after the modernisation program at 
least the same as before
• no adverse effect on long-term availability
• no shortening of plant life-time
• additional electricity production economically 
justiﬁed.
The thermal power was uprated from 2160 MW to 
2500 MW (15.7 percent). Some design changes im-
plemented due to the uprating are listed below:
• 10×10 fuel bundles are used instead of the origi-
nal 8×8 bundles.
• Inertia of the main circulation pumps has been 
increased electrically.
• Steam separators have been replaced.
• High-pressure turbine was modiﬁed.
• High-pressure turbine valves were replaced.
• Feed water system has been modiﬁed.
• Capacity of the decay heat removal system has 
been increased.
• Generator has been replaced.
• Main transformers have been replaced.
Enhancing staff expertise
The modernization program continues TVO’s pol-
icy to maintain and enhance the expertise of the 
own staff by having challenging projects always 
in progress. The most important projects since the 
plant commissioning have been the previous reac-
tor uprating, severe accident mitigation, training 
simulator, PSA, interim storage for spent fuel, re-
pository for reactor waste, investigation program 
for disposal of spent fuel, preparation of the speci-
ﬁcations and evaluation of the bids for a new nu-
clear power plant in the beginning of the 1990’s 
and again in the beginning of the 2000’s.
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Implementation
The modernisation program of the Olkiluoto plant 
was started in 1994 and completed in 1998. Some 
later installations were realised during outages 
in 1999. The modernization program consisted of 
about 40 separate projects. The installations were 
performed during the refuelling outages of the 
years 1996–1998. In spite of large modiﬁcations 
the refuelling outage times were reasonable, be-
tween 15 and 20 days. The test program was quite 
the same as in the case of a new plant. In addition, 
the capacity factors of the power plant units have 
been satisfactory (well above 90%) during and after 
the modernisation. The total cost of the modernisa-
tion program was EUR 135 million.
Licensing
Licensing steps related to the modernisation pro-
gram were as follows:
• An uprated Safety Analysis Report (PSAR, for 
example) and an uprated Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment (level 1 PSA) were submitted to 
and reviewed by STUK.
• Design modiﬁcations and test runs were ac-
cepted by STUK before implementation.
• The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and 
the related Topical Reports were rewritten. It 
means also that almost all transient and acci-
dent analyses were redone taking into account 
the uprated power level and modiﬁed plant 
design. The FSAR and Topical Reports were 
submitted to STUK at the end of 1996.
• An operating license renewal application, cover-
ing design modiﬁcations and the power uprat-
ing, was submitted to the Government at the 
end of 1996. The license was granted in 1998.
• The power uprating has been reviewed also 
according to the Environmental Impact Legis-
lation.
Results
The results were: ensured safety, additional pro-
duction capacity (over 260 MW in total), extended 
plant life time, and more competent and motivated 
staff.
After modernization
Modernization of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 is a continuous 
process. Modernization and power uprating during 
years 1996–1998 in Olkiluoto 1 and 2 contained 
several safety, ageing and efﬁciency remedies. 
Mostly inﬂuences of modiﬁcations have been posi-
tive. A negative ﬁnding has been a slight increase 
of steam moisture. To improve this in both units 
steam dryers will be replaced in outages 2005 and 
2006. Another slightly negative ﬁnding was in-
crease of condensate clean up temperature, which 
decreased the life cycle of clean up resins. To avoid 
this problem the location of condensate clean up 
system has been changed in the process. In this 
connection even the ﬁrst LP-preheaters were re-
placed and modernized.
The modernization of turbine plant was contin-
ued with replacement of steam reheater moisture 
separators (MSR). They were replaced with mod-
ern two stage MSR’s. This replacement required 
modernization of HP-turbine as well. These re-
placements were performed in outages 2005 and 
2006. In the same outages the automation system 
of the turbine plant process was be replaced with a 
modern digital one.
The latest plant modiﬁcations in the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant (2005-2007)
Condensate puriﬁcation 
system modiﬁcations
The condensate system of the Olkiluoto plant units 
has been modiﬁed to improve the operational con-
ditions of the ion-exchange resins of the system’s 
ﬁlters. The system of Olkiluoto 1 was modiﬁed dur-
ing the 2004 annual maintenance outage and that 
of Olkiluoto 2 in 2003.
The condensate system pre-heats the conden-
sate coming from turbine condensers and transfers 
it to the feed water system, which injects it to the 
reactor. Prior to entering the reactor, it passes 
through the ﬁlters of a puriﬁcation system. The 
condensate puriﬁcation systems of the Olkiluoto 
plant units comprise seven ion-exchange ﬁlters.
Reactor water sulphate concentrations above 
target value water have been a problem at both 
plant units. Sulphate signiﬁcantly contributes to 
stress corrosion under certain circumstances. The 
sulphate concentrations have been low enough, 
however, not to have essentially contributed to cor-
rosion. The sulphate in reactor water comes from 
sulphate released from the ion-exchange resins of 
the condensate puriﬁcation ﬁlters. The service life 
of strong cationic ion-exchange resins has been 
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restricted to decrease the sulphate concentrations. 
In addition, sulphate-free ion-exchange resins have 
been used.
Temperature is one of the factors contributing 
to the release of sulphate from ion-exchange resins. 
The temperature of condensate passing through 
the ﬁlters has been adjusted to 60 °C previously 
by partially bypassing the pre-heater. In modiﬁca-
tions made at the plant units in 2003 and 2004, the 
temperature of water passing through the conden-
sate puriﬁcation ﬁlters was lowered by moving the 
pre-heater of the condensation system such that it 
is now after the ﬁlters when it was formerly before 
them in the process. The temperature of conden-
sate passing through the ﬁlters was thus reduced 
to approx. 50°C.
After the modiﬁction ﬁlter resins have stayed 
operational for considerably longer periods with no 
signiﬁcant increase in the sulphate concentration 
of the reactor water. The longer service life of the 
resins reduces the volume of medium-level waste 
at the plant.
Rectiﬁers replaced
At the 2004 annual maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto plant, a modiﬁcation project was started 
to replace rectiﬁers in the 110 V, 48 V, 24 V and ±24 
V DC power systems with new ones carrying out 
corresponding functions. Replace is due to the age-
ing of the rectiﬁers currently in use, the decreasing 
availability of spare parts and increasing mainte-
nance costs. In normal operational conditions the 
rectiﬁers feed DC power to components that need 
it and, simultaneously, maintain batteries on ﬂoat 
charge. A total of 18 rectiﬁers were replaced at 
both plant units by 2007.
Modiﬁcation of the turbine/reactor 
power monitoring system
In the 2004 annual maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 
1, the plant’s monitoring system for turbine/reactor 
power was modiﬁed by adding a function which, 
in the event of a turbine/reactor power disequilib-
rium, partially trips the reactor and limits reactor 
power to a level consistent with the turbine plant.
The designing of the monitoring system began 
in early 2002 with the objective of ﬁnding a way of 
preventing a reactor/turbine power disequilibrium 
independently of the trip signal. The importance of 
the modiﬁcation was accentuated by a disturbance 
in the 400 kV network of Olkiluoto 1 on 20 April 
2002. The event is described in the 2002 annual 
report (STUK-B-YTO 224).
The modiﬁed system detects a break in the 
power supplied by the 400 kV network without 
the help of an external signal; it is also capable 
of switching the plant unit over to internal power 
supply in case of the loss of external power supply, 
whether it be caused by human error or by a purely 
technical fault.
The monitoring system was implemented by 
digital technology programmed into the turbine 
pressure control system. Olkiluoto 2 has been simi-
larly modiﬁed.
Sealing changes in the expansion joints 
of the containment building intermediate 
level and the transportation shaft
The sealings of the expansion joints of the contain-
ment building intermediate level and the trans-
portation shaft were replaced in the 2005 annual 
maintenance outage. The intermediate level sepa-
rates the upper drywell and wetwell. Systems con-
taining high pressure water and steam are housed 
in the upper drywell. The wetwell is the water-
ﬁlled part of the containment to which steam dis-
charging from the reactor is channelled during 
accidents. The sealing, installed in the expansion 
joint between the reinforced-concrete intermediate 
level and the containment building, is required to 
withstand dislocations, pressure differences and 
heat loads during accidents. The transportation 
shaft between the containment upper and lower 
drywell is rigidly attached to the concrete casing 
at both ends. A construction joint is ﬁtted to it to 
accommodate for thermal and other constrained 
motion.
The original rubber sealings of the expansion 
joints have exceeded their design service life. In ad-
dition, the original design did not consider severe 
accident conditions, which makes the sealing of the 
intermediate level expansion joint and that of the 
transportation shaft a hazard to the pressure sup-
pression function.
A new intermediate level expansion joint seal-
ing was installed on top of the old operational seal-
ing. Old transport shaft sealing was removed and 
a new one was installed in the existing ﬂange. The 
new sealing material withstands severe accident 
conditions better than the old one. Post-installa-
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tion leakage tests showed the trasportation shaft 
to be leaktight. The leaktightness of the new inter-
mediate level sealing was satisfactory.
Containment sampling system modiﬁcation
The sampling system at Olkiluoto 2 was improved 
to facilitate gas sampling in the containment gas 
space during an accident. The evaluation of ra-
dionuclide concentrations in the containment gas 
space must be possible by sampling, or some other 
method, even during severe accidents. A sample 
can be used to assess a release time and the neces-
sary protective measures.
The new system samples gas from the gas space 
of the containment upper drywell by a sampling 
tube connected to the containment ﬁltered venting 
system. It determines the concentration of noble 
gases and iodine in the containment gas space. The 
volumes of aerosols released cannot be determined 
but they are rather effectively adsorbed onto the 
system’s ﬁlter. Measurements enable the evalua-
tion of the magnitude and environmental impact of 
a possible release through the ﬁlters of the ﬁltered 
venting system during a severe accident.
The sampling system is normally in stand-by 
mode and requires no electrical power to function. 
Gas sampled from the system is analysed in the 
laboratory. The system complements and backs up 
other monitoring systems as well as the radiation 
monitoring system for rooms, which is coupled to 
the battery-backed system. The sampling system 
was installed in the 2005 annual maintenance.
Feed water distributors were reinstalled
In the 2005 annual maintenance outage at 
Olkiluoto 2, new feedwater distributors, repaired in 
the winter of 2005, were reinstalled in place of the 
old ones. The new distributors were ﬁrst installed 
in the 2003 outage but were replaced with the old 
ones in the 2004 annual maintenance outage, since 
cracks had been found in them (see Annual Report 
2004).
The new distributors are designed to handle 
feed water ﬂow after a power uprating and their 
design takes into account the thermal stresses to 
which the emergency cooling system riser pipes, 
located inside the reactor pressure vessel, are sub-
jected. The riser pipes are located directly where 
the feed water distributors are. A thermal stress 
hazard arises when cold feed water mixes with the 
hot water returning from the steam separators. 
The new distributors are intended to bring the ﬂow 
mixing point further away from metal surfaces and 
to thus restrict riser pipe thermal stress.
No cracks were detected in the new feed water 
distributors replaced at Olkiluoto 1 in 2004. The 
distributors of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are due for inspec-
tion in future outages.
The steam dryers were replaced
The steam dryer was replaced in the 2005 an-
nual maintenance outage at Olkiluoto 2. The mois-
ture content of the reactor–to–turbine steam at 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 increased after a power uprating 
in 1998. The moisture content was approx. 0.1% 
before the power uprating. After it, the annual 
average moisture content has been 0.27−0.33% at 
Olkiluoto 1 and 0.31−0.34% at Olkiluoto 2. The 
moisture in steam has not been ascertained to have 
increased erosion-corrosion in turbine systems. The 
steam from the reactor at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 is chan-
nelled direct to the turbine plant. Thus, along with 
the moisture, radioactive substances dissolved in 
water are transported to the turbine plant, caus-
ing elevated radiation levels there. The dose rates 
measured at the turbine plant have been 2–10 fold 
compared with those measured before the power 
uprating. An increase in the steam moisture con-
tent essentially increases occupational doses when 
working with or around systems having to do with 
steam. Collective occupational doses at Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 have been below the limit established by 
STUK.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy ordered new steam dry-
ers to reduce the steam moisture content. The 
more effective design of their dryer panels aims 
at reducing steam moisture below 0.1%. The new 
dryer was installed at Olkiluoto 2 in the 2005 an-
nual maintenance outage and at Olkiluoto 1 in 
the 2006 annual maintenance outage. A steam 
moisture content of 0.009% was measured after the 
annual maintenance with Olkiluoto 2 operating at 
full power. With continued operation, the moisture 
values have been 0.007%.
A high pressure turbine and steam 
reheaters were replaced
A high pressure turbine and steam reheaters 
were replaced at the 2005 annual maintenance of 
Olkiluoto 2 to increase the turbine power output 
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and reduce the moisture content of steam. The 
efﬁciency of the high pressure turbine had signiﬁ-
cantly deteriorated in consequence of modiﬁcations 
made over the years, one of which was the removal 
of two blading stages. The power uprates accom-
plished in 1998 had increased the loading on the 
reheaters. Some of their tubes have been plugged, 
which has restricted their service life. Equivalent 
replacement of high pressure turbine and steam 
reheater was preformed at Olkiluoto 1 in 2006.
The utility replaced one-stage steam reheat-
ing with two-stage steam reheating to improve 
turbine efﬁciency. With two-stage steam reheating, 
a new high pressure turbine extraction point was 
required to lead steam to the ﬁrst-stage piping 
group of the new two-stage reheater. Live steam is 
directed from the reactor to the other reheater pip-
ing group. The high pressure turbine blading were 
improved, which increased the turbine output.
Turbine plant process automation 
system renewal
A new automation system was installed in the 
Olkiluoto 2 turbine plant control system in 2005 
annual maintenance outage (equivalent modiﬁca-
tion was performed at Olkiluoto 1 in 2006). One 
reason was the need to switch from analogue to 
programmable technology because spare parts pro-
curement for the old system was getting difﬁcult. 
In addition, the modiﬁcations made in the tur-
bine plant process in 2005, and in 2006, required 
some additional modiﬁcations to the automation 
system. The new system facilitates component 
maintenance. Another system renewal objective is 
increased reliability and reduced susceptibility to 
malfunctions.
The new automation system is implemented by 
programmable technology. This allows an increased 
number of process status measurements. As re-
gards turbine automation, it facilitates for turbine 
operators more versatile information management, 
process control at operating work stations, trend 
monitoring and setting of safety limits. Safety 
limit settings enable turbine operator reaction to 
even minor process changes. The control desk for 
the turbine side in the control room was replaced 
with a safety systems control desk and a turbine 
systems control and monitoring board and the 
control room was ﬁtted with a giant screen display. 
In addition, the process computer system capacity 
had to be upgraded in connection with the control 
system renewal to handle the large volume of data 
yielded by the turbine automation. The automation 
interface was introduced at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
training simulator in September 2004, which made 
possible the training of operating personnel in its 
use.
Modernisation of medium 
voltage switchgears
In the 2005 annual maintenance outage at 
Olkiluoto 2, the 6.6 kV medium voltage switch-
gears of the internal power supply system, which 
distributes most of the internal electrical power 
required by the unit, were modernised. This was 
done mainly because of the ageing of the original 
switchgears, the reduced availability of spare parts 
and to bring the switchgears up to modern require-
ments. During this REMES project, a total of over 
60 medium voltage switchgear cubicles were mod-
ernised. The project included several signiﬁcant 
modiﬁcations and replacements as regards i.a. the 
control, relay protection and auxiliary voltage sys-
tems, cabling and structural work. The modernisa-
tion improved the availability, protection, control 
and resistance to malfunctions of the switchgears. 
The same modiﬁcations were implemented at 
Olkiluoto 1 in 2006.
Protection against ﬁres in the Olkiluoto NPP
The possibility of ﬁres and the risks of nuclear pow-
er plant accidents arising from ﬁres have been tak-
en into account in the functional and layout design 
of the existing Olkiluoto plant. Fire safety has been 
improved in different areas of the ﬁre protection 
at the existing Olkiluoto plant after commission-
ing. Although the loss of external electrical supply 
has been taken into account in the plant design, 
the plants were provided with e.g. a new start-
up transformer, based on the experience gained 
from the ﬁre of the electric supply unit in 1991, to 
improve the independency of plant’s external grid 
connections. Furthermore, the main transformers, 
in-house transformers and start-up transformers 
are protected with a sprinkler extinguishing sys-
tem, which reduces essentially the risks arising 
from transformer ﬁres. The use of halon is forbid-
den in Finland after the year 1999 with the excep-
tion of some special items. Due to this the halon ex-
tinguishing systems at the existing Olkiluoto plant 
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were replaced with other extinguishing systems by 
the year 2000. Fire risks have been assessed in a 
probabilistic safety analysis that concentrates on 
ﬁre issues. Based on this the ﬁre protection of ca-
bles, that are crucial to safety, have been improved 
at the entire plant. On the basis of the probabilis-
tic safety analysis these improvements reduce the 
risks arising from ﬁres considerably.
Results of PSA
By the means of probabilistic safety analyses (PSA) 
the effects of different initiating events – plant 
transients, ﬁres, internal ﬂoods, natural external 
events including harsh weather conditions and 
earth-quakes – to the plant safety are assessed.
At the beginning of 2007 the overall core dam-
age frequency of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 is according to 
the living PSA approximately 1.5 × 10–5 per reactor 
year, when all analyses described below are taken 
into account. The core damage risk is distributed 
according to following frequencies:
• internal initiating events, power operation, 
6 × 10–6 a year
• internal initiating events, refuelling outage, 
2 × 10–7 a year
• internal hazards, ﬁres, power operation,   
3 × 10–7 a year
• internal hazards, ﬁres, refuelling outage,   
8 × 10–9 a year
• internal hazards, ﬂoods, power operation,  
1 × 10–7 a year
• external hazards, natural, earthquakes, power 
operation 6 × 10–6 a year
• external hazards, natural, other, power opera-
tion, 1 × 10–6 a year.
Level 1 PSA – Internal initiating events
TVO delivered the level 1 PSA, for the part of 
analysis of internal initiating events, to STUK in 
the summer of 1989. The analysis contained an 
analysis of core damage risk caused by different 
plant transients, ruptures of cooling water piping 
and disturbances of external grid. After the analy-
sis, improvements were made e.g. on emergency 
and operation procedures, which endeavour to en-
sure the supply of excess water to the tanks of the 
auxiliary feed water system and to the condenser, 
electrical supplies from the diesel generators of the 
neighbouring unit as well as the manual depres-
surisation of the reactor conducted from the relay 
room. Furthermore, modiﬁcations that affect the 
core damage frequency were conducted in connec-
tion with the modernisation, for example
• two valves that apply to both the steam and 
water blow-ups were added to the reactor over 
pressure protection system
• turbine control and protection system was mod-
ernised
• plant’s grid connections were improved by in-
stalling on each unit a parallel start-up trans-
former supplied by an independent transmis-
sion line from the external grid.
TVO has continuously kept the PSA model up-to-
date with regard to the plant modiﬁcations and 
operating experience. The core damage frequency 
due to internal initiating events was in 1989 4 × 
10–5 per reactor year. During the recent years it has 
been around 1 × 10–5 per reactor year.
Outage risks were assessed in an analysis com-
pleted in 1992. The core damage frequency during 
an outage was assessed to be approximately 3.6 × 
10–6 per refuelling outage. The most signiﬁcant out-
age risk proved clearly to be the bottom leakage of 
the reactor vessel caused by a maintenance error 
of main circulation pumps. To reduce the risk the 
instructions of maintenance work were improved 
and the Technical Speciﬁcations were modiﬁed in 
such a way that the lower personnel hatch is kept 
closed during the maintenance of main circulation 
pumps.
The modiﬁcations of procedures have reduced 
the core damage frequency during an outage signif-
icantly, an it has been from the year 1997 to 2004 
around 4 × 10–7 per refuelling outage. However, re-
duction of conservatism in the assumptions has in 
the year 2006 decreased the core damage frequency 
due to outage to 2 × 10–7 per reactor year.
Level 1 PSA – Internal hazards
Fire risks at the plant were assessed in an analy-
sis completed in 1991. According to the analysis 
the core damage frequency due to ﬁres was ap-
proximately 1 × 10–5 p.a. To reduce the ﬁre risks 
improvements were made e.g. in ﬁre extinguishing 
systems and in the separation of cables important 
to safety. TVO has updated the ﬁre risk analysis 
for power operation in 1994 and 1997. In the year 
1998 the ﬁre risk analysis was extended to the re-
fuelling outage.
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According to the living PSA results in the 
year 2007 the core damage frequency due to ﬁres 
– including power operation and outage – at the 
Olkiluoto plant units 1 and 2 is 3 × 10–7 per reactor 
year. The contribution of the ﬁres during the refu-
elling outage is small, 8 × 10–9 per reactor year.
As a part of the PSA, TVO analysed also the 
risks caused by internal ﬂoods. According to a 
study conducted in 1994 the core damage frequen-
cy caused by ﬂoods is approximately 1.4 × 10–6 p.a. 
TVO has updated the analysis of internal ﬂoods in 
1997 and 2004.
Conducted plant modiﬁcations haven’t signiﬁ-
cantly affected this value. However, reduction of 
conservatism in the assumptions has in the year 
2003 decreased the core damage frequency due to 
ﬂoods one order of magnitude to 1 × 10–7 per reac-
tor year.
Level 1 PSA – External hazards
A limited external hazards was conducted to as-
sess the risks caused by the most important harsh 
weather conditions, the severe blizzard and the 
frazil ice experienced in the beginning of 1995. 
Severe blizzard and frazil ice were found to be very 
signiﬁcant risks. The probability of reactor core 
damage caused by them was at that time assessed 
at approximately 2 × 10–5 p.a. Following plant mod-
iﬁcations were made to reduce the risks:
• To improve the reliability of emergency elec-
trical supply, automatically opening dampers 
based on the pressure difference operation, 
were installed in the diesel generator system 
during the 1996 annual maintenance outage, 
so that the combustion air can be taken directly 
from the rooms.
• A system that supplies warm water, when nec-
essary, to plant units’ sea water inlet was built 
for the plant to reduce the risk caused by frazil 
ice. The system secures the supply of condenser 
water to the plant by preventing the blockage of 
the sea water canal caused by icing.
A comprehensive screening analysis of external 
hazards was conducted to assess the risks caused 
by the natural phenomena (threats from the sea, 
earth and air) in 1997. Detailed analyses were 
done for the single phenomena and combinations 
of phenomena that exceeded the screening limit of 
the core damage frequency: White frost; Frazil Ice; 
Storm – Blizzard; Lightning; Algae and mussels in 
the seawater tunnels. The analysis was extended 
at the end of 1998 with the detailed analyses of the 
high and low seawater level and the high tempera-
ture of the seawater and the air.
By the means of modiﬁcations the core damage 
frequency due to external hazards has been re-
duced, and it is in 2007 1 × 10–6 per reactor year.
The risk analysis of earthquakes, was completed 
in 1996. Especially direct-current systems and ac-
cumulators were found to be sensitive to minor 
earthquakes. To reduce the risks, modiﬁcations 
have been made to support the accumulators in the 
direct-current systems that are important to safety 
and to anchor rectiﬁer/inverter cabinets to the load 
bearing structures. After the modiﬁcations the core 
damage frequency due to earthquake is approxi-
mately 6 × 10–6 p.a.
Level 2 PSA
In the year 1996 TVO also delivered to STUK the 
level 2 PSA, in which the durability of the contain-
ment and the releases of radioactive materials to the 
plant vicinity are assessed. The analysis has been 
updated during 1997 and 2003. The level 2 PSA has 
caused or contributed following modiﬁcations:
• The isolation valves of the ﬁltered venting line 
are left open after a LOCA in order to provide 
ﬁltered overpressure protection of the contain-
ment.
• The primary route for containment venting is 
from the upper drywell through the automatic 
rupture disk line, because the venting from 
wetwell does not signiﬁcantly decrease the re-
lease of radio nuclides.
• The lower drywell access locks of Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 were modiﬁed in 2001 and in 2002, 
respectively, so that they will sustain a steam 
explosion.
• The basket bolts of the four containment spray 
system pipes penetrating the pedestal wall 
were changed in the 2001 refuelling outages to 
weaker ones to prevent the deformation of the 
pipes in case of ex-vessel steam explosion.
• The operator training was extended in the 
initiation of the lower drywell ﬂooding, because 
the time available is rather short.
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According to the living PSA model in 2004 the 
frequency of the large early release to the environ-
ment (>100 TBq Cs or undelayed release of noble 
gas) is 6 × 10–6 per reactor year, which is approxi-
mately one third of the core damage frequency. 
Several modiﬁcations in the plant systems and in 
the procedures as well as training of the control 
room staff have signiﬁcantly decreased the size 
of the release, but the frequency of the release 
exceeding the limit has decreased only slightly. 
The frequency of the unﬁltered release has been 
reduced from 8 × 10–6 to 3 × 10–6 per reactor year, 
while the total large early release frequency has 
been decreased from 8 × 10–6 to 6 × 10–6 per reactor 
year. The risk of release is greatest during the op-
eration at power. The biggest threats to the integ-
rity of the containment are caused by the
• inadvertent opening of the ﬁltered venting line 
of the containment leading to undelayed release 
of noble gas
• early containment failure due to hydrogen deto-
nation in shutting down the reactor for refuel-
ling, or start up of the reactor after refuelling, 
when the containment is not inert.
The renewal process of safety documentation 
of for periodic safety review (PSR)
In addition of the continuous updating process of 
safety documentation e.g. SAR and classiﬁcation 
documents TVO emphasizes special effort to the 
development of safety documentation for periodic 
safety review (PSR) in 2008. TVO has already com-
bined the separate SAR system description reports 
of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 to one updated common sys-
tem description part of SAR. The work for renewal 
of general parts and combined analyses reports of 
SAR for PSR is going on. Also the links between 
SAR and Topical reports and other design basis 
reference reports will be deﬁned more precisely.
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in Depth Concept in Finnish NPPs
Defence in Depth concept and severe 
accident management in the Loviisa NPP
Levels of protection in the Loviisa NPP
Decision 395/1991 requires that in design, con-
struction and operation proven or otherwise care-
fully examined high quality technology shall be 
employed to prevent operational transients and 
accidents (preventive measures). A nuclear power 
plant shall encompass systems by the means of 
which operational transients and accidents can be 
quickly and reliably detected and the aggravation 
of any event can be prevented. Accidents leading 
to extensive releases of radioactive materials shall 
be highly unlikely (control of transients and ac-
cidents). Effective technical and administrative 
measures shall be taken for the mitigation of the 
consequences of an accident. Counter-measures for 
bringing an accident under control and for prevent-
ing radiation hazards shall be planned in advance 
(mitigation of consequences). Detailed require-
ments are given in Guides YVL 1.0 and YVL 1.4.
The Loviisa 1 and 2 units have operated reli-
ably. The number of the occurred incidents sig-
niﬁcant to safety has remained small. Incidents 
have been dealt with in quarterly reports issued by 
STUK. Important events such as failures of equip-
ment, preventive maintenance and deviation from 
the Operational Limits and Conditions cause una-
vailability of safety important components. Figure 
A1 presents the effect of this unavailability to the 
total accident risk. STUK has set a goal value 
of 5% of the total accident risk to the equipment 
unavailability. The goal value was exceeded during 
2003 because of latent failures of diesel generators 
and preventive maintenance of additional emer-
gency feedwater system.
In addition to the structure of the plant, the 
quality of operating activities has also an essen-
tial effect on preventing transient and accidents. 
Quality assurance related to operating instruc-
tions, other plant instructions and operating activi-
ties has been developed by Fortum continuously in 
recent years. In the training of the staff, the impor-
tance of recognising the instructions and quality 
assurance programme has been emphasised. The 
inspection programme of STUK concerning the 
operation of a nuclear power plant includes several 
inspections which are concentrated on procedures 
and methods followed in operating activities.
Guide YVL 1.0 requires that a nuclear power 
plant is equipped with a protection system. Loviisa 
1 and 2 are provided with the protection systems 
which comprise a reactor protection system and a 
plant protection system. The duty of the protection 
systems is to initiate automatically the needed 
safety functions, if some quantity important to 
safety essentially deviates from its normal value. 
The duty of the reactor protection system is to 
initiate the shutdown of the reactor. The most 
important of the functions initiated by the plant 
protection system are emergency core cooling, de-
cay heat removal and containment functions. For 
these functions Loviisa 1 and 2 are equipped with 
the necessary safety systems.
Figure A1. Share of the accident risk caused by the 
unavailability of equipment at the Loviisa NPP.
Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Loviisa NPP
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk
LO1
LO2
0 %
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4 %
6 %
8 %
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14 %
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 2.66 1.54 5.09 2.30 7.39 5.96 7.20 11.21 9.20 3.15 3.10
 2.17 3.80 1.87 6.80 8.23 12.39 3.30 10.90 3.70 4.14 1.60
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The present reactor protection system is re-
alised by using relay techniques, and the plant 
protection system by using conventional electron-
ics. The techniques employed are proven, but is al-
ready getting obsolete. The design and implemen-
tation of the reactor protection system are based 
on those solutions on which the plant supplier had 
got experiences from earlier constructed VVER-
type plants. The reliability of the system has been 
improved based on experiences by replacing some 
components with more reliable ones, and by add-
ing new components in the system to ensure the 
function also in the case of a common-cause failure 
of the redundant components. The tests and opera-
tional experiences of the plant protection system 
show that the solutions employed until now have 
been appropriate.
The renewal of the plant automation has start-
ed. The aim of the renewal is to ensure that auto-
mation systems will not restrict the safe and eco-
nomic operation of the plant to the end of planned 
life time. Maintenance of the current automation 
systems is difﬁcult. The systems have become ob-
solete and the availability of spare parts is poor. 
The renewal will cover nearly the whole automa-
tion; including control rooms, safety automation, 
operational automation and training simulator. 
Valve actuators and part of ﬁeld instrumentation 
and cabling will remain. There will be only minor 
changes in the functions of automation. The new 
automation will be based on digital technology.
The installation of the new automation will be 
realized during normal maintenance outages of the 
units. For this reason the renewal will be divided 
into four stages. In stage one mainly operational 
automation will be renewed. In stage two safety 
automation like reactor protection and plant pro-
tection systems are renewed. In stage three the au-
tomation of the primary side systems are renewed. 
The automation of the turbine plant is renewed in 
the fourth stage. The installation work will start in 
summer 2007 at unit 1. The renewal work at unit 
2 will follow 1-2 years later. Stages 1 and 2 will 
be completed in summer 2010. Stages 3 and 4 are 
planned to be completed by the summer 2014.
The protection systems fulﬁl the fail safe princi-
ple required by Guide YVL 1.0. It means that each 
subsystem settles in a state requiring protection, if 
any of its components fails.
For mitigating the consequences of the postulat-
ed accidents taken into account in the design of the 
Loviisa plant, the plant has been equipped with 
the appropriate safety systems. In addition, the 
operators of the plant have available procedures 
for transient and accident situations. These proce-
dures have been evaluated by STUK. Emergency 
Plan is a document approved by STUK. It includes 
i.e. the deﬁnitions of duty and responsibility areas 
for accident situations. Regular exercises are car-
ried out for testing planned emergency prepared-
ness activities.
Major amounts of radioactive materials could 
be releases to the environment mainly in severe 
accidents.
Technical barriers for preventing 
the dispersion of radioactive 
materials in the Loviisa NPP
Decision 395/1991 requires that dispersion of ra-
dioactive materials from the fuel of the nuclear 
reactor to the environment shall be prevented by 
means of successive barriers which are the fuel 
and its cladding, the cooling circuit (the primary 
circuit) of the nuclear reactor and the containment 
building. Detailed provisions on the integrity of the 
technical barriers are also given in the Decision 
395/1991.
During the operation of a nuclear power plant, 
radioactive materials are mainly produced as the 
result of uranium nuclei ﬁssions in the fuel pellets, 
made from uranium dioxide. The uranium dioxide 
matrix creates as such the ﬁrst barrier for prevent-
ing the dispersion of radioactive materials. During 
normal operational conditions, when the tempera-
ture of uranium dioxide does not rise abnormally 
high, the great majority of ﬁssion products remain 
inside the fuel pellets (in matrix).
As regards the Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear fuel, the 
uranium dioxide pellets have been loaded in clad-
ding tubes, the external diameter of which is about 
9 mm. The cladding tubes have been hermetically 
plugged by welding and fabricated as fuel assem-
blies, each comprising of 126 fuel rods. Based on 
its properties the cladding material is well suited 
for the reactor conditions, and it also fulﬁls the 
abnormal durability requirements caused by high 
temperatures.
Next barrier following nuclear fuel (uranium 
dioxide matrix and surrounding hermetic cladding 
tube), for preventing the dispersion of radioactive 
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materials, is the pressure-retaining barrier of the 
primary circuit. The main components of the pri-
mary circuit (the reactor pressure vessel, steam 
generators, pressurizer, piping) have been manu-
factured from stainless steel, or from carbon steel 
with a stainless steel cladding.
A basis for the primary circuit design was that 
releases to the environment would remain within 
the set limits, although about one percent of the 
fuel rods in the reactor (of about 40 000 fuel rods 
altogether) would lose their cladding integrity 
during normal operational conditions. The water 
treatment system of the primary circuit has been 
equipped with ﬁlter devices by means of which ﬁs-
sion products released in the coolant can be ﬁltered 
and removed. This concerns also corrosion prod-
ucts, which have been activated by neutron radia-
tion and which are moving in the primary circuit.
Current requirements for the basic dimension-
ing of the primary circuit as well as of the fuel as-
semblies are mainly similar as in the construction 
stage of the plant.
The whole primary circuit is inside the hermetic 
containment, made from steel plates. The steel con-
tainment is surrounded by a concrete cylindrical 
secondary containment. The secondary contain-
ment has a light roof structure supported by a steel 
frame. A low pressure is held in the space between 
the primary and secondary containment. The space 
has been equipped with a ﬁltered ventilation sys-
tem for reducing possible releases of radioactive 
materials in accident situations.
The containment was not originally designed 
for severe reactor accidents. Measures to mitigate 
the consequences of severe accidents have been 
implemented later.
Ensuring fuel integrity
Decision 395/1991 requires that the probability of 
signiﬁcant degradation of fuel cooling or of a fuel 
failure due to other reasons shall be low during 
normal operational conditions and anticipated op-
erational transients. During postulated accidents, 
the rate of fuel failures shall remain low and fuel 
coolability shall not be endangered. The possibil-
ity of a criticality accident shall be extremely low. 
Detailed requirements are given in Guides YVL 
1.0, YVL 2.2 and YVL 6.2.
An essential objective of the modernisation of 
Loviisa 1 and 2 was the increase of the reactor 
thermal power by 9 percent units. The increase 
was implemented without changing the current 
fuel thermal margins. This resulted in that the 
power increase had no essential effects on the 
behaviour of the fuel and reactor during normal 
operational conditions, anticipated transient and 
postulated accidents.
Fuel cladding has been fabricated from a zirco-
nium-niobium alloy. The fuel manufacturers have 
a signiﬁcant amount of experiences on its use as a 
fuel rod cladding material. The experiences extend 
to 1960’s. The results of operational experiences 
and hot cell examinations, received from the manu-
facturers, could be conﬁrmed by means of spent 
fuel examinations carried out at the plant. The ox-
ide layer on the fuel cladding, caused by corrosion, 
remains very thin, and the ductility properties of 
the material remain sufﬁcient for the fuel opera-
tion life.
Measurement results on ﬁssion gas amounts, 
released in fuel rods from fuel pellets, have been 
received from the fuel manufacturer. These results 
have also been assessed with analytical methods. 
In addition, supplementary measurement results 
have been received on fuel assemblies irradiated 
at the Loviisa plant. Based on these results and 
analyses the release rate of ﬁssion gases can be 
considered to be adequately small at the current 
operation mode of the reactor.
The fuel integrity in transient situations re-
lated to the normal reactor operation is ensured 
by the limitations on power change rates. These 
limitations are mainly based on studies carried out 
at research reactors as well as on operating experi-
ences received from Russia and other countries.
Based on the current operating experiences 
of the Loviisa plant, the probability of fuel fail-
ures can be considered to be very small during 
normal operational conditions (see Figure A2). 
The structure of the fuel assemblies and rods has 
been developed step by step based on accumulated 
experiences. The current upper part design of the 
fuel assemblies takes properly into account the 
elongation of fuel rods during the operation – the 
elongation is bigger than originally considered. 
The manufacturing process of fuel pellets has been 
changed. The inner pressure of fuel rods has been 
increased. The material of fuel assembly spacers 
is a zirconium based alloy. All these changes have 
had a favourable effect on the fuel integrity during 
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normal operational conditions, anticipated tran-
sients and postulated accidents.
Several fuel assemblies were clogged at Loviisa 2 
during 1994–1995 after the decontamination of the 
primary circuit. Some of the assemblies were con-
sequently damaged due to fretting failures caused 
by clogging induced vibrations. After this incident 
the fuel failure rate has been almost non-existent.
The probability of a signiﬁcant degradation 
of fuel cooling (heat transfer crisis) is very low 
at Loviisa 1 and 2. This depends mainly on the 
favourable relations between the fuel gross and 
linear power as well as the primary and secondary 
coolant ﬂow rates, coolant amounts and related 
time constants. This is indicated e.g. by a fairly big 
dryout margin during a stationary state.
Based on the reasons mentioned above heat 
transfer crisis is very improbable during antici-
pated transients.
Related to the postulated accidents fuel fail-
ures would mainly be expected in loss of coolant 
accidents, in an accident concerning a control rod 
ejection and in an ATWS-accident. Related to these 
accidents, analyses have shown that the plant com-
plies with the appropriate acceptance criteria.
One basic objective is to prevent transients 
leading to an unintended criticality of the reactor 
and/or to a reactivity increase. The possibility and 
importance of malfunctions resulting in the dilu-
tion of the boron solution – boron is used as a reac-
tivity poison – and of the inner dilution of the bo-
ron concentration in connection with some accident 
types have been evaluated. Based on calculations, 
signiﬁcant plant modiﬁcations have been done for 
preventing the sudden dilution of the boron con-
tent. Major modiﬁcations are described later on.
The reliability of the reactor core and con-
tainment emergency cooling systems during an 
accident has been improved by replacing the con-
tainment emergency sumps of the systems. Heat 
insulator materials, damaged in a loss of coolant 
accident, would have blocked the reactor emergen-
cy cooling and decay heat removal, if the material 
had drifted to the original sumps. The need for the 
modiﬁcation was discovered in the analyses, which 
were started based on a foreign operating event.
Ensuring primary circuit integrity
Decision 395/1991 requires that the primary circuit 
of a nuclear reactor shall be designed so that the 
stresses imposed upon it remain, with sufﬁcient 
conﬁdence, below the values deﬁned for structural 
materials for preventing a fast growth crack dur-
ing normal operational conditions, anticipated op-
erational transients and postulated accidents. The 
possibility of a primary circuit break due to other 
reasons shall be low, too.
The most important components of the primary 
circuit of Loviisa 1 and 2 are the reactor pressure 
vessel, pressurizer, main circulation piping, prima-
ry collector and heat transfer piping of the steam 
generators, reactor coolant pumps, main isolation 
valves and those piping which have a direct connec-
tion to the reactor pressure vessel. Requirements 
for the construction plan of the primary circuit 
components are given in Guides YVL 3.1, YVL 3.3, 
YVL 5.3 and YVL 5.4. According to these Guides, 
the components in Safety Class 1 shall be dimen-
sioned as required by the standard ASME Boiler 
and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, or in other 
way resulting in the same safety level. The pri-
mary circuit components of the Loviisa 1 and 2 
units have been designed according to a Russian 
standard concerning nuclear power plants, except 
the reactor coolant pump, which has been designed 
according to ASME III. As regards brittle fracture 
assessments, the old Russian standard from the 
year 1973 included deﬁciencies. Otherwise these 
two standards do not essentially deviate from each 
other as regards the dimensioning.
During the manufacturing of the Loviisa 1 and 
2 pressure vessels systematic quality assurance 
activities could not be implemented in the way re-
quired by YVL Guides. The licensee tried to ensure 
the quality by compensatory measures. The result-
ing deﬁciencies cause some uncertainties in the 
Figure A2. Number of leaking fuel bundles at the 
Loviisa NPP.
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evaluation of the pressure vessels embrittlement.
The reactor pressure vessel has been manu-
factured from a low alloy CrMoV-steel, and it has 
an inner cladding made from austenitic stainless 
steel. After the three year operation of Loviisa 1 
it was noted, based on the examinations of mate-
rial samples irradiated inside the pressure vessel 
that the material of the circular weld joint at the 
level of the reactor core became brittle faster than 
anticipated. The observation was made before the 
commissioning of Loviisa 2. Neutron radiation 
produced in the reactor core increases the critical 
temperature around which the ductility of the re-
actor pressure vessel quickly decreases, when the 
temperature drops. During the normal operating 
temperature safety is not endangered. However, in 
some transient and accident conditions cold water 
is injected in the primary circuit, and the danger of 
the sudden brittle fracture of the pressure vessel 
increases, if there are cracks in the pressure ves-
sel.
The integrity of the pressure vessel in the con-
ditions mentioned above has been evaluated by 
means of thermo-hydraulic and fracture-mechani-
cal calculations. For decreasing the dose rate of fast 
neutrons 36 fuel assemblies on the perimeter of the 
reactor core have been replaced by steel elements. 
Several modiﬁcations of the plant have been im-
plemented for reducing loads and decreasing their 
probabilities. For preventing a cold pressurisation 
during outages, primary circuit relief valves func-
tioning in a low pressure have been installed at the 
units. In addition, the best non-destructive testing 
methods have been used for ﬁnding out possible 
cracks.
Fortum has made both deterministic and proba-
bilistic safety analyses concerning the Loviisa 1 
and 2 reactor pressure vessels. Both analyses fulﬁl 
the acceptance criteria set for them.
The brittle weld joint of the Loviisa 1 reactor 
pressure vessel was heat-treated during the 1996 
annual outage for improving the ductility proper-
ties of the welding material. In this connection the 
reactor pressure vessel was subject to thorough 
non-destructive tests. The use of the reactor pres-
sure vessel has been accepted so far until the 2004 
annual outage.
Embrittlement rate has been re-assessed based 
on the new surveillance programme representing 
the critical weld. Analysis results were given to 
STUK for acceptance in the beginning of 2004 and 
Fortum was granted a permission to use the reac-
tor pressure vessel until 2012.
Based on the smaller contents of impurities in 
the critical welding material the use of the Loviisa 
2 reactor pressure vessel has been accepted until 
2010. So the service life of the pressure vessel is 30 
years also without a heat-treatment.
Other pressure-retaining components of the 
primary circuits of Loviisa 1 and 2 have been 
manufactured from austenitic stainless steel or 
carbon steel which has an austenitic stainless steel 
cladding. A safety factor for deformations is at 
least 1.5. So the size of a crack resulting in a sud-
den break is so big that the crack can, with great 
conﬁdence, be detected either as a small leakage 
or be found out in in-service inspections. Based on 
the material selections, common corrosion wearing 
wall thicknesses can’t occur in the primary circuit.
The effect of the power increase on the primary 
circuit integrity is very minor, because the oper-
ating pressure isn’t changed and the operating 
temperature is increased only by few degrees. The 
ﬂow rate of the primary circuit remains almost 
unchanged. The power increase raises the fast neu-
tron dose of the reactor pressure vessel, and it has 
been taken into account in the safety analyses.
The primary circuit over-pressure protection 
was made more effective in 1996 by installing new 
safety valves which have been demonstrated to 
function both with water, steam, and with a com-
pound of water and steam.
Erosion corrosion failures were detected in the 
original feedwater distributors on the secondary 
side of the steam generators. Although the di-
rect safety signiﬁcance of these failures is minor, 
Fortum decided to replace the feedwater distribu-
tors. The new feedwater distributors are of a new 
type. They are located on the pipe assembly of the 
steam generator which is a different place than the 
original one. In this connection Fortum has exten-
sively studied different distributors, as an objective 
a structure which is as undisturbed as possible. 
As a result of the new location of the distributor, 
heat fatigue may be possible in the steam genera-
tor pipes during some accident situations. This has 
been exactly examined. The ﬁnal design was ac-
cepted, and the last new distributor was installed 
in 2002.
The original fatigue analyses of the components 
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have been carried out a 30 years service life as a 
basic assumption. The number of different load-
ing situations has been evaluated for the analyses 
based on this service life. The frequency of the oc-
curred loadings has been essentially smaller than 
anticipated. The ageing control of the primary 
circuit components has been made more effective 
by adopting new plant life management system in 
2002.
Ensuring containment integrity
Decision 395/1991 requires that the containment 
shall be designed so that it will withstand reli-
ably pressure and temperature loads, jet forces 
and impacts of missiles arising from anticipated 
operational transients and postulated accidents. 
Furthermore, the containment shall be designed so 
that the pressure and temperature created inside 
the containment as a consequence of a severe ac-
cident will not result in its uncontrollable failure. 
The possibility of the creation of such a mixture 
of gases as could burn or explode in a way which 
endangers containment integrity shall be small in 
all accidents. The hazard of a containment building 
failure due to a core melt shall also be taken into 
account in other respect in designing the contain-
ment building concept. Detailed requirements are 
given in Guide YVL 1.0.
The Loviisa 1 and 2 units are provided with 
the containment in which the increase of the inner 
pressure caused by steam is limited by ice condens-
ers. The inner spray system of the containment 
and the treatment systems for hydrogen are an es-
sential part in the provision for mitigating accident 
situations. The primary, pressure-retaining tight 
steel containment is surrounded by a secondary 
building with concrete walls. The purpose of the 
double structure is to protect the primary contain-
ment against external effects, and to enable a low 
pressure in the space between the buildings with 
a ﬁltered ventilation system. Releases to the envi-
ronment, arising from containment leaks, can be 
decreased in this way in accident situations. Figure 
A3 shows the results of leakage measurements of 
isolation valves and penetrations of the contain-
ment during the annual outage periods. The total 
leakage is presented as a percentage of the leakage 
budget.
The functioning and tightness of the manholes, 
penetrations and process lines isolation valves of 
the containment are veriﬁed with regular periodic 
tests. The tightness of the primary steel contain-
ment is veriﬁed every forth year with tightness 
tests. A special periodic testing programme has 
been established for testing the functions of the 
auxiliary systems necessary for the overall con-
tainment function.
Based on what is presented above, it can be 
concluded that the containment and to it directly 
related auxiliary systems have been designed so 
that the containment withstands reliably pressure 
and temperature loads, jet forces and impacts of 
missiles arising from anticipated operational tran-
sients and postulated accidents.
The original design bases of the Loviisa 1 and 
2 containment systems have not directly includ-
ed loads arising from severe accidents. Decision 
395/1991 and Guide YVL 1.0 require for a severe 
accident management as regards the containment 
of new nuclear power plants. Based on a long re-
search and development work Fortum has estab-
lished a strategy for the severe accident manage-
ment which is due to the special features of the 
plant internationally considered unique and inno-
vative in many respects. Severe accident manage-
ment strategy for Loviisa NPP is described later on 
in this document.
The essential parts of the strategy are the reli-
able pressure reduction of the primary circuit, the 
retaining of melt core in the reactor pressure ves-
sel by cooling the pressure vessel externally, the 
containment decay heat removal by the external 
containment spray system and the prevention 
of a sudden pressurisation (energetic hydrogen 
deﬂagrations and detonations) by ensuring with 
Figure A3. The total leakage rate through the isola-
tion valves and penetrations at the Loviisa NPP com-
pared to the leakage limit.
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catalytic recombiners the controlled oxidation of 
hydrogen released in the core meltdown process. 
The strategic plan also included provisions for 
instrumentation, automation and electriﬁcation 
which are needed for the implementation of these 
measures and which are independent from the oth-
er operation of the plant. An especially favourable 
aspect in the Fortum ‘s overall plan was the aim to 
take care of the retention of the containment tight-
ness also during severe accidents.
Because the integrity and tightness of the steel 
containment can be retained, the safety signiﬁ-
cance of the containment bypass through the proc-
ess and other systems is emphasised. This fact is 
also seen in the results of the level 2 PSA.
The external containment spray system was im-
plemented in 1991. The depressurisation capability 
of the primary system through separate severe ac-
cident depressurization valves was implemented 
in 1996. The plant modiﬁcations needed to ensure 
the reactor pressure vessel external cooling were 
installed in the year 2000 for Loviisa 1, and in 
2002 for Loviisa 2. For the hydrogen control, the 
installation of passive autocatalytic recombiners 
has been completed in 2003. Also, the glow plug 
igniters system, installed originally in the early 
1980’s has been modiﬁed at the same time. In or-
der to ensure efﬁcient mixing of the containment 
atmosphere thereby efﬁcient hydrogen removal, a 
speciﬁc pneumatic system was installed in 2002 
which can be used for forcing the ice-condenser 
doors open in a severe accident situation.
Ensuring safety functions
Decision 395/199 requires that in ensuring safety 
functions, inherent safety features attainable by 
design shall be made use of in the ﬁrst place. In 
particular, the combined effect of a nuclear reac-
tor’s physical feedbacks shall be such that it miti-
gates the increase of reactor power. If inherent 
safety features cannot be made use of in ensuring 
a safety function, priority shall be given to systems 
and components which do not require an off-site 
power supply or which, in consequence of a loss of 
power supply, will settle in a state preferable from 
the safety point of view. Systems which perform 
the most important safety functions shall be able 
to carry out their functions even though an indi-
vidual component in any system would fail to oper-
ate and additionally any component affecting the 
safety function would be out of operation simulta-
neously due to repairs or maintenance. A nuclear 
power plant shall have on-site and off-site electri-
cal power supply systems. The execution of the 
most important safety functions shall be possible 
by using either of the two electrical power supply 
systems. Safety systems which back up each other 
as well as parallel parts of safety systems shall be 
separated from each other so that their failure due 
to an external common cause failure is unlikely. 
In ensuring the most important safety functions, 
systems based on diverse principles of operation 
shall be used to the extent possible. Detailed re-
quirements are given in Guides YVL 1.0, YVL 2.1 
and YVL 2.7.
The most important safety functions of a nu-
clear power plant are 1) reactor shutdown, 2) decay 
heat removal from the reactor to the ultimate heat 
sink and 3) the functioning of the containment. 
These functions shall be ensured during normal 
operational conditions, anticipated operational 
transients and postulated accidents.
Inherent reactor-physical feedbacks have been 
made use of in the design of the Loviisa 1 and 2 
reactors and their reloading so that each physical 
feedback separately, and thus their combined ef-
fect, mitigates the increase of reactor power during 
transient and accident conditions. This is dem-
onstrated analytically as well as experimentally 
during the start-up of the plant after the reloading 
outages.
Both the control rods and the reactor boron 
systems are available for shutting down the reac-
tor. The control rods can be used either by driving 
them into the reactor by means of a electric motor, 
or by dropping them into the reactor by gravitation 
in connection with a reactor scram. If the control 
rods lose the needed electrical power, they drop 
into the reactor and shut down it.
The reloading of the Loviisa 1 and 2 reactors 
have been designed so that the reactor can be shut 
down with the control rods during normal opera-
tional conditions, anticipated operational transient 
and postulated accidents, although the most effec-
tive control rod would not function.
In addition to the control rods, the reactors can 
be shut down with the boron systems. Boron is 
used in the coolant for the long-term power control 
of the reactor. Modiﬁcations in the systems and op-
eration mode of the plant have been done for avoid-
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ing an unintended boron concentration dilution of 
the coolant. For example following modiﬁcations 
were implemented:
• In the beginning of the fuel cycle borated water 
from a dedicated tank is used to dilute primary 
coolant. The boron content of the water is such 
that a possible boron dilution transient does not 
result in a reactivity accident.
• The dilution of the primary coolant will be in-
terrupted in case of primary coolant pump stop-
ping.
• Borating of the primary coolant will be started 
automatically in case of stopping of 4 or more 
primary coolant pumps.
• Before starting of a primary coolant pump the 
loop will be ﬂushed with the counter-current 
ﬂow through the loop.
The risk of the boron concentration dilution arising 
from external reasons has been reduced to an ac-
ceptable level with these measures. The safety sig-
niﬁcance of the inner boron dilution during some 
accident situations has been considered small 
based on Fortum’s extensive assessments.
Decay heat is removed from the primary to the 
secondary circuit by a gravitation-driven inher-
ent circulation in six similar coolant loops. Heat 
transferred into the secondary circuit can be fur-
ther transferred in the sea or to the atmosphere by 
several different systems. In these systems active 
components are needed. The driving power of these 
components is supplied either from the diesel-
backed power sources or diesel generators. The 
additional emergency feedwater system has been 
equipped with own diesel-operated pumps. The 
system is partly common to both units. The decay 
heat removal by the secondary circuit is ensured in 
a versatile and reliable way.
After a possible break in the primary circuit, 
at the beginning water would be obtained in the 
primary circuit from the safety accumulator tanks 
which discharge without external driving power. 
Later on, decay heat should be removed by means 
of the active components which need electric en-
ergy as a driving power and which mainly are four- 
redundant.
If the decay heat removal isn’t possible through 
the secondary circuit, there is an alternative way 
to remove decay heat directly from the primary 
circuit by a so-called feed and bleed method. In this 
case, water is injected in the primary circuit with 
high pressure safety injection cooling pumps. In 
the primary circuit up-heated water is discharged 
in the containment by opening the new safety 
valves of the pressurizer. The valves have a large 
capacity. Decay heat is removed from the contain-
ment by circulation through the sumps by means 
of the emergency heat transfer chain.
The emergency sump structures of the contain-
ment have been completely re-designed after a for-
eign operational event indicated that the original 
design had essential deﬁciencies. A sump blockage 
would mean the complete loss of the emergency 
core cooling function. A danger for a blockage oc-
curs, when heat insulators around the primary 
circuit pipes are damaged during pipe breaks. Due 
to its characteristics, a damaged insulator material 
disturbs the sump function much more than previ-
ously was believed. The new strainer structures of 
the sumps have been designed to collect the largest 
possible amount of damaged insulators without 
disturbing the emergency core cooling function. 
This amount has been determined based on the 
best current knowledge, taking into account also 
other impurities released simultaneously. In addi-
tion, the new sump strainers have been equipped 
with an instrumentation and a puriﬁcation system. 
In this way the build-up of a blockage can be con-
trolled and when necessary the strainers can be 
puriﬁed. So the long-term function is also ensured.
As a result of the sump modiﬁcation, a need 
has also been noted to evaluate more closely the 
functioning of the high pressure safety injection 
pumps during a sump circulation. The pumps in 
question have been designed only for pumping 
clean water, but during the sump circulation they 
may be exposed to impurity loads, especially at the 
beginning of the circulation. Fortum has examined 
the functioning of the pumps with water including 
insulator-impurities.
Additional tests were performed with a strainer 
element in order to investigate effects of pressure 
loss caused by fragmented paint debris, especially 
with thin ﬁbre beds. Due to increased sump strain-
er area the amount of ﬁbres penetrating the strain-
er system would also increase. Therefore high and 
low head safety injection pumps were tested with 
ﬁbre concentrations higher than those used in pre-
vious tests. The tests for low pressure pumps were 
performed with different types of shaft seals.
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The low pressure safety injection pumps were 
renewed in 2000–2002. In order to increase the 
delivery head of the low pressure safety injection 
system the new pumps have higher head than the 
original ones. The modiﬁcation of the low pressure 
safety injection system included also an increase 
of the water volume and lowering the pressure 
of the passive safety accumulators. The goal of 
these modiﬁcations was to improve core cooling by 
increasing the feeding capacity of the system and 
lengthen the injection period of the accumulators.
The intermediate circuit of the emergency heat 
transfer chain has a function to transfer decay 
heat from the emergency core cooling systems to 
the sea water. The intermediate circuit has been 
re-dimensioned, because the original design includ-
ed faults. According to the revised safety analyses, 
the sump water accumulating on the containment 
ﬂoor may warm up near to the saturated tem-
perature in some primary coolant leak situations. 
This increases the heat load to the intermediate 
circuit, and together with the simultaneous high 
sea water temperature results in the temperature 
level increase of 10 degrees in the intermediate 
circuit. In addition to the decay heat transfer, the 
intermediate circuit has a function to cool almost 
all emergency, auxiliary and support systems im-
portant to the plant’s safety, and their room spaces. 
The original design temperatures of the most cool-
ing objects of this kind would be exceeded, when 
the temperature of the intermediate circuit rises. 
Fortum took immediately measures both to make 
the functioning of the intermediate circuit more 
effective and to develop the systems concerned and 
components to withstand the higher functioning 
temperature. The needed measures have been de-
signed and mainly implemented. These safety im-
provements would have been made independently 
of the plant nominal power.
Plant modiﬁcations have been done to ensure 
the reactor core cooling and decay heat transfer 
in the case of leaks from the primary side of a 
steam generator to the secondary circuit. These 
plant modiﬁcations are the construction of a new 
safety injection water tank common for the both 
units, the spray pipelines of the pressurizer from 
the high pressure safety injection pumps and the 
increases of a protection automation. The manage-
ment of the primary–secondary leaks is based on 
the assumption that the steam pipelines integrity 
is maintained. Pressure shocks endangering the 
integrity of the steam piping in this situation were 
evaluated. However, the possibility of the pressure 
shocks of a dangerous magnitude, in the critical lo-
cation of the piping from the viewpoint of the acci-
dent management, can be evaluated to be so small 
that the management of the primary–secondary 
leaks can be considered as acceptable. Emergency 
operation procedures take into account that the 
safety valve of the steam generator may stick open 
in the steam generator collector break.
The functioning of active components is not 
required to keep the containment pressure and 
temperature within the design values at the be-
ginning of any design basis accident. In situations 
during which large amounts of steam leak in the 
containment, the containment inner spray system 
is needed to ensure the integrity and functioning 
of the containment after the melting of the ice in 
the ice condensers. In this kind of situation decay 
heat released from the reactor is separately trans-
ferred through the emergency core cooling system 
and intermediate cooling system into the sea water 
circuit. The functioning of these systems is based 
on active components which need electric energy 
as their driving power. Decay heat removal from 
the containment is also possible to carry out with 
an external spray system which is directed on the 
outer surface of the containment. The spray pumps 
get their driving power from their own diesel gen-
erators which are independent of other electric 
systems of the plant. The tightness of the process 
penetrations of the containment is ensured with 
isolation valves, the number of which is mainly 
two, one is inside and the other outside the con-
tainment.
The possibility for a preventive maintenance 
during the operation is limited for the systems 
where the number of the redundant components is 
only two. The needed preventive maintenance re-
quires, however, that from time to time some compo-
nents are separated from the process. Maximising 
the operability of systems with a well planned 
preventive maintenance is a demanding duty. It is 
subject to Fortum’s continuous attention.
The external electric power supply system of 
the Loviisa plant comprises two 400 kV and one 
110 kV connections to the Finnish base electrical 
network. In addition to the normal internal elec-
tric systems, there are four diesel generators per 
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unit for the emergency supply of electric power as 
well as battery systems. The plant safety systems 
have been divided into two subsystems which are 
separated from each other. Each subsystem is sup-
plied from the external electrical network or from 
two diesel generators. Each component is supplied 
from a bus bar connected to a separate diesel gen-
erator in those plant systems which comprise four 
redundant active components, e.g. low and high 
pressure safety injection pumps.
A 20 kV overhead line connection has also been 
built to the Loviisa plant from the Ahvenkoski 
hydro power station, located at the extent of 20 
km from the Loviisa plant. This connection can be 
coupled instead of any diesel generator.
Many electric component modiﬁcations have 
been done at Loviisa 1 and 2 to ensure safety 
functions. The purpose of these modiﬁcations is 
to ensure the functioning of the safety systems 
during accident conditions, taking into account 
the requirements indicated by the revised safety 
analyses.
Detailed requirements given in the Technical 
Speciﬁcations guide the operation of the units in 
maintaining continuously the acceptable safety lev-
el and in ensuring the necessary safety functions. 
The requirements of the Technical Speciﬁcations 
are extensive as regards their number as well as 
very detailed as regards their content, indicating 
thus the need to compensate system deﬁciencies 
resulted from the design bases with strict adminis-
trative procedures.
The components needed for the safety func-
tions of Loviisa 1 and 2 are not completely well 
separated physically, and so a same external cause 
may result in a failure of redundant components. 
Therefore, after the commissioning of the plant 
several modiﬁcations have had to be done, mainly 
as a result of the separation requirements for ﬁre 
protection. The physical separation of the systems 
has been further improved based on the results of 
the probabilistic safety analyses concerning ﬁre 
and ﬂood risks.
In conclusion, the safety functions of the Loviisa 
plant have been ensured according to Decision 
395/1991 except the following deviations: The func-
tioning of the safety systems has not fully been 
ensured in case of an individual component is 
inoperable and additionally other component is 
out of operation simultaneously due to repairs or 
maintenance. In addition, the redundant parts of 
the safety systems have not been fully separated 
from each other so that their failure as a result of 
the same external cause would be unlikely.
After the commissioning of the plant, safety 
functions have been continuously improved by 
means of studies carried out and plant modiﬁca-
tions implemented based on the studies. In addi-
tion, the safety systems of the Loviisa units are 
mainly functionally exceptionally ﬂexible which 
compensates the above mentioned deﬁciency con-
cerning the reliability of the safety functions.
Severe Accident Management 
implementation at Loviisa NPP
The Loviisa severe accident program, which in-
cludes plant modiﬁcations and severe accident 
management procedures, was initiated in order to 
meet the requirements of STUK.
Fortum’s approach for severe accident assess-
ment and management for Loviisa is based on four 
successive levels. The ﬁrst level of the approach is 
to ensure that severe accidents can be prevented 
with high probability. The quantitative targets for 
the overall core damage frequency (CDF) obtained 
from PSA level 1, are 10–4 /reactor year for existing 
plants.
The second level is to show a very low frac-
tion of overall CDF for those classes of accident 
sequences which can be assumed to directly lead 
to a large release. Such sequences are the ones 
with an impaired containment system function, 
high pressure core melt sequences and reactivity 
accidents leading to core damage. The class called 
sequences with impaired containment function 
consists of containment by-pass sequences (pri-
mary to secondary leakage accidents and auxil-
iary system LOCAs), sequences with pre-existing 
openings, containment isolation failures, contain-
ment pressure suppression system by-passes and 
sequences with induced leakage outside the con-
tainment.
On the third level of the approach, the focus is 
on physical phenomena capable of threatening the 
containment integrity. The challenge to the con-
tainment integrity due to any physical phenomena 
should be excluded either by excluding the phe-
nomenon itself as physically unreasonable or by 
showing that the loads caused by the phenomenon 
are tolerable. The phenomena considered include 
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in-vessel and ex-vessel steam explosions, hydrogen 
burns, direct containment heating, missiles, slow 
over pressurization due to steaming and genera-
tion of non-condensable gases, core-concrete inter-
action, recriticality of the degraded core and core 
debris, and temperature loadings of the contain-
ment. It is obvious that plant speciﬁc studies are 
needed for proper treatment of the individual phe-
nomena. Fortum has treated the main phenomeno-
logical, Loviisa-speciﬁc questions along the lines 
of the ROAAM (Risk Oriented Accident Analysis 
Methodology) approach. Besides this Fortum has 
also made traditional PSA level 2 type of approach 
for Loviisa NPP.
After successful exclusion of the containment 
system and structural failures, the fourth and ﬁnal 
level of the approach is to deﬁne the radioactive re-
leases through containment leakages. The releases 
during the managed accident sequences should 
stay below the acceptable criteria concerning acute 
health effects and land contamination.
For Loviisa, the approach translates to ensuring 
the following top level safety functions:
• depressurization of the primary circuit
• absence of energetic events, i.e. hydrogen burns
• coolability and retention of molten core in the 
reactor vessel
• long term containment cooling
• ensuring subcriticality
• ensuring containment isolation.
The cornerstone of the SAM strategy for Loviisa is 
the coolability of corium inside the reactor pressure 
vessel (RPV) through external cooling of the vessel. 
Since the RPV is not penetrated, all the ex-ves-
sel phenomena such as ex-vessel steam explosions, 
direct containment heating and core-concrete in-
teractions can be excluded. The only energetic phe-
nomena remaining which could have potential to 
threaten the containment integrity are hydrogen 
burns.
In-vessel retention of corium
Some of the design features of the Loviisa plant 
make it most amenable for using the concept in-
vessel retention (IVR) of corium by external cool-
ing of the RPV as the principle means of arresting 
the progress of a core melt accident. Such features 
include
• the low power density of the core
• large water volumes both in the primary and in 
the secondary side
• no penetrations in the lower head of the RPV 
and, ﬁnally,
• ice condensers ensure a passively ﬂooded cavity 
in most severe accident scenarios.
On the other hand, if in-vessel retention was not 
attempted, showing resistance to energetic steam 
generation and coolability of corium in the reactor 
cavity could be laborious for Loviisa, because of the 
small, water ﬁlled cavity with small ﬂoor area and 
tight venting paths for the steam out of the cavity.
An extensive research program regarding the 
thermal aspects was carried out by Fortum. The 
work included both experimental and analytical 
studies on heat transfer in a molten pool with volu-
metric heat generation and on heat transfer and 
ﬂow behaviour at the RPV outer surface.
Based on experiments, the IVR concept for 
Loviisa was ﬁnalised. The conceptual design was 
submitted to STUK for approval and approval 
in principle was received in December 1995. The 
concept included plant modiﬁcations at four loca-
tions. The modiﬁcations were completed in 2002. 
The most laborious one of them was the modiﬁca-
tion of the lower neutron and thermal shield such 
that it can be lowered down in case of an accident 
to allow free passage of water in contact with the 
RPV bottom. Other two modiﬁcations included 
slight changes of thermal insulations and ventila-
tion channels in order to ensure effective natural 
circulation of water in the channel surrounding the 
RPV. Finally a strainer facility was constructed in 
the reactor cavity in order to screen out possible 
impurities from the coolant ﬂow and thereby pre-
vent clogging of the narrow ﬂow paths around the 
RPV.
Absence of energetic events
Based on plant-speciﬁc features, the only real con-
cern regarding potential energetic phenomena is 
due to hydrogen combustion events. The Loviisa 
reactors are equipped with ice-condenser contain-
ments, which are relatively large in size (compa-
rable to the volume of typical large dry contain-
ments) but have a low design pressure of 0.17 MPa. 
The ultimate failure pressure has been estimated 
to be well above 0.3 MPa. An intermediate deck di-
vides the containment in the upper (UC) and lower 
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compartments (LC). All the nuclear steam supply 
system (NSSS) components are located in the lower 
compartment and, therefore, any release of hydro-
gen will be directed into the lower compartment. 
In order to reach the upper compartment, which 
is signiﬁcantly larger in volume, the hydrogen and 
steam have to pass through the ice-condensers.
Because of the relatively low design pressure of 
the containment, the hydrogen burns that can cre-
ate a potential threat include not only detonations, 
but also all large-scale combustion events that 
are rapid enough to yield an essentially adiabatic 
behaviour. An additional concern, which is caused 
by the type of the containment, occurs when the 
steam and hydrogen mixture passes through the 
ice-condenser. The steam will be condensed in the 
ice beds, which could potentially lead to very high 
local hydrogen concentrations.
In the 1990’s an extensive research program 
was carried out at Fortum to assess the reliability 
and adequacy of the existing igniters system. One 
of the focus areas in the studies was to determine 
the prerequisites for creating and maintaining a 
global convective ﬂow loop around the containment 
for ensuring well mixed conditions. The global ﬂow 
loop which passes from the lower compartment 
through an ice-condenser to the upper compart-
ment and back to the LC through the other ice-con-
denser is necessary in order to bring air into the 
LC and thus to be able to recombine or burn hydro-
gen in a controlled way already in the LC. The ex-
periments and the related numerical calculations 
demonstrated that the global convective loop will 
be created and maintained reliably provided that 
the ice-condenser doors will stay open.
Based on the studies a new hydrogen manage-
ment strategy for Loviisa was formulated. The 
new strategy concentrates on two functions: en-
suring air recirculation ﬂow paths to establish a 
well-mixed atmosphere (opening of ice condenser 
doors) and effective recombination and/or control-
led ignition of hydrogen. Necessary plant modiﬁca-
tions were identiﬁed. These included installation of 
autocatalytic hydrogen recombiners, modiﬁcations 
in the igniters system (igniters were removed from 
the upper compartment and left only in the lower 
compartment) and a dedicated system for opening 
the ice-condenser doors. The modiﬁcations were 
completed in 2003.
Prevention of long term over pressurization
The studies on prevention of long term over pres-
surization at Loviisa started by considering the 
concept of ﬁltered venting as was done for many 
European NPPs after the Chernobyl accident. 
However, the capability of the steel shell contain-
ment to resist subatmospheric pressures is poor. 
If using ﬁltered venting, it is possible that the 
amount of noncondensable gases after the vent-
ing is signiﬁcantly less than originally, which later 
– after cooldown of the containment atmosphere 
– may lead to subatmospheric pressures and possi-
bly collapse of the containment. Therefore, alterna-
tive solutions were sought for.
Since the concrete used in the reactor cavity 
of Loviisa does not contain any CO2, the amount 
of noncondensable gases (except for hydrogen) 
generated during core-concrete interaction would 
be practically zero. Therefore, the overpressure 
protection of the containment could be limited to 
condensing the steam produced. An obvious way 
of doing this is to spray the exterior of the contain-
ment steel shell. Later on, the concept of in-vessel 
retention was introduced to Loviisa (as discussed 
above), which excludes core-concrete interactions 
altogether and thus ﬁnally ensures that no non-
condensable gases apart from hydrogen need to be 
considered.
The system was designed to remove the heat 
from the containment in a severe accident when 
other means of decay heat removal from the con-
tainment are not operable. Due to the ice condenser 
containment, the time delay from the onset of the 
accident to the start of the external spray system is 
long (18–36 hours). Thus the required heat remov-
al capacity is also low, only 3 MW (fraction of decay 
power is still absorbed by thick concrete walls). 
The system is started manually when the contain-
ment pressure reaches the design pressure 1.7 bar. 
Autonomous operation of the system independ-
ently from plant emergency diesels is ensured with 
dedicated local diesel generators. The single failure 
criterion is applied. The active parts of the system 
are independent from all other containment decay 
heat removal systems. There are no active parts of 
the system inside the containment.
The both units Loviisa 1 and 2 have their own 
external spraying circuits and spray water storage 
tanks. The cooling circuit of the spraying system 
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and the dedicated diesel generators are common 
for both units. The ultimate heat sink is sea water.
Primary circuit depressurization
The primary system depressurization is an inter-
face action between the preventive and mitigation 
parts of SAM. If the primary feed function is oper-
able, the depressurization may prevent the core 
melt (primary system cooling by feed and bleed). 
If not, it sets in motion the mitigation actions and 
measures to protect the containment integrity and 
mitigate large releases.
Manual depressurization capability has been 
designed and implemented through motor-operated 
high capacity relief valves. Depressurization capac-
ity will be sufﬁcient for bleed & feed operation with 
high-pressure pumps, and for reducing the pri-
mary pressure before the molten corium degrades 
the reactor vessel strength. Depressurization is to 
be initiated from indications of superheated tem-
peratures at core exit thermocouples. The depres-
surization valves were installed at the same time 
with the replacement of the existing pressurizer 
safety valves in 1996.
Implementation
The SAM-strategy described in the previous chap-
ters has lead to a number of hardware changes at 
the plant as well as to new severe accident guide-
lines and procedures.
The containment external spray was imple-
mented at the two units in 1990 and 1991. Primary 
system depressurization capability was installed 
at both units in 1996. The major back ﬁttings 
related to external coolability of the reactor pres-
sure vessel and to opening the ice-condenser doors 
are, for the most part, implemented at Loviisa 1 in 
2000 and at Loviisa 2 in 2002. The modiﬁcations 
to ensure the hydrogen control were completed in 
2003. In addition to the mechanical equipment, 
the implementation included also a new, dedicated, 
limited scope instrumentation and control system 
for the SAM-systems, a dedicated AC-power system 
and a separate SAM control room which is common 
to both units. These were implemented mainly in 
year 2000 for Loviisa 1 and 2002 for Loviisa 2.
In addition to the hardware modiﬁcations, se-
vere accidents guidance for the operating crew has 
been implemented. It consists of SAM-procedures 
for the operators and of a so-called Severe Accident 
Handbook for the Technical Support Team. The 
SAM procedures are entered after a prolonged un-
cover of the reactor core indicated by highly super-
heated core exit temperatures. The procedures are 
symptom oriented and their main objective is the 
protection of containment integrity through ensur-
ing the top level severe accident safety functions. 
The most important operator actions after the core 
uncover are the ensuring of containment isola-
tion, primary circuit depressurization, opening of 
ice-condenser doors in order to ensure mixing of 
hydrogen, lowering of the neutron shield of the 
lower part of the RPV and, in the long term, start-
ing of the containment external spray. The Severe 
Accident Handbook contains background material 
for the procedures and it should facilitate the sup-
port team in gaining understanding of the progress 
of the accident and of potential means of recovery.
Defence in Depth concept and 
severe accident management 
in the Olkiluoto NPP
Levels of protection in the Olkiluoto NPP
Prevention
Olkiluoto plant has continuously utilised the expe-
rience and data that the plant supplier, Asea-Atom 
AB, gathered in connection with design, construc-
tion and operation of the Swedish plants. The solu-
tions implemented by TVO have, for the most part, 
been similar to the ones in corresponding Swedish 
plants, which have enabled the deployment of 
Swedish plants as a reference also in modiﬁcations 
implemented after the plant construction. When 
different technical solutions have been assessed 
in connection with modiﬁcations, TVO’s policy has 
been to take into use only such systems, whose reli-
ability and maintenance can also be assessed on 
the basis of operating experience. Important events 
such as failures of equipment, preventive mainte-
nance and deviation from the Operational Limits 
and Conditions cause unavailability of safety im-
portant components. Figure A4 presents the effect 
of this unavailability to the total accident risk. 
STUK’s 5% goal value was exceeded during 2003 in 
the plant unit 2 because of common cause failures 
(material defects) in the actuators of external isola-
tion valves of the emergency core cooling system.
New technology, such as control systems that 
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use programmable automation has been installed 
at the plant units in connection with the mod-
ernisation and plant uprating project during the 
years 1995–1998 and subsequent turbine plant 
modernizations. Special attention has been paid to 
the design and testing of the modiﬁed systems. The 
biggest modiﬁcations, such as the modernisation of 
the electric drives in the main circulation pumps 
and the modernisation of the turbine control sys-
tem, have been conducted in stages at different 
plant units. The modiﬁcations in systems impor-
tant to nuclear safety have also been taken into 
use in stages and by using the traditional analo-
gous hardwired technology as a backup. According 
to the experience gained from the commissioning, 
special attention shall be paid to the forthcoming 
design and validation of systems that utilise new 
technology.
Management of operational 
transients and accidents
Olkiluoto plant units are equipped with measur-
ing systems that continuously monitor the state 
of the processes to detect operational transients 
and accidents. An alarm limit, which, when ex-
ceeded, causes a transmission of an alarm signal 
to the control room, has been set for a large part of 
the measurements. When protection limits, which 
have, in addition, been set for the most important 
measurements, are exceeded, the protection sys-
tem monitoring the measurements shuts down the 
reactor or reduces its power. If the measurements 
indicate a leak in the primary circuit, the system 
also starts the emergency cooling of the reactor 
and closes the isolation valves of process pipelines 
penetrating the containment wall. To ensure the 
reliability of functions, the protection system has 
been realised as four independent subsystems, 
where the function of two subsystems is enough to 
initiate the needed protection functions. According 
to the conducted analyses the measuring systems 
and protection systems are adequate for detecting 
transients in the plant operation.
TVO has continuously developed the process 
computer system that is operated by the control 
room personnel and that is responsible for gather-
ing information from the measuring systems and 
transmitting it to the control room. A big modiﬁ-
cation, from the standpoint of accident manage-
ment, was implemented in 1992, when the Safety 
Parameter Display System (SPDS), in which the 
main measured variables related to different tran-
sients are grouped into their own entities, was 
taken into use. TVO implemented the modiﬁcation 
so that the Display System supports the symptom 
based emergency operating procedures used by op-
erators as well as possible.
To increase the efﬁciency of transient control, 
modiﬁcations, arising mainly from the changes in 
reactor operation at the new power level, to the 
protection system have been designed and im-
plemented in connection with the modernisation 
project. The tightened requirements concerning 
the management of a faulty reactor scram (ATWS) 
have also caused some modiﬁcations to the protec-
tion and safety systems.
To develop the management of severe accidents 
at the Olkiluoto plant units, a containment build-
ing monitoring system, which is independent from 
other monitoring systems and normal electrical 
supply, has been taken into use. The task of the 
system is to ensure that information concerning 
the accident course is gained even in a situation, 
where all normal measuring systems are lost.
STUK’s review judgement is that the Olkiluoto 
plant units have such systems available, by means 
of which both transients and accidents can be de-
tected and their aggravation prevented. 
Figure A4. Share of the accident risk caused by the 
unavailability of equipment at the Olkiluoto NPP.
Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Olkiluoto NPP
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk
OL1
OL2
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 2.17 1.05 0.65 2.47 30.30 5.28 10.90 4.68 5.10 9.64 7.60
 5.46 1.14 0.72 2.26 42.50 7.17 3.50 7.39 8.60 10.95 5.00
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Mitigation of consequences
For mitigating the consequences of the postulated 
accidents taken into account in the design of the 
Olkiluoto plant, the plant has been equipped with 
the appropriate safety systems. In addition, TVO 
has taken steps to mitigate the consequences of 
an accident by planning the actions of the con-
trol room personnel in advance and by drawing up 
related instructions (emergency operating proce-
dures), by ensuring the transmission of data from 
the control room to other parts of the organisation 
and to the regulatory body by the means of the 
process computer and by planning and exercising 
in advance the actions of the entire organisation 
for emergency preparedness situations.
The plant speciﬁc full-scope simulator has been-
was used in the preparation of emergency operat-
ing procedures and in the training of operators. 
The simulator provides a possibility for exercising 
the management of different transient and acci-
dent situations in realistic conditions. The applica-
bility of the emergency operating procedures was 
also assessed in connection with the probabilistic 
safety analyses, when the probability and the con-
sequences of operator errors were examined.
To ensure the transmission of data also in ac-
cident situations the process computer connection 
has, in addition to the control room, been arranged 
to the commando centre and technical support cen-
tre of the power plant as well as to STUK. The data 
transmission connection makes it possible to follow 
the state of the plant almost in real time also from 
outside the control room. The operation, by utilis-
ing the connection, has been tested in emergency 
preparedness exercises. Experience shows that an 
on-line connection facilitates the communication 
between the regulatory body and the power com-
pany, and reduces the risk of acting on false or 
insufﬁcient information.
An emergency preparedness plan, that e.g. de-
ﬁnes the emergency preparedness organisation 
with its responsibilities and duties used in acci-
dent situations and presents detailed instructions 
on how to organise the operation and to inform 
from it in accident situations, has been drawn up 
against accidents. Operation in accident situations 
shall be exercised regularly.
STUK’s review judgement is that TVO has 
taken proper measures to mitigate accident conse-
quences.
Technical barriers for preventing 
the dispersion of radioactive 
materials in the Olkiluoto NPP
The operation of a nuclear power plant produces 
radioactive materials from fuel pellets fabricated 
of uranium dioxide mainly as a result of ﬁssion of 
uranium nuclei. Uranium dioxide matrix as such 
forms the ﬁrst barrier against the dispersion of ﬁs-
sion products. Under normal operating conditions, 
when temperature of the uranium dioxide doesn’t 
become exceptionally high, the majority of ﬁssion 
products remain inside the pellet (in the matrix).
Since a small part of the ﬁssion products, pro-
duced from the fuel, drifts outside the fuel matrix 
even during normal operation, the excursion of 
ﬁssion products outside the reactor core has been 
prevented by enclosing the fuel pellets into a gas-
tight cladding. The cladding material is, due to its 
properties, well suited for the conditions existing in 
the reactor and also meets the exceptional endur-
ance requirements set by the high temperatures. 
According to the operating experience gained from 
the manufacturer and the results of laboratory 
researches, the oxide layer, arising from corrosion, 
on the cladding surface remains within acceptable 
limits and the ductility properties of the material 
remain adequate during the fuel’s operating life. 
These observations were also veriﬁed in inspec-
tions, directed at spent fuel, that were conducted 
at the plant.
The basis for the design of the plant is that the 
releases to the environment shall remain within 
the set limits, even if approximately one percent 
of the fuel rods (with 500 modern 10×10 fuel as-
semblies there are approximately 45.000 fuel rods 
in the core) contained by the core lose the integrity 
of the cladding during normal operating conditions. 
The water treatment system of the reactor primary 
circuit is equipped with ﬁlters, which allow an con-
trolled gathering and removal of ﬁssion products 
– once released into the cooling water – and corro-
sion products activated by the neutron radiation. 
Operating experience has shown that fuel leakage 
are rare and that systems are adequate for keeping 
the activity concentrations of the primary circuit 
within acceptable limits.
The next barrier, after the fuel (uranium diox-
ide matrix and the surrounding gas tight cladding), 
against the dispersion of radioactive materials is 
the pressure retaining boundary of the primary 
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circuit. The reactor pressure vessel is manufac-
tured from the low alloyed steel generally used in 
western countries and its inner surface is lined 
with the stainless steel. The pipelines connected 
to the pressure vessel are manufactured either 
from stainless steel or low alloyed steel. Current 
requirements related to the basic dimensioning of 
the primary circuit are for the essential parts same 
as during the plant construction.
The last barrier, that surrounds the reactor 
pressure vessel and part of the connected pipelines, 
is a cylindrical, gas tight containment building, 
built out of prestressed concrete, having bottom 
and upper slabs manufactured from concrete and 
on the top also a removable steel dome for opening 
the reactor pressure vessel.
Ensuring fuel integrity
A starting point in ensuring the fuel integrity is 
that the properties of the fuel are known accurate-
ly enough, so that the plant operation and manage-
ment of transient situations can be planned with 
the objective that fuel does not fail in any design 
basis situation. To ensure the properties of the fuel, 
maximum limits have been set for e.g. fuel burn-up 
and for the quantity of ﬁssion gases released dur-
ing operation from the fuel pellet inside the rods. 
The limits have been set so that their fulﬁlment 
can be demonstrated already in connection with 
the design by the means of calculation analyses 
and measurements conducted by the fuel manufac-
turer. At Olkiluoto plant the fulﬁlment of the set 
limits, for the part of fuel types used so far, has also 
been demonstrated by measurements performed 
on the spent fuel. Figure A5 presents the number 
of leaking fuel bundles at the Olkiluoto NPP.
The preservation of fuel integrity, under power 
variation situations that relate to normal opera-
tion of the reactor, is ensured by limits that con-
cern power variation speeds and that are based on 
research on test reactors and on operating experi-
ence gained from other BWR units.
Measures have been taken to eliminate the two 
transients that originally set the margins for op-
eration: loss of electricity of the main recirculation 
pumps and malfunction of the turbine pressure 
controller.
A transient that is caused by a simultaneous 
tripping of the main circulation pumps – caused 
by a loss of electricity – is mitigated by adding a 
rotating mass to the electric drives, due to which 
the pumps can be run down in a controlled man-
ner. This helps to avoid any degradation of the heat 
transfer conditions during the ﬂow coast-down.
In the pump drive control system, the control 
of the pump coastdown is conducted by means of 
a programmable automation system. In addition, 
there is a separate protection logic unit which is 
based on hardwired technology.
Another transient that has originally limited 
the power level of the plant is the malfunction of 
the turbine pressure controller. The pressure con-
troller controls e.g. the steam ﬂow to the turbine, 
and so the failure of the controller may cause a 
sudden stop in the steam ﬂow to both the turbine 
and the bypass to the condenser. The pressure 
of the primary circuit rises when the ﬂow stops, 
which results in the decrease of the void content 
in the reactor. As the steam void content decreases 
the reactor power tends to rise, and if the opera-
tional margins between the reactor power and the 
cooling capacity are not adequate, local heat trans-
fer crisis may result. Although the cooling becomes 
adequate as the reactor power decreases again, the 
transient may cause fuel failures in a limited part 
of the reactor.
After the implementation of a new, single fail-
ure tolerant pressure controller system, the pres-
sure transient caused by a failure is no longer an 
anticipated operational transient but a so-called 
postulated accident, which enables the application 
of milder criteria in provision for the transient. The 
failure of the turbine pressure controller still re-
mains, however, as the event that limits the power 
level, in spite of the alleviated acceptance criteria 
as to the fraction of fuel rods that may undergo 
heat transfer crisis.
Figure A5. Number of leaking fuel bundles at the 
Olkiluoto NPP.
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The elimination of these two transients has 
made the plant uprating possible without too much 
toll on the fuel economy.
The change of the reactor operating mode may 
cause the stability characteristics of the reactor 
to weaken. Instability causes the reactor power to 
oscillate, possibly even with a growing amplitude. 
To avoid such situations and possible fuel failures 
resulting from them, certain modiﬁcations, that 
have an positive effect on the reactor stability, have 
been made at Olkiluoto 1 and 2. Steam separa-
tors above the reactor core have been replaced by 
new separators that have a smaller pressure loss. 
Limits have been set for the reactor operation do-
main in such areas of the power-ﬂow map that are 
the most limiting from the standpoint of stability. 
Limits have also been set to the power peaking 
factors in the core. Stability control has also been 
ensured by increasing the efﬁciency of the partial 
scram. Stability is also one of the criteria applied 
when assessing the feasibility of new fuel types for 
use at the Olkiluoto plant units.
The demand that measures must be taken to 
prepare for a complete inoperability of the reactor 
scram system – a situation where control rods can’t 
be inserted into the core by means of the hydrau-
lic scram system nor by electric motors – has also 
been taken into account in the present modernized 
design of the plant. In order to manage the com-
plete failure of reactor scram without fuel failures, 
the reactor power must be quickly limited by con-
trolling the feed water ﬂow and main recircula-
tion pump speed and by pumping boron solution 
into the reactor. To ensure the power limitation, 
modiﬁcations have been made in the protection 
system. These include automatic depressurization 
of the reactor and modiﬁcations in the operation of 
the feed water system and main recirculation and 
boron pumps. The capacity of the boron system has 
also been improved by going over to the use of en-
riched boron and by increasing the concentration of 
the boron solution and the capacity of the pumps.
The objective is to keep the probability of a criti-
cality accident adequately low during the outages 
and the refuelling by strict technical and adminis-
trative limits. The prevention of inadvertent criti-
cality has also been taken into account in the fuel 
storage and handling systems at the plant.
Ensuring primary circuit integrity
The primary circuit of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 includes 
the reactor pressure vessel, the internal main re-
circulation pumps with heat exchangers as well as 
the pipelines and their accessories from the reactor 
pressure vessel down to the outer isolation valves 
of the containment. The components that fall into 
the safety class 1 have been designed according 
to the standard ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel 
Code, Section III.
The integrity of the primary circuit in the nu-
clear power plant may be threatened, if there is a 
transient that causes the circuit pressure and the 
loads arising from local thermal expansion of ma-
terial to exceed the values used in design, or if, as 
a result of plant ageing, the structural materials of 
components degrade uncontrollably due to changes 
in structural properties, thinning of wall thickness, 
fatigue of metal or cracking. Figure A6 presents 
the largest uncontrolled leakage from the primary 
circuit during the operation of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
in comparison with the limit value of Operational 
Limits and Conditions.
In addition to the conditions that prevail dur-
ing operation, anticipated operational transients 
and postulated accidents have been taken into ac-
count in the design of the primary circuit. During 
operation, the circuit is loaded by the temperature 
changes that arise from the start-ups and shut-
downs of the plant units as well as from operation-
al transients that cause changes to the stress state 
of the structures and metal fatigue. Loads arising 
from plant operation are monitored continuously 
Figure A6. The largest uncontrolled leakage from the 
primary circuit during operation of Olkiluoto NPP units 
1 and 2 in comparison with the limit value of Opera-
tional Limits and Conditions.
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and cumulative loads are compared to the values 
used in design. The loads arising from operation 
thus far, have been smaller than designed, and so, 
making an review based on this, the accumulation 
of primary circuit loads does not limit the designed 
operating life of the plant.
There are two different types of valves in the 
relief system, which adds diversity and makes it 
possible to improve the reliability of the entire 
system. The pressure control of the primary cool-
ant system has been implemented according to the 
accident and reliability analyses in a such manner, 
that no signiﬁcant risk of circuit rupture, resulting 
from over pressurisation, is related to the transient 
situations.
The properties of the base material and weld 
seams in the primary circuit may degrade during 
operation due to changes in the structural prop-
erties of the material that are caused by neutron 
radiation, thinning of wall thickness caused by 
corrosion or initiation and propagation of cracks 
resulting from e.g. thermal stresses or stress cor-
rosion.
Embrittlement of the pressure vessel is not a 
similar general problem in boiling water reactors 
as in old pressurised water reactors, because the 
dose of fast neutrons directed at the wall of the 
reactor pressure vessel is considerably smaller in 
boiling water reactors than in pressurised water 
reactors due to a longer distance between the core 
and the wall. Due to the character of boiling wa-
ter reactors, a parallel existence of high thermal 
stresses and stresses caused by pressure is also not 
possible. Due to these reasons the embrittlement of 
the reactor pressure vessel does not limit the oper-
ating life time of the Olkiluoto plant.
Effects of corrosion have been prevented al-
ready in advance by e.g. material selections dur-
ing the plant construction. The reactor pressure 
vessel is made out of low-alloyed MnMoNi steel 
that has been layered with austenitic stainless 
steel weld except for the pump housing, which has 
a low operating temperature. The heat exchang-
ers of the primary circulation pumps, and steam 
lines with their valves are of carbon steel while 
the other components are of high alloyed carbon 
steel or mostly of austenitic stainless steel. Due to 
the high alloyed steel, dry steam or low operating 
temperature, a general corrosion that reduces the 
wall thickness is either rare or non-existent. The 
erosion speed of steam lines is monitored by meas-
uring the wall thickness of the lines regularly. No 
signiﬁcant thinning has been observed, nor is the 
corrosion expected to speed up during the future 
operation.
Intergranular stress corrosion, which has oc-
curred in the heat affected zone of the austenitic 
stainless steel base material beside the weld seam, 
is a problem for boiling water reactors. A narrow 
defect or a crack may initiate in a structure even 
if the thickness of the surrounding wall doesn’t 
become any thinner. A stress corrosion mechanism 
like this requires the parallel existence of three 
factors: a high tensile stress, sensitised material 
and aggressive environment. Tensile stresses to 
material are generated by welding, which causes 
residual stresses that could, at the worst, be in the 
same magnitude with the material’s yield strength. 
Welding arrangements can be used to affect re-
sidual stresses, and this has also been done when 
pipelines have been replaced with materials that 
have a better resistance against stress corrosion. 
Sensitising refers to the degradation of corrosion 
properties of material’s grain boundaries e.g. as a 
result of thermal effect arising from welding. This 
means that a chromium poor zone liable for cor-
rosion, is left in the vicinity of chromium carbide 
precipitates at the grain boundaries. The aggres-
sive effect of the water at operating temperatures 
is aggravated especially by oxygen, which is always 
present in the water of a boiling water reactor due 
to radiolysis. An environmental effect can also be 
aggravated by other impurities in the water. Strict 
requirements have been set for water purity and 
the amount of impurities is monitored continu-
ously.
The intention has been to design the proc-
esses in a such manner, that the lines do not 
become loaded uncontrollably, when ﬂows of dif-
ferent temperatures get mixed. The elimination 
of some mixing items was not possible and they 
are under special monitoring. The condition of the 
primary circuit is monitored in periodical non-de-
structive inspections, which enable the detection 
of possible cracks already in their initiating phase. 
Furthermore, the material properties and the wall 
thickness of primary circuit lines at the Olkiluoto 
plant are such that instead of a fast break a rup-
ture will probably take place gradually, so that it 
can be detected on the basis of measurements as 
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a leakage from the primary circuit to the internal 
space of the containment.
STUK’s review, based on the experience gained 
from the ageing of nuclear power plants, is that the 
risk of a primary circuit break, caused by degrada-
tion of material properties or by growth or accumu-
lation of loads, is not likely to increase signiﬁcantly 
in the future. Since, at the moment, there is rela-
tively little experience at hand from the operation 
of boiling water plants that are over 30 years old, 
the effects of ageing can’t be reliably assessed far 
to the future.
Ensuring containment building integrity
Anticipated operational transients and postulated 
accidents have been taken into account in the de-
sign of containments for Olkiluoto 1 and 2 by di-
mensioning the structures – according to the prac-
tice applied in the western countries – on the basis 
of loads arising from a sudden and complete break 
of the biggest primary circuit line. To condense the 
exiting steam from the primary circuit, the contain-
ment is provided with a condensation pool, where 
the steam is directed by natural mechanisms, and 
with a spray system that is automatically turned 
on in accident situations. To remove the heat that 
is released from the reactor core to the contain-
ment during an accident, the plant units are pro-
vided with the necessary intermediate cooling and 
sea water circuits, by means of which the heat can 
be removed to the ﬁnal heat sink, the sea. The cor-
rect operation of the suppression pool as a steam 
condenser (the pressure suppression principle) is a 
precondition for retaining the containment integ-
rity in connection with accidents involving rupture 
of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
The containments of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 have a 
reinforced concrete structure and their outer walls, 
in addition, have a prestressed structure. The leak 
tightness of the containment in connection with a 
design basis accident is ensured by ﬁtting a steel 
liner, which is, for all parts, protected from jet 
forces and ﬂying objects considered possible in ac-
cident conditions, inside the containment wall. To 
minimise the releases arising from possible seal 
leakage of the penetrations, the containment has 
been placed inside the reactor building. The reac-
tor building is provided with a ventilation system 
that enables the underpressurization of the reactor 
building in relation to its environment and thus a 
controlled collection and ﬁltering of the radioactive 
substances leaking from the primary containment 
in accident conditions. Figure A7 shows the results 
of leakage measurements of isolation valves and 
penetrations of the containment during the annual 
outage periods. The total leakage is presented as a 
percentage of the leakage budget.
In postulated accidents part of the fuel clad-
ding material may become oxidised and cause also 
a hydrogen release. Also the radiation inside the 
reactor causes the water molecules to break down 
into oxygen and hydrogen. To eliminate the ﬁre 
and explosion risk caused by the hydrogen, the 
containments of the Olkiluoto plant are inerted 
with nitrogen during normal operation at power 
except for short periods of time during start ups 
and shutdowns. Furthermore, the containment is 
provided with a separate hydrogen recombination 
system, by the means of which the hydrogen and 
oxygen released by radiolysis during the accident 
can be controllably recombined back to water.
Design criteria that concern the containment 
and relate to the anticipated operational tran-
sients and postulated accidents have not changed 
after the construction of the Olkiluoto plant. The 
uprating of reactor powers at the plant units 
has, however, required some modiﬁcations to the 
containment systems. The uprating of the power 
level affects mostly the functioning of emergency 
heat transfer chain, because the magnitude of the 
decay heat power, to be transmitted during the 
accident, depends directly on the normal power 
level of the plant. Due to the power uprating, the 
capacity of the emergency heat transfer chain has 
been raised by increasing the capacity of heat 
Figure A7. The total leakage rate through the isolation 
valves and penetrations at the Olkiluoto NPP com-
pared to the leakage budget.
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exchangers. Nevertheless, the temperature of the 
condensation pool would exceed the earlier values 
during a pipe break accident. The effect that the 
temperature rise has on the functioning of the 
containment has been analysed by means of scal-
culation, and according to the conducted clariﬁca-
tions the temperature rise doesn’t signiﬁcantly 
increase the risk of loosing the containment leak 
tightness during an accident.
The effects that the plant ageing has thus far 
had on the containment and its systems have been 
relatively small. In the regularly conducted tight-
ness tests of the containment no such increase 
of leaks has been observed that would indicate a 
degradation of sealing materials. To assure the 
functionality of the pressure suppression principle, 
the original seal of the expansion joint between the 
drywell and wetwell has been complemented with 
a new seal structure, which practically eliminates 
the risk for condensation pool bypass in connection 
with accident.
The starting point for design during the con-
struction of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 was that by di-
mensioning the containments against pipe break 
accidents, their integrity could be ensured by an 
adequate certainty also in accidents, where the 
reactor core suffers substantial damage or even 
melts completely. The Harrisburg accident demon-
strated that the loads arising from a pipe break ac-
cident on structures can’t be considered commen-
surate with the possible loads arising from a core 
melt down accident especially in containments, 
where measures against the pipe break accidents 
include different steam condensing systems. The 
Harrisburg accident launched several new inspec-
tions, whose objective was both to clarify the char-
acter and magnitude of loads arising from a severe 
accident and to ﬁnd means for controlling the 
loads. The inspections led to plant modiﬁcations, 
whose implementation was accelerated by the 1986 
Chernobyl accident, which concretely demonstrat-
ed the importance of a functioning containment.
The most signiﬁcant deﬁciencies at the Olkiluoto 
plant containments, from the standpoint of control-
ling severe accidents, have been the small size of 
the containment, which may cause the contain-
ment to pressurise due to the hydrogen and steam 
generation during an accident, and the location of 
the reactor pressure vessel inside the containment, 
which is such that the core melt erupting from the 
pressure vessel may expose the structures and 
penetrations that ensure the tightness of the con-
tainment, to pressure loads and thermal stresses. 
To eliminate these deﬁciencies, the containment is 
e.g. provided with a pressure relief system, by the 
means of which gases that pressurise the contain-
ment can be removed through a ﬁlter designed for 
the purpose, if the pressure inside the contain-
ment threatens to increase too much. The part of 
the containment underneath the reactor pressure 
vessel can be ﬂooded with water in order to protect 
the containment bottom and penetrations from 
the thermal effect of core melt. Some penetrations 
of the containment have been protected from the 
direct effect of core melt also by structural means. 
To ensure the cooling of reactor debris, the plant 
units are also provided with a water ﬁlling system, 
by the means of which the water level inside the 
containment can be raised all the way to the same 
level with the upper edge of the reactor core.
The means for managing severe accidents had 
to be adjusted to the existing design, and so an 
optimal implementation of all chosen solutions was 
not possible.
The cooling of reactor core melt and the protec-
tion of containment penetrations requires that the 
lower dry well of the containment is ﬂooded at such 
an early stage of the accident that if the pressure 
vessel melts through, the erupting core melt falls 
into a deep water pool. When the core melt falls 
into the water a so-called steam explosion, which 
causes a strong and quickly propagating pressure 
wave in the water pool, may occur. A lot of research 
has been done on steam explosions, but it is still 
uncertain, how probable the explosion is, when 
the core melt and water meet, or how powerful the 
explosions may be. Based on inspection results and 
experience gained from e.g. metal industry, the 
possibility of a powerful explosion that causes a 
pressure wave strong enough to rupture the struc-
tures of containment penetrations or personnel 
hatches, can’t be ruled out. To decrease the risk for 
loss of containment integrity due to loads caused 
by steam explosions, the structures of the lower 
equipment hatch have been enforced.
According to the conception that existed, when 
measures to manage severe accidents more effec-
tively were designed, iodine occurs in the contain-
ment during accidents mainly as aerosols, which 
are effectively absorbed in the condensation pool 
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of the containment and in the ﬁlter of the ﬁltered 
venting system. The Chernobyl accident and the 
tests conducted after it have, however, demon-
strated that in unfavourable conditions iodine may 
also form organic compounds that are not easily 
absorbed in the containment or in the ﬁlter. Such 
conditions may occur at the Olkiluoto plant, if the 
water inside the containment is acidiﬁed due to 
chemicals released during the accident. Organic 
iodine may also be generated in the primary cir-
cuit, if iodine reacts with the hydrocarbons that 
are released, when the boron carbide contained in 
the control rods becomes oxidised during the core 
damage. To improve the possibilities for retaining 
organic iodine in the ﬁltered venting system, chem-
icals have been added to the water in the scrubber 
tank of the system. To minimize the formation of 
organic iodine, it is also possible to control the pH 
of the containment water volume.
Ensuring safety functions
Reactivity control
The Olkiluoto plant reactors and their loading, op-
eration and control has been designed and imple-
mented so, that the combined effects of inherent, re-
actor physical feedbacks are always negative or, in 
other words, mitigate the increase of reactor power 
in all operating conditions of the reactor. Due to 
this, disturbances in power will decay even without 
any functioning of active systems. The stability of 
the reactor has also been ensured by means of e.g. 
a partial scram function, which has been designed 
to trip early enough in circumstances in which risk 
for core instability might exist.
The reactor can be shutdown either by the 
control rods that are operated by a pressurised ni-
trogen/hydraulic system and by electric motors, or 
by the boron system, which is used to pump boron 
solution into the reactor. The systems function on 
different principles and are independent from each 
other. Both systems receive automatic commands 
from the reactor protection system, but can also be 
tripped by the operators.
The loading of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 has been de-
signed and the reactors ordinarily operated so 
that the reactor shutdown can be carried out both 
hydraulically and electrically, even if the most ef-
ﬁcient control rod group from the fourteen groups 
is not functioning. Furthermore, it has been dem-
onstrated by analyses that the pressure of the hy-
draulic system is adequate for the shutdown of the 
reactor, even if none of the relief and safety valves 
opened.
Plant modiﬁcations, which ensure that the re-
actor can be shutdown by the boron system alone, 
have been implemented to prepare for a complete 
inoperability of control rods. The single failure 
criterion has been applied in the design of boron 
system as well.
The shutdown systems of the reactor have been 
designed so that in a situation, where electrical 
operating power is lost, the reactor is shutdown 
by the hydraulic system, which pushes the control 
rods into the reactor core. Control rods alone are 
adequate for keeping the reactor subcritical in all 
other operating conditions except possibly in se-
vere accidents.
In a severe accident the control rods melt before 
the fuel rods, and so the reactor may return to criti-
cality, if the core cooling during the core damage 
starts to function again. According to the conduct-
ed analyses, the reactor power exceeds the capacity 
of decay heat removal systems after the reﬂooding 
of the core in the most unfavourable conditions. 
To prevent this from occurring requires that the 
reactor is kept shutdown by pumping boron solu-
tion into it. The modiﬁcations made in the boron 
system, such as the increase of boron concentra-
tion and pumping capacity, improve the capability 
to control reactivity also in severe accidents. The 
capacity increase is, however, still not adequate 
for ensuring the reactivity control in a situation, 
where the reactor core is reﬂooded after the con-
trol rods have melted and the boron pumped into 
the pressure vessel escapes because of leaks or an 
error in adjustment of the reactor water level. It 
can be assumed that leaks underneath the core 
are produced mostly during the maintenance of 
the main circulation pumps. TVO has reduced the 
core damage risk arising from the aforementioned 
issues by modifying work related instructions and 
the Technical Speciﬁcations. The risk arising from 
the adjustment error of water level can, on the 
other hand, be reduced by assuring the correct 
and reliable operation of the reactor water level 
monitoring. Possibilities for improving the reli-
ability of the reactor water level measurement are 
constantly being investigated.
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Decay heat removal
The decay heat removal at the Olkiluoto plant has 
been designed so, that the decay heat released in 
accident conditions is transferred as water and 
steam from the primary circuit through the pres-
sure relief system to the wet well of the contain-
ment, which can, at an early stage, store all the de-
cay heat released from the fuel. Sooner or later the 
heat must be removed from the containment with 
active equipment by circulating the containment 
water in the spray system, from where the heat 
is transferred through the heat exchangers to the 
intermediate cooling system and sea water system 
and then to the ﬁnal heat sink, the sea.
A controlled decay heat removal in accident 
conditions requires that the pressure of the prima-
ry circuit and the water level in the reactor can be 
controlled by means of the measurements as well 
as by the feed water, emergency cooling water and 
pressure relief systems. These systems have been 
designed according to a principle that it must be 
possible to carry out a safety function also in a sit-
uation, where any single device is inoperable and 
simultaneously any other device affecting safety is 
not in use due to repair or maintenance (so-called 
N+2 criterion). This requirement has been fulﬁlled 
by implementing the process and measuring sys-
tems in question as four redundant sub-systems. 
Electrical power is supplied to each subsystem 
from four separate and independent diesel-backed 
alternating current buses. Subsystems are ordinar-
ily situated in different rooms to prevent common 
cause failures. An exception is made in certain 
premises of the reactor building, where two paral-
lel subsystems are situated in a same room contra-
ry to the requirements set forth in the Guide YVL 
1.0. The objective has been to locate the systems as 
far from each other as possible and separate them 
with distinct shields in such places, where ensuring 
the separation has been found necessary. In order 
to improve especially the ﬁre safety, TVO has also 
modiﬁed the sprinkler and ﬁre alarming systems of 
the main transformer and plant transformers.
Systems that take part in controlling the pres-
sure and surface level of the primary circuit have 
been designed mainly by following the diversity 
principle, according to which crucial safety func-
tions shall be ensured by systems, whose operating 
principles or technical solutions differ from each 
other. Water level measuring system, where all 
measurements are realized with the same tech-
nique, is an exception. TVO follows the research 
and development work – done in the ﬁeld – whose 
objective is to create a functioning and reliable 
water level measuring system that is based on an 
alternative technique.
Severe accidents were not taken into account in 
the original design basis for controlling the water 
inventory and the pressure of the primary circuit. 
Ensuring the pressure control in severe accidents 
is particularly important, in order to avoid the 
pressure vessel melt-through and the loads arising 
from it to the containment, when the pressure of 
the circuit is high. TVO has made modiﬁcations, 
which ensure that two of the valves of the over-
pressure protection system stay open also in con-
nection with severe accidents.
The original design basis for the heat removal 
from the containment did not require the fulﬁl-
ment of the diversity principle, and the Olkiluoto 
plant doesn’t fulﬁl the aforementioned require-
ment at the moment. There are no such technical 
solutions in the immediate sight that would make 
it possible to equip the Olkiluoto plant with decay 
heat removal systems that are separate from the 
current systems and that are based on a different 
functioning principle. Continuous research work 
is, however, being done in the ﬁeld to develop new-
fashioned active and passive systems.
Containment
The task of the containment is to prevent the dis-
persion of ﬁssion products that may escape from 
the fuel during an accident, to the environment. 
The precondition for stopping the dispersion of ﬁs-
sion products is that the containment can be iso-
lated in an accident situation so that it forms a gas 
and water tight boundary between the fuel and the 
environment, and that the containment maintains 
its leak-tightness during the entire accident.
The containments of the Olkiluoto plant are de-
signed so that in an accident the process penetra-
tions going through the containment walls can be 
closed with isolation valves. There are usually two 
isolation valves: one outside and the other inside 
the containment. Certain penetrations that are not 
connected to the primary circuit or directly to the 
inner space of the containment as well as instru-
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mentation lines, where the possibility of a leak is, 
in addition to the isolation valve, also limited by 
transmitters that can endure the pressures and 
temperatures generated in severe accidents, are 
provided with one isolation valve.
Loading mechanisms that may occur during 
severe accidents haven’t been taken particularly 
into account in the original design of contain-
ments at the Olkiluoto plant units, but the con-
tainments are dimensioned based on pipe break 
accidents. Due to this there has been and still is, 
despite the performed plant modiﬁcations, some 
deﬁciencies in the design of containments at the 
Olkiluoto plant concerning the preparedness for 
severe accidents.
Severe Accident Management 
in the Olkiluoto NPP
The main provisions for severe accident manage-
ment were installed in Olkiluoto 1 and 2 during 
the SAM project which was ﬁnished in 1989. The 
measures implemented were
• containment overpressure protection
• containment ﬁltered venting
• lower drywell ﬂooding from wetwell
• containment penetration shielding in lower dry-
well
• containment water ﬁlling from external source
• containment instrumentation for severe acci-
dent control
• Emergency Operating Procedures for severe ac-
cidents.
Subsequent development of the accident manage-
ment proceduresand additional minor plant modi-
ﬁcations at Olkiluoto plant have taken place dur-
ing the years when new aspects on the issue have 
emerged.
Containment pH
A large amount of chlorine, which could be con-
verted to HCl in the containment, could reduce 
the pH of the water pools and wet surfaces. The 
chlorine originates from the synthetic rubbers used 
as insulation in cables. This could lead to a signiﬁ-
cant amount of elemental as well as organic iodine. 
Another source of organic iodine could be reactions 
between boron carbide in control rods, steam and 
iodine in the degrading core.
TVO has implemented a system for controlling 
the pH of the containment as part of severe ac-
cident management. The function of the system is 
based on addition of NaOH to the ﬁre ﬁghting wa-
ter reservoir which is used for ﬁlling of the contain-
ment in post-accident conditions.The lower drywell 
will be ﬂooded from the wetwell prior to the NaOH 
supply and the lower drywell water pool pH will be 
kept above 7.
Energetic ex-vessel fuel coolant interactions
TVO has investigated the response of concrete 
structures in the containment to energetic fuel 
coolant interactions, steam explosions, and the re-
sult is that they would withstand large steam ex-
plosion loads. The enforcement of the structures of 
the equipment and personnel access hatch in the 
lower drywell has already been mentioned.
Primary system depressurization 
in severe accidents
To secure depressurisation of the reactor primary 
system in severe accident situations and to prevent 
a new pressurisation of the reactor, two valves of 
the relief system have been modiﬁed. It is now 
possible to keep the valves open with the help of 
nitrogen supply or water supply from outside the 
containment.
